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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 14

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 9 THROUGH 43

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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(20v)

Mrs. R.E. Wells
Jan 16, 1953

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
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HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina	

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

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(After January 14, 1946)

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JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1-----	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2-----	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3-----	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4-----	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5-----	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6-----	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7-----	172 11-17-45	301	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8-----	233 11-19-45	301	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A-----	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B-----	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C-----	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D-----	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9-----	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10-----	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11-----	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12-----	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13-----	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14-----	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15-----	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16-----	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A-----	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B-----	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17-----	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18-----	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19-----	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20-----	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21-----	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22-----	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 16@115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A-----	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B-----	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C-----	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D-----	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Wells and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23-----	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24-----	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25-----	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26-----	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1883.
29-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008.
30-----	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11-28-45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (070645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42-----	990 12-5-45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43-----	997 12-5-45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44-----	1001 12-5-45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45-----	1019 12-5-45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46-----	1027 12-5-45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47-----	1041 12-5-45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850"; dispatch 300850 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48-----	1044 12-5-45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48-A-----	2093 12-31-45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49-----	1053 12-6-45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).
50-----	1053 12-6-45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

51	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64-----	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65-----	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66-----	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (961255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67-----	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68-----	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69-----	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70-----	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71-----	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72-----	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73-----	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74-----	1703 12-15-45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74-A-----	2768 1-19-46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75-----	1705 12-15-45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76-----	1709 11-15-45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77-----	1712 12-15-45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78-----	1724 12-17-45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79-----	1724 12-17-45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80-----	1724 12-17-45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81-----	1724 12-17-45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82-----	1728 12-17-45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83-----	1754 12-17-45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (Ø31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84-----	1775 12-17-45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85-----	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86-----	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87-----	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88-----	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89-----	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90-----	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91-----	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92-----	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93-----	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94-----	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95-----	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander. <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	2479 1-5-46	2333	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114-----	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115-----	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A----	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District, "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B----	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116-----	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117-----	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A----	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118-----	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119-----	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120-----	2559 1-16-46	2721	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121-----	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122-----	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123-----	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124-----	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125-----	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126-----	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127-----	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128-----	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129-----	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130-----	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Taiwan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131-----	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132-----	2917 1-21-46	2943	<p>Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript):</p> <p>(a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941";</p> <p>(b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941";</p> <p>(c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."</p>
132-A-----	5137 2-20-46	2946	<p>Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.</p>
133-----	2965 1-23-46	2953	<p>Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.</p>
134-----	2965 1-23-46	3124	<p>Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.</p>
135-----	2965 1-23-46	3171	<p>Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.</p>
136-----	2966 1-23-46	3187	<p>Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.</p>
137-----	2966 1-23-46	3187	<p>Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.</p>
138-----	2976 1-23-46	3195	<p>Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)</p>

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139-----	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140-----	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141-----	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142-----	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A----	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B----	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C----	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D----	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143-----	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144-----	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145-----	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146-----	3332	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147-----	3332	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148-----	3332	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149-----	3332	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150-----	3333	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151-----	3335	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152-----	3351	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153-----	3353	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154-----	3430	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155-----	3435	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156-----	3436	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157-----	3441	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158-----	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159-----	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160-----	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161-----	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A----	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162-----	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A----	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163-----	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164-----	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165-----	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166-----	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178-----	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179-----	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180-----	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181-----	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182-----	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183-----	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Utah</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 9

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Selected Letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson

1. 18 January 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
2. 26 January 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
3. 16 February 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
4. 8 March 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
5. 11 March 1940 to Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
6. 15 March 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
7. 8 April 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
8. 7 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
9. 13 May 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
10. 22 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
11. 22 May 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
12. 27 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
13. 22 June 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
14. 22 June 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark (with enclosures)
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16. 24 September 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
17. 1 October 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
18. 9 October 1940 memo from Admiral Richardson for Admiral Stark
19. 22 October 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
20. 12 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson (with enclosures)
21. 22 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
22. 28 November 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
23. 17 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
24. 23 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson (with enclosures)
25. 30 December 1940 from Admiral Bloch via Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
26. 7 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
27. 25 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
28. 10 February 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson

18 JANUARY 1940.

DEAR JOE: AS of possible interest to you I am enclosing the General Board's report on organization of the Navy Department. Will be glad to get your comments if and when you get time.

I will drop entirely the question of Captain Smith coming to the PENNSYLVANIA for the purpose of acquiring CincC background on war plans.

Before he starts East I will ask him to ask you for an appointment so that you may send back any general thoughts you may wish to of a confidential nature which would be useful to all of us. In this connection I have a letter from Tommy Hart, just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch, and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will; that is my only reason for existing here. Incidentally by officer messenger or otherwise, I would be glad to know what your thoughts are in that connection so that I may be in harmony and may be able to transmit them to higher authority if they should be asked.

Hope the Army Maneuvers have been greatly beneficial. The President is intensely interested in our working closely with them in all ways, and the pull-together here in the Department is very close.

Best wishes to you all as ever

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
J. S. PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

26 Jan. 1940.

EWB
A

Dear Betty:

The remarks in your letter of 18 Jan about the situation in the Far East, the possibility of something breaking without warning and my need to be mentally prepared are somewhat disquieting.

When the China incident started and on every opportunity until after I left the job as head PNO I used to say to Bill Leahy "Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to be drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us in the lurch."

There is a possibility that this constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

When this understanding was reached it had some value but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about $2\frac{1}{2}$ continents.

I strongly feel that you should repeatedly impress on the boss that an Orange war would probably last some years and cost much money, my guess is 5 to 10 years 35 to 70 billion dollars.

I have always thought that our Orange plan was chiefly useful as an exercise in War Planning, to train officers in War Planning and to serve as a basis for asking for 16

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
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appropriations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its shore facilities as to actually executing the O plan I hope we will never be called on to do that unless the Administration fully realizes the probable cost and duration of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support an expensive war of long duration.

Even if we could take Truk What would we have a secure anchorage, nothing else, several thousand miles from our nearest drydock and adequate repair facilities and still hundred of miles from the enemy country. Of course it could not be taken without some underwater damage. In actually put on real pressure we would have to have a real base that would take many years and much money. We ought not to go into a thing like this unless we expected to see it through.

I hesitate to write you because the written word is so easily mis understood, also I do not know what your ideas are, what you are letting the base, what is the meaning of our diplomatic moves, or our Senatorial talks, or our neutrality patrol. But you are the principal and only Naval advisor to the race and he should know that our Fleet ¹¹² ¹¹² ¹¹² can not just sail away like soap and be back at home in a year or so. Also the probable cost of any war should be compared the probable value of winning the war.

When we commissioned the San Diego DDs we used the facilities of San Diego, Brea, Lethem DD Tenders, etc

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working farther from active DDs and their tenders and Mare Island yard. I think that an excellent job was done but if it had been a real mobilization, all of these activities would have been fully occupied. How long would it have taken Ensigns to have done this and its other mobilization work without any outside assistance? A war plan if it is to be executed should be based on realities.

All of this letter may be needless but I know that if you do not tell the force what you really know and feel about the probable cost and duration of an Orange Ware Nobody will

I would hate to see our leaders make a move from which they could not gracefully withdraw, and which would eventually force us into a war, half heartily supported by our country. In other words before the Nation takes a step I hope we will carefully examine the direction we are heading, where we will eventually go and be prepared to resolutely pursue the course whatever the cost.

I will finish this letter after I see Alex. Sharp and send it to you by him.

1 Feb.

I have seen Sharp and he has told me about his work on this trip.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S S PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

The Minor Joint Bureau and Brigade have
been completed. There was no evidence of any
friction or discord. The Bureau certainly led the
Army to believe that the Navy is highly efficient.

There is danger that many erroneous conclusions
will be drawn from this exercise. If course in actual
war we could not have done any thing like using
all boats from 13 Boats, Lts & LAs for landing. The
boats would not have been on board and ships
could not have come on shore and I appeal for
25 men while towing boats. There was no sea, no
surf and nothing but ideal weather.

If we ever do anything like this again I hope
we have adequate warning, plenty of time, and
super supervision.

!! we sending this by Land Cante.

Sincerely

-- Richardson

23 Feb

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

C.N.O.

I have not answered
this -

Mundy - had a letter
from Andrews and wrote
him the substance of my
letter to Taffinder -

Then later sent him a
copy of my letter to
Taffinder -

In my opinion further
reply is not necessary
unless to say that
Mundy has written to
Andrews -

R. L. G.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipAIRMAIL
PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIALSan Pedro, California
16 February 1940*OPNAV
J*Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Betty:

Today I received a despatch from Andrews, a copy of which is enclosed, urging that the information in regard to the change of home ports of vessels of the Hawaiian Detachment be released for publication. This is requested in order that the maximum number of unoccupied houses and apartments at Honolulu may be overhauled and made available for occupancy. I felt constrained to reply negative.

The delicacy with which you must handle this matter is fully appreciated; and the reasons for your negative reply to my previous despatch requesting that the security classification of the despatch changing the home ports of these ships (Opnav 031811 of February 1940) be lowered are fully understood.


It seems to me, however, that the provision of acceptable living accommodations will be highly conducive to contentment and morale. Therefore, I request that the restriction on publicity be eliminated as early as you deem it advisable, and that Andrews and I be informed by despatch.

It may be of interest to you to know that the fact that the home ports of these vessels have been changed appeared in the Los Angeles Times of 4 February under a Honolulu date line, and was subsequently copied in Long Beach and San Diego papers as shown by the enclosure.

It appears that this matter is widely known now, but in view of the restrictions on publicity Andrews probably feels that he can not officially urge private interests in Honolulu to prepare houses for the occupancy of Naval personnel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,


J. O. RICHARDSON

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA, 8 March 1940.

*Personal**Confidential*

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,

Chief of Naval Operations,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BETTY: I am forwarding today, by air mail, my recommendation regarding a relief for the U. S. S. AUGUSTA. I find, in making this recommendation, that I am in a position in which I frequently find myself, in that I do not know all the points that should be considered in reaching a decision. For example:

(a) I do not know what considerations led to the assignment of Commander Scouting Force to command the Hawaiian Detachment, but if there were reasons controlling at that time there probably has been no change.

(b) I do not know why we have a Hawaiian Detachment, but if it has any relation to existing plans as stated in my official letter I think it should be commanded by Commander Cruisers.

(c) I do not know how much weight is attached to the necessity of having a cruiser available for the President, and I do not know whether he insists on having the HOUSTON so available, or whether another ship would be equally acceptable.

Andrews recommended that Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, shift to the HOUSTON and remain in command of Cruiser Division FOUR with the Hawaiian Detachment, and that the present Commander Cruiser Division FOUR shift to the LOUISVILLE or CHESTER in command of Cruiser Division FIVE, and return to the West Coast with that division, and that the AUGUSTA be assigned to Crudiv FIVE.

It does not seem logical to me to have both Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, and Commander Scouting Force, in the Hawaiian Detachment. As things now exist, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, frequently sends recommendations to me in order [2] to save time, with copies to Commander Scouting Force, and Commander Scouting Force frequently makes recommendations affecting the cruisers without having the recommendations of Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.

Any number of solutions could be suggested and any one that you select will be acceptable to me because I have made what appeared to me to be a logical recommendation, but I have no personal pride in it, and any solution will work. However, the easiest one that would not disturb existing conditions would be to send the HOUSTON out as temporary relief of the AUGUSTA, and have the AUGUSTA return to China after her overhaul.

In any event, there will be no heavy cruiser with the Fleet for several months this summer while Cruiser Division FIVE is undergoing overhaul, and I know that both Bloch and I feel that there should be two divisions of heavy cruisers with the Fleet.

I do not know why Cruiser Division SEVEN is retained with the Atlantic Squadron. Consequently, I have made no recommendations or requests that that division rejoin the Fleet. Neither have I recommended that one of the divisions now in the Hawaiian Detachment return with the Fleet.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipPERSONAL
CONFIDENTIALSan Pedro, California
11 March 1940

Dear Betty:

In going over the memorandum you enclosed with your letter of 12 February (Subject: Defense of the Fleet against attack by aircraft), my first reaction was somewhat similar to Admiral Bloch's, that is, no harm can come from letting the General Board consider the comprehensive agenda contemplated - although at the same time there arose in my mind a question as to how much good might result from such an undertaking. In justice to the serious thought that has gone into the preparation of the memorandum and its enclosure, I have given the matter detailed study and my general conclusions are as follows:

(a) The General Board is well within its intended scope in studying all matters relating to improvements in armament. I believe that it has generally been understood that the General Board would deal principally with major characteristics, although it is understandable that full treatment of major characteristics may require varying degrees of consideration of details of batteries and fire control equipment.

(b) In my opinion the General Board would be stepping outside its intended scope if it were to consider matters immediately connected with details of training and operation of existing personnel, ships, and equipment. I say this with the realization that article 402 of the Navy Regulations uses the very words "organization, maintenance, training, and operation", which might be invoked to refute my opinion. However, I choose to believe that the terms "system of principles" and "general terms" used in the same article do not contemplate treatment of all of the phases and details included in the proposed agenda.

Applying these general conclusions to the several sub-heads of the proposed agenda, I consider items to be matters appropriate or otherwise for the General Board's specific consideration and recommendation, as follows:

The Fleet.

Treatment of none of these items by the General Board is either necessary or desirable. All are actively under consideration within the Fleet. As you will know, the re-✓

-1-

¹ Subsequent pages of this letter, upon investigation, appear not to be in existence.

Confidential

15 MARCH 1940.

DEAR J. O.: I am somewhat at a loss as to just how to answer your questions (a), (b) and (c) in your letter of 8 March.

I do not know whether Bloch left his personal file of correspondence between him and me, for you to read over or whether he talked it over with you. The background for sending the Hawaiian Detachment was for the most part contained in this personal correspondence.

One of the first questions which was brought to me after I took over this job was the possible reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet which had been requested by Admiral Hart. This reinforcement was to be preferably, according to Hart's request, a division of heavy cruisers. His second choice was a division of light cruisers. The situation in the Shanghai Settlement in regard to control of that area was tense. The situation in Tientsin, especially in regard to British Japanese relations, was critical. The war in Europe was breaking. We wanted to do what we could for Hart, strengthen the State Department's hands, and at the same time not weaken our own position.

I looked into the question of our War Plans, especially as to the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan for an Orange campaign. This seemed to meet a strategic situation in the Pacific in a manner by which Hart would be supported by naval deployment, and the Commander-in-Chief would still have close control over all units of the Fleet.

The result was that on 8 September I wrote to Bloch and made the suggestion of sending a detachment to Hawaii, but only after I had talked it over with the President and the okayed it one hundred percent; as did the State Department.

There were several despatches back and forth (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1225, CinCUS 0023-1255, all of September), and also one or two telephone calls. Bloch recommended that Andrews be in command; he also recommended that my first suggestion of moving the submarines to Hawaii be held up; I concurred in both recommendations. Admiral Bloch was opposed to sending any more cruisers to the Asiatic. They were not sent.

We did reinforce the Asiatic by one tender, one squadron of patrol planes and six new submarines. The Hawaiian Detachment fits in with the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan Orange.

When the time came for the Hawaiian Detachment to go, a proposed press release as drawn up showing the reason to be "For the purpose of facilitating training operations." The President finally said: "Do not release it to the press."

Hardly had the Detachment arrived in Hawaii when the question of rotation came up. After a good deal of correspondence back and forth we took the bull by the horns and sent out our directive in regard to this question (CNO Serial 938 or 4 January 1940). Of course the question of home ports and transportation of dependents was a big item in arriving at the final decision.

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the Mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

I find that in the above I have more or less covered your paragraphs (a) and (b). I cannot help but feel that a Vice Admiral should be in command of the Hawaiian Detachment. He would probably command the above force prescribed in War Plans. Administration may be difficult but it will be more difficult in war and means should be developed to offset this difficulty.

In regard to your question (c), of course I don't know whether the President will go to the Coast before his term of office expires or not, but I think the chances are that he very probably will; in fact he intended to go last October and couldn't. At that time he told the people in San Francisco that he would try and come at a later date. My guess is that if world conditions will permit his leaving Washington you will see him sometime before Winter on the West Coast with the desire for a fishing trip, or more possibly a desire to go to Alaska which he has so often expressed. A cruiser force flagship or its equal will be required, because the President will doubtless want to take someone with him. When he went to the

Canal Zone in the TUSCALOOSA he was comfortable but he had cut down his entourage to the minimum.

In regard to the relief of the AUGUSTA, I have received your official letter and we are now making a careful study of it from all angles and hope to find a solution which will be satisfactory in the main to both ends.

The decision to retain one division of CAs in the Atlantic was made after considerable discussion with the President. Some would have two divisions. I held one division is enough, supplemented as it is by a couple of CLs. With the general requirement of two cruisers in the Caribbean and two on the North Atlantic Coast, we cannot well do with less. For the time being at least we will have to retain one division of CAs on this side.

I will be glad to get your reply to my letter on the CL Force Flagship. Personally I do not see it—but I am prepared to do what you want.

Every good wish as always and best of luck.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania,"
San Pedro, California.

P. S.—Mr. Edison expects to leave Washington on 26 March and join the Fleet 1 April; leave Hawaii in NASHVILLE 15 April, arrive San Francisco 20 April; inspect San Diego about 24 April and return to Washington about 28 April. I do hope you can acquaint him with the Navy on this trip. Deyo will take up the details on his arrival in the West, etc. and you will be acquainted with them later.

8 APRIL 1940.

DEAR JO: I have just been glancing over your letter of 8 February to Admiral Nimitz to check my memory on one of your questions as follows: I did it because of some information which came in this morning.

(a) Is "CinCus facing trouble in the Western Pacific" so surely as to warrant giving that consideration greater weight in the preparation of the flag slate than the usual peacetime considerations of training flag officers for higher command: If so, the best should be kept at, or ordered to sea.

I believe Nimitz answered your letter but was not able to answer the above question. I want now to answer that question with an emphatic affirmative. I believe the situation in the Far East is continually deteriorating so far as our relations with Japan are concerned. I may be unduly pessimistic but I do want to communicate my thoughts for what they are worth and I might add they are backed by some pretty concrete evidence. I think you should continually keep uppermost in your mind the possibility of trouble in the Orient, and the means to meet it.

The President has been troubled with a bad cold and we are about two weeks overdue in an appointment with him; however, we are hoping we will have it within the next few days and after he has agreed to the topside slate we will send you his desires for your further recommendations lower down.

I am also in hearty accord with the last paragraph of your letter and to save you the trouble of checking I am quoting it:

"If the eminence of trouble does not outweigh other considerations, I think that the most promising material for high command should be given adequate sea experience at the expense of the less promising, and that a long range plan should be prepared with a view to having the best possible available with recent Fleet experience and with adequate time to serve when those now in high position in the Fleet step out of the picture."

Here's hoping the Maneuvers are highly beneficial from every standpoint.

Every good wish as always,

/s/ BETTY.

[Copy of Mr. Edison's letter of 5/7 enclosed]

Confidential

Mailed 5/8/40 to catch clipper of 5/14
7 MAY 1940.

DEAR J. O.: Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian Waters for a couple of weeks.

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the Fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the Fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaiian Waters. This will present somewhat of a problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement and unless you hear to the contrary you may assume it okay.

I am glad you want to run East to have a talk in the Department. Had you not suggested it, I would have myself. We have been making some close examinations into the War Plans recently and I remarked at the time I wished you could have been present. I trust your arrival here will not be delayed over about two weeks, beyond what it normally would have been.

Of course you know the thought behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then - - - ???? nobody can answer the riddle just now.

I am still hopeful that our Expansion Bill will go through. The Appropriation Bill has also to be acted on. Other than these two items nothing of particular interest that I can think of for the moment from the Fleet standpoint.

I hope to get money for elevation of the NEW YORK, TEXAS and ARKANSAS guns. My feeling is that these ships are of little use as is, and that even if they have to be out of the Fleet under overhaul at a critical time, we should go ahead with them. Do you concur?

Am also looking into the question of one or two more flag officers in Atron which I believe you desire.

Am delighted you are able to give War Plans your personal attention. Personally I think it is one of our most important jobs.

I don't know how you feel about it, but I have always felt that CincUS was loaded up with too much in the way of material matters and administration; and that in general material matters should not go beyond type commanders, at least as far as routine items are concerned. For example if Comdesbatfor wants to find out something about his destroyers, he can send for Comdesbatfor tell him, or better still, let Comdesbatfor write him or see him frequently enough to keep him in general touch. It seems to me force commanders should not have to sign or even think about the thousand and one material details which must detract from their more important duties; let the type commanders do this.*

I know you have a tough job in submitting the names of six rear admirals from among whom three may be earmarked for furlough. I have got to do the same myself. If you and Peck agree it will automatically make it easier. I just mentioned to the President the advisability of appointing the three of us to constitute a board to actually meet and make this recommendation. This would take away any political repercussions so far as the President is concerned. However, he didn't take to this idea and said all he wanted was to be told verbally the names.

With best wishes as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

*This is just thinking out loud—but I would like to talk this over with you when you are here.

Cinc File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship*From
H*Pearl Harbor, T. H.
May 13, 1940

Dear Betty:

When Hill was detached last January he took with him to Washington some ideas, largely Bloch's, as to what might be acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, (under the assumptions then made, to serve as a start from which Op-12 would develop basic assumptions to be officially transmitted, within a few weeks, to the Commander-in-Chief for use in making plans.

During a recent conference in the Twelfth Naval District it was brought out that we were woefully short of 5"-38 caliber ammunition at Mare Island.

I am unable to grasp the meaning of Opnav dispatch 112130 sent at 1630 last Saturday, but we are guessing that the Department has tentatively approved, with minor exceptions, the contents of the memorandum prepared for me by Hill, and that the Department will correct the ammunition situation at Mare Island.

*being
taken
care
of*

The assumptions under which the Hill memorandum was drawn up and under which all other operations in the Western Pacific have previously been considered, are today all different. Previous assumptions and estimates of the situation no longer hold.

It seems that, under present world conditions, the paramount thing for us is the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything -- anything certainly in the Far East, our own or other interests.

South America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed. Until the outcome in Europe can be more clearly seen, security in the Western Hemisphere seems to be the most important consideration for us.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital.


If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.

Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I want you to know that if the situation becomes such that higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.

These are some of the things I wanted to talk to you about, and since I can not see you, I feel that I am duty bound to write you.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,



Please acknowledge receipt by despatch.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

P.S. On 9 April I sent Andrews with a detachment in to simulate a raiding force against Pearl Harbor, to serve as an object for attack by our patrol planes and Army bombers. Andrews reported sighting Navy patrol planes, but he did not see any Army bombers.

Today we were picked up by our patrol planes about 0630, but we did not see any Army bombers. However, our submarines made several successful attacks from fairly short ranges. We had a heavy swell with white caps so that it was difficult to see the submarines.

While the Secretary was on board, one of the SARA-TOGA'S fighting planes had a forced landing close aboard. The plane sank, but the Reserve Ensign was recovered without his even getting his feet wet.

Today one of the LEXINGTON bombing planes (SEU) had a forced landing. The plane sank, but the pilot and passenger were recovered with slight injuries.

The PENNSYLVANIA should anchor in Lahaina about 1700.



H. R. S.

Serial 013212

22 MAY 1940.

Secret

DEAR JOE: When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. I also realize events may change this picture and possibly over night.

With regard to the specific questions raised in your letter of 13 May, the Joint Plan for Rainbow Two is about complete, and a copy of it, including the studies upon which it is based, will go to you shortly by officer messenger. This Joint Plan embraces in general all the basic assumptions listed in the memorandum Hill brought East. The joint tasks of this plan will require the operation of the Fleet in general with the fleet tasks set up in Hill's memorandum.

I think these assumptions are about the best upon which a basic plan of this nature can be promised, although in any preliminary operating plan which you may prepare at present, I think you should assume the present strength and disposition of the Fleet, in order to develop the problem from a practical basis.

As you get time in these strenuous days, I believe it would be advisable for you to go ahead with the preparation of a tentative Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow Two, as we are most anxious to have the benefit of your detailed study of the difficulties involved, and the logistic and other requirements.

I wish you would keep constantly in mind the possibility of a complete collapse of the Allies, including the loss of their fleets. A very probable development of such a catastrophe is visualized in the Rainbow One Plan. Should the Allied fleets pass into the hands of the Germans, however, an entirely different, and far more serious situation would exist. I would appreciate your views regarding the best disposition of fleet forces in such an event.

Regarding the 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition we have realized the deficiency, and, as you probably know, Ordnance has now arranged for shipment of 20,000 rounds on the PYRO. We understand that this will complete the first increment of the mobilization supply on board and will give some room for target practice ammunition. It is my understanding that there will still be enough on shore on the West Coast and in Hawaii to meet mobilization requirements. I would be glad if you would confirm this.

I find that the 6 inch 47 caliber reserve supply on the West Coast is not what it should be. There are 6,000 shells out there and I have requested the Bureau of Ordnance to send a like quantity of powder by rail.

We are taking up the question of another Flag Officer in ATRON which you suggested. We hope to put this in effect in the near future; the idea being to assign this officer as Commander Destroyers Atlantic Squadron. Present plan is to rig up something on the DENEbola for him to use as an Administrative Flag Ship and then assign ad interim one of the new 1500 ton destroyers as a Tactical Flag Ship with the idea of recalling from the Fleet the SAMPSON (which seems most logical choice) or another 1850 destroyer to take the place of this new 1500 tonner tentatively assigned. On account of the anti-aircraft armament on the 1500 tonners I feel that the 1500 tonner would be more valuable to you than the SAMPSON, and at the same time the SAMPSON would give a little more room for Flag Quarters and Operating Staff accommodations. I do not want to tie up another cruiser as a separate Flag Ship. I sometimes feel there has been too much of this already. This seems to be the best solution for the problem, unless you can suggest a better one.

In regard to the disposition of cruisers I feel that the ST. LOUIS and HELENA should join the Fleet as soon as they are out of the Yard. They should get Fleet Training. They are valuable units to you. If we take them out of the Atlantic and send them to the Pacific I must replace them. Under the present situation the reduction in cruiser strength as it is, should, if anything, be augmented. There are two possible solutions: one, to assign Rowcliff and Cruiser Division FIVE to the Atlantic. This would give two heavy cruiser Divisions in the Hawaiian Detachment and two in the Atlantic. The other is to send Fletcher's Division, Cruiser Division THREE, to the Atlantic which would give one heavy Cruiser Division and one light Cruiser Division in the Atlantic, but would reduce

your Light Cruiser strength by one Division and would give you a total of three heavy cruiser divisions in the Pacific. Of course as soon as the TRENTON comes home from Europe we will have her overhauled and she will be available for duty where most needed in the Atlantic or Pacific in case either Cruiser Division THREE or FIVE is sent to the Atlantic. Please let me have your perfectly frank reaction to the above by dispatch (supplemented by air mail if you so desire).

You may draw back at the thought of reducing your cruiser strength at this time in the Pacific. This I can believe might well be your inclination,—as it would be mine. But, as I indicated above, the changing situation may push the decision one way or the other. In fact the picture may change by the time you get this letter to the extent that it may be necessary to send a real component of the Fleet to the Atlantic much as we would hate to do so and thus divide our forces.

The ST. LOUIS is due to be completed in Norfolk 15 July. The HELENA in New York, 9 July.

Th situation in some of the Southe American countries gives real cause for concern—and I say this advisedly. *If* Germany should win—then *what*????

Wish I could see you—and if the pressure here—day and night ever lets up—I hope to fly out.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Please acknowledge by dispatch.

Have literally lived on the Hill—State Dept.— & White House for last several days. Thank God yesterday I finally swung support for 170,000 men and 34,000 marines. Lots still in the mill—but I hope coming.

I hope to commission the remaining 35 DDs, 3 AOs & 36 SS—another personnel nightmare for the fleet—but I simply couldn't do it before.

Here's hopin.

BETTY.

CinC File No.

1. a lot of work has been

**UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship**

CONFIDENTIAL

OB

Lahaina Roads, T. H.
22 May 1940

Dear Betty:

(?) As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know not about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on. For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

- (a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, air fields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered. *none*
- (b) Are we here as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion. *how?*

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet. If only peacetime training is involved should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

✓ The answer to your proposal to retain the ENTERPRISE at San Diego is dependent upon the answer to the above questions.

I am returning to Pearl Harbor with the Fleet on 24 May to remain until 10 June for upkeep. During the first week of this period, on the assumption that we are here for normal peacetime training, I will complete a survey of what is available and what are the minimum additional requirements in the way of:

Auxiliary air fields	Airplane services
Targets	Athletic fields and facilities
Tugs	Provisions
Utility planes	Fuel

Upon completion of this survey I may recommend a reduction in the number of carriers to be maintained in this area and I will probably request the allocation of funds for immediate work on auxiliary air fields and athletic fields and facilities.

Based on this survey and additional information from you, I may modify my orders regarding the shifting of tugs, tenders, targets, and utility planes from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.

At present the following are under orders to proceed to Pearl Harbor leaving the West Coast in June (except UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, which are to come upon completion of overhaul in July or August):

- (a) Entire utility wing, including drone squadron, less Atron units and less minimum base units for continued overhaul, and for acceptance of new units (chiefly new drones). This amounts to approximately 40 planes and 300 personnel. The sufficiency of present facilities for repair and operation of these is questionable. However, without practically all the utility wing present in this area it is certain that the gunnery schedule of the Fleet will be seriously curtailed.
- (b) Three battle towing targets and four series 60 high speed sleds, and a number of series 40 high speed sleds, are to be towed or carried to the Hawaiian area by Base Force tugs and other Base Force vessels noted in (c) and (d).
- (c) MEDUSA, MELVILLE, WHITNEY, DORSEY, ELLIOT, and UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, on completion of overhaul.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipCONFIDENTIAL

(d) One oil barge and one garbage lighter, and five tugs.


✓ If the Fleet is to remain here and carry out normal peacetime training it will be conducive to efficiency of administration, to the carrying out of employment schedules and to the most effective use of services and operating areas if the ships and services of the Hawaiian Detachment are incorporated under their normal type commanders. Unless advised to the contrary by you before 30 May, this will be done.

In any event and whatever the future holds, we seriously need additional enlisted personnel. We should no longer be content to operate with any vacancies in peacetime allowance materially below our needs and our complement. With so many ships building and other ships to be recommissioned, we must have many additional trained men. It will take a long time to train them. I urge that all training stations be operated to full capacity. Trained men are fully as important as additional material and equipment.

If we are in the preliminary stage of preparation for belligerent action our ships should be fully manned by the most competent available officer personnel. Peacetime shifting of officer personnel should cease. With my lack of knowledge of the Department's purposes and intentions, I feel that we may work at cross purposes, and the whole matter of officer personnel changes may become most confused.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,


J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

*Admiral H. R. Stark
4 May 1942
J. O. Richardson
with 1-10*

Bc

Secret

27 MAY 1940.

DEAR JO: Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow—well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer is that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

[2] The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status—go ahead. Just keep us informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? Answer: obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel:—Nimitz has put the personnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly 172,300) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently.

I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as—

(a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.

(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.

[3] (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.

(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.

(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.

(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.

(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet;*

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies,—I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is **WORK** and homemade recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1,—modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that *now* appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant [4] from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made,—for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic—should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in these areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands:—We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is

recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter—as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "PENNSYLVANIA," Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.

Secret

JUNE 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to the movements of the fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time. It rests partly upon the question as to what happens to the French fleet. On this last there is no definite and final information as yet.

So all I can say is that the fleet must stay in a condition of complete readiness. By now you will have received my last letter, in which in reply to your question I stated I thought it would be best for you to concentrate your planning energies on a distribution of task forces to provide for the problems of Rainbow 1 modified by those set up in Rainbow 4. This picture is as yet unchanged.

The floating dry dock from New Orleans has recently completed the transit of the Panama Canal, and is being reassembled for towing on to Pearl Harbor as originally planned. A few days ago the question was brought up as to whether or not this plan would be carried out. After giving it some reconsideration, we decided to go ahead and take the dock on to Honolulu as it would be needed there to care for the forces that must be maintained in the Honolulu area in any case.

Guantanamo is receiving considerable development. In addition to air fields on both sides of the Bay, we are increasing the gun defenses by four 6" guns and four 3" antiaircraft guns. In the near future we will send about 105 additional Marines, and somewhat later, when its training has been completed, we will send down a Marine Defense Battalion of about 750 men.

I am also endeavoring to get two transports ready for the use of the Marines in the immediate future, one for the Atlantic (probably Caribbean) and one for the Pacific. We plan to load these transports with combat units of the Fleet Marine Force so that they will be strategically ready for immediate use,—such a transport full of Marines and equipment can be dispatched to a needed task in the same manner as we now dispatch a cruiser.

We recently, as you read in the papers, introduced a bill expanding the Navy sufficiently to provide for major tasks simultaneously in both oceans, and of a strength that will permit us at all times to have strong forces in each ocean. It is not our intention to have a permanent Atlantic fleet somewhat disassociated from the permanent Pacific fleet. However, there will necessarily be some decentralization in fleet command. We can talk this over when you come East.

Another subject to take up with you is the question of basing the fleet units that might be brought to the Atlantic—using Caribbean bases, primarily—Cristobal, Guantanamo and others.

This is the first of an attempt to write you a weekly letter. Hope they may prove to be of some use to you.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON. U. S. N.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,

U.S.S. "Pennsylvania," c/o Postmaster,

San Francisco, California.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S S PENNSYLVANIA
Flagship

Lahaina Roads, T.H.
22 June 1940

Dear Betty:

The enclosures are self-explanatory, and caused me to send confidential despatch 220603.

To clarify the situation, I flew to Pearl yesterday and held a conference with Andrews, Bloch, and General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department. Briefly, on 17 June, due to the "Alert" from the War Department, the Army issued live ammunition to all posts including A.A. batteries, etc., and established a patrol and guard over all critical areas, which are considered by them to be, all landing beaches, land areas (bridges, roads, etc.) and Pearl Harbor (Marines). Their directive included a proviso that all despatches were to be sent in code via cable to the Chief of Staff and that the public in Honolulu were not to be excited, hence no Army was stationed at waterworks, electric light plant, gas or telephone companies, but extra precautions were taken by these latter.

The navy increased their distant plane patrol from 130 miles to 300 miles and enlarged the sector being covered to include from 180° to 360°, as well as establishing a 30 mile inner patrol.

Two days later, the Army received word to "ease up on the Alert", but to maintain guard on all critical areas on a semi-permanent basis. We did not know about this, until General Herron mentioned it at the conference in reply to my query as to how long the Alert would continue. General Herron stated that he might, on the 24th, further modify his present interpretation of the "modified alert".

As a matter of interest, Herron said he had been asked if he could store crude rubber and tin to the extent of 600,000 cubic feet (his figures) and further that no such storage space was available.

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
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S S PENNSYLVANIA
Flagship

Admiral Stark - 2

The Army "Alert" and action taken caused me some concern though I felt positive that any Army intelligence bearing on the above would be available to and evaluated by the Navy, with information to me. Of course, anything of this character tends to aggravate the tenseness of the situation and to interrupt training, as the Fleet is operating from Lahaina and Pearl by single ships and groups and without the full screening and scouting which a more serious situation would necessitate.

✓ / As a similar situation may again arise, I believe a remedy would be to insure that where possible, when joint action is involved, even in drills, that the Commanders of the Army and Navy be jointly informed, with definite information to me as to whether the alarm is real or simulated for purposes of training.

With best regards,



J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

"COPY"

SECRET

U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.
 Tuesday, 18 June 1940.

Memo. for Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Rear Admiral Bloch visited me yesterday stating that he had just been informed by General Herron, in secret, that he (Herron) had just received orders from the War Department placing Army in this area on the "Alert". This was done with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. He asked Bloch for a distant air patrol and inner air patrol.


I explained to Bloch your present patrol plan and informed him that I would establish immediately an inner patrol which I did at 1300 yesterday and am continuing same. General Herron desires that a VP patrol be established covering western semi-circle with Oahu as center instead of present VP patrol from Lahaina which as you know covers from 220 to 335 distance 180 miles.

I agree with Herron and I have VP to establish such a patrol which must begin at dawn each day.

I have discussed this matter with Fitch who is ready to start when you give the order.

I have also informed Rear Admiral Calhoun in secret.

If you desire this patrol established in lieu of present patrol I suggest that you send Combasefor a message "Affirm patrol" and this new patrol will be started tomorrow. Such a patrol is pictured as below:



Sector to be searched daily - Western semi-circle. The Army will cover night patrol, leaving us day patrol only.

Calhoun and I are awaiting instructions.

Respectfully,

I sent "Affirm Patrol" to Andrews and receipt of this.

/s/ Adolphus Andrews

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AT 2200 (LOCAL TIME) ON 18 JUNE, 1940, SENT THE FOLLOWING
TO COMMANDANT, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT:

SECRET

"WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL AIR PATROL IS A PART OF
ARMY EXERCISE OR IS IT BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE WAR
DEPARTMENT"

AT 0945 (LOCAL TIME) ON 19 JUNE, 1940, THE FOLLOWING
REPLY WAS RECEIVED:

CONFIDENTIAL

"REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL WAS BASED UPON A DIRECTIVE
FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT X HE HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN EXERCISE"

180

"COPY"

SECRET and
PERSONALCOMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
PEARL HARBOR, T.H.*OK*
12

20 June 1940

Dear Richardson:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 20 June, received by plane this morning; I note the contents thereof and will carry out your wishes expressed therein.

General Herron received a dispatch from the War Department the other day which stated in substance: "Alert your forces against hostile oversea raid. This must be done in such a way as to prevent newspaper publicity or notice of foreign intelligence agents. Department suggests that you do this on a maneuver basis in order to accomplish the above." General Herron brought this dispatch down to me and told me he was taking the necessary action and hoped that the Navy could see its way clear to have an off-shore patrol each day and do anything else in its power. I consulted Andrews and an off-shore and in-shore patrol around Pearl Harbor has been arranged concerning which you have been advised by Calhoun. I have no idea of how long this situation will exist, nor as to the gravity thereof; for two days I had out the Fleet Marine Force and their anti-aircraft guns with ammunition. I called them in yesterday inasmuch as it was necessary to keep their ammunition under tarpaulins in the vicinity of the guns and this did not look like a very safe practice inasmuch as they were deployed in the heart of the navy yard. My idea is, if something more definite is not heard by Monday, I will probably put them out again on Monday and on a distant station somewhere near the Army guns.

I have many things of relative importance and unimportance to discuss with you. Everything goes along smoothly and busily. I took the liberty of telling Eddy that I thought he should go back with Rucker in the plane today without giving him any reasons.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ C. C. BLOCH.

Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

CCB;kt

MC

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, FlagshipAIR MAIL
PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIALHonolulu, T. H.
18 September 1940.

Dear Betty:

While the Secretary was on board the ENTERPRISE he said to me, "Admiral, will you come to Washington in early October while you are on the Pacific Coast?". I replied, "I can not come to Washington except under orders, but if Stark wants to see me I suppose I will be ordered."

Just before leaving Pearl Harbor the Secretary said, "Admiral, I will talk to Stark and it is possible that we may want you to come to Washington for a conference." I replied, "I will be glad to come any time I am wanted."

I do not know of any benefit to the Navy that would accrue from my coming to Washington as I fully and frankly expressed my views to the Secretary on all points where I felt that such expression might help the Navy or the Nation. I also gave him a memorandum which covered the more important points discussed with him. Nevertheless, if you or the Secretary want me to come I will be pleased to do so.

During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet and I have frequently heard officers say, "I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election."

In the Fleet we did all we could to show both Secretaries what we are, what we are doing, and what we are thinking. Regardless of whether we made a good impression on the Secretary I believe that it would have boosted our spirits a bit if, upon his departure, he had sent a dispatch to the Fleet in these waters or to Cincus expressing some appreciation of our efforts to show our wares or approbation of our endeavors to maintain an efficient Fleet. Personally I feel that the Fleet made a good impression, and that a dispatch would have been sent had the Secretary been accompanied by a competent aide.

Please tell Himitz that his letter of 30 August regarding six-year enlistments was delivered to me by the Secretary's Aide on Monday afternoon a few minutes before the Secretary left


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UNITED STATES FLEET
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the ENTERPRISE and after I had completed my serious talks with the Secretary.


With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,



J. G. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. A. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

P.S. As far as I know I have nothing to take up
with the Department that can not be handled
by correspondence but if I am wanted in
Washington I am ready to come on arrival
at San Pedro


CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
At Sea,
12 September, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

1. The following notes are submitted on the points which we discussed in my effort to meet your wishes to know officers, learn about ships and find out how you could assist the Fleet's preparation for war.

2. PERSONNEL(A) Officers.

(a) Promotion by selection best method yet devised. ✓

(b) Members should be allowed to serve on two successive boards if circumstances render it advisable (requires change by Congress).

(c) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; the most promising officers should be given preference. *Ministry*
This would tend to create a division of officers into two classes, the most promising and the least promising, or an A and B list. *of "*

(d) The abuses of retirement for physical disability and the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of the physically unfit should be corrected. ✓

(B) Enlisted Personnel.

(a) While the enlisted strength increased 11,349 between 25 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expenditures for material may prove futile unless there is a prompt and commensurate personnel expansion. *Ministry*

(b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the rate of acceptance of new men, should be eliminated at once and emergency expansion should begin now without awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not waited for specific appropriations in providing material expansion, and it is difficult to understand or explain to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet even more vital problems of personnel (involving the imperative necessity of making ready what we already have as well as training men for new construction) with equally direct and effective action. I estimate *with*

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

the time necessary to make a modern man-of-war's-man at 4 years. You can see the necessity of getting started on this training right away.

(C) Separate Air Corps.

- (a) Unquestionably a higher degree of cooperation will exist between our Naval air arm and other Naval arms if all of them continue to be intimately bound together in one Navy.
- (b) With a separate air corps there is bound to develop a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy, many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, administration, and above all a serious loss in effectiveness. ✓
- (c) I know of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that would accrue from the creation of a Naval Air Corps.

3. MATERIAL(A) Surface ships.

- ✓ (a) I believe new construction is being expedited as much as possible. Minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast. *just*

(B) Aircraft.

- (a) A tremendous expansion in this field complicated by foreign orders as well as by our demands. Airplanes, either for sale or for training, should not be obtained at the expense of the active Fleet. Fleet planes must be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes, but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are on hand. *Yes No*

(C) Ammunition.

- ✓ (a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of anti-aircraft ammunition. ✓

4. OPERATIONS(A) Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

- (a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are: *Yes No*

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- (1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
- (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
- (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.
- (4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface. *Yes*
- (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing. *Yes*
- (6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale. *Yes*
- (7) In case of war, necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measures resulting in confusion and a net loss of time. *Yes*
- (b) If the disposition of the Fleet were determined solely by Naval considerations the major portion of the Fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war. *Yes*
- (c) If factors other than purely Naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the Fleet should be based at this time, the Naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases? *Yes*
- (d) In case our relations with another Pacific Nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the Fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary train-

*we should work
toward that end -
Check*

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
I S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

ing from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 2000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases? —

5. SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

- (a) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the position and purpose of the Shore Establishment over-emphasized. It has only one purpose - the support, maintenance and augmentation of the fighting Fleet. It cannot, of itself, damage an enemy. It is only human that some of those in Washington and long removed from the active Fleet, (predominantly staff corps) frequently fail to visualize the correct priority of objectives. ✓

6. NAVY PUBLICITY

Practically all Navy Publicity, hearings before committees, speeches in Congress and handouts from the Navy Department have stressed one or more of the following ideas: *YCS & N - per data somewhat distorted - but still good hope and work on ground*

- (a) The Navy is built for defense.
- (b) A so-called adequate Navy will keep us out of war.
- (c) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Nations of the earth with little danger of becoming involved in war.
- (d) In the unhappy event of war the Fleet is a kind of mobile Maginot Line behind which the people can reside in peace with no obligation to their Country except to promise that their descendants will some day pay for the Navy.
- (e) The Fleet is fully manned, fully trained and ready to fight at the drop of a hat.
- (f) The comparative strength of navies is measured solely by material things.
- (g) Aviation is a cheap means of defense and that large numbers of planes and pilots will render the nation secure.
- (h) Outlying Naval bases and air fields, in themselves are weapons of defense.

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

The type of publicity mentioned above is wrong in that it tends to lull the public into a false sense of security. It tends to weaken their moral fibre and to create an unhealthy national morale in a country which may be drawn into war on very short notice. For a people, who may actually be involved in war in a comparatively short time, to be told that they can risk war without danger or wage war without risk, may be fatally detrimental to the determined prosecution of the very war towards which such conceptions inevitably lead. At the beginning of the present war, the French and British had just these ideas, with the present result.

7. COOPERATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE, STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.

(a) Whether justified or not, I can not escape the feeling that the coordination and mutual understanding between the above departments of the government is not as close as is necessary for effective action.

(b) Before reaching a decision as to the disposition and movements of the Fleet, or units thereof, is the Navy Department consulted, are its views frankly and forcibly presented, and are its representations thoroughly understood and considered?

(c) Present policy appears to be headed towards forcing our will upon another Pacific Nation by diplomatic representations supported by economic measures, a large material Navy in process of construction, and the disposition of an inadequately manned Fleet in being. Can this be done and are we prepared to face war or the inevitable loss of prestige if it cannot? Have the objectives of such a war been formulated, and its costs considered and compared with the value of victory? Can such a war be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe that the Navy is for defensive purposes only, and that their whole obligation to their country can be met by the payment of taxes?

(d) The Commander-in-Chief has no responsibility for the formulation of National policy, but he has a definite responsibility for the efficiency of one arm upon which the government relies to enforce National policy, when its aims can not be secured by diplomatic means. He must be concerned over the question as to whether the strength and efficiency of the Fleet are commensurate with the aggressive policy of the administration in the Pacific. Especially so if there is a possibility that this

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

policy will require implementation.

(e) Are objectives being formulated and plans made for our active participation in the European war? We cannot long remain half in and half out of such a war. We should decide now on definite objectives and plans and should not assume that we will fight this one like we did the last, i.e., by sending aviation and light forces for active participation and utilizing our heavy ships, in secure home bases, largely as training ships. Such a course would immobilize our heavy ships, which are most certainly going to be needed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, depending on the progress of the war.

✓ correct
and better

Lo Richardson

H. L. H. k
O.S.A.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Important items to be discussed in the Department.

1. Mediterranean Study. *Joint Board, (Admiral Stark)*
2. Defenses and developments for new bases. Atlantic. *Underground storage, auxiliary landing fields, etc. Will defense be entire responsibility of Navy, or will Army be involved? - (Admiral Stark.)*
3. Personnel increase. *(President, after discussion with Admiral Stark, Admiral Nimitz.)*
4. Fleet Training. Present training too elementary and cautious. What steps to make more advanced? *(Admiral Stark)*
5. Greater target practice, ammunition allowance and more drone practice. Ships with war ammunition allowance cannot carry sufficient target practice ammunition. Additional ammunition ships urgently and constantly needed. *(Admiral Stark) Yes - 2 ships*
6. Great weakness in fast auxiliaries. What steps for early procurement of fast and adequate numbers of auxiliaries to cover all probable Fleet employment? *(Admiral Stark - Admiral Robinson)*
7. Mine laying by airplanes. What is contemplated? *(Admiral Towers - Admiral Stark)*

24 SEPTEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: I am working on a letter for you but will send you a copy of my letter to Peck; it is self-explanatory.

I meant simply to mention Faulkner but got into something a little more serious.

Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too well. Spent over three hours in the State Department yesterday—something over two in the morning with Mr. Hull, Welles and Hornbeck, and then again in the afternoon over an hour with Mr. Welles. I believe had you been present you would have been in agreement with what I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I could. I may say that the same general picture so far as our attitude is concerned still holds, although I would not be surprised, confidentially between you and me, to see an embargo on scrap but this too would be along the lines State has been working on.

I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to you and with which I may say I think the State Department is in concurrence. I believe Mr. Hull brought it up to get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr. Welles said he was in complete agreement with me.

Hope to get a letter off in the next day or two with a coverage of some of the thoughts that I have been playing with and, as you know, my mind is completely open to you, almost to simply thinking out loud.

With every good wish as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," Long Beach, California.

P. S. Just received yours with regard to your coming East and will take it up with the Secretary. Unless there is something you feel you want to talk about or that crops up after your arrival on the Coast, I will tell the Secretary I see no need of your coming East, at least for the moment.

I am sorry the message was not sent to the Fleet. I have felt that was an Aide's job. When with the Secretary I always sent them; in the last case when I visited Hawaii I sent them for the Secretary not only to the Navy and to the Army but to the Governor as well. I will tell Mort Deyo to be on guard against these slips hereafter.

Perhaps a letter from the Secretary now would be helpful. I will talk to him about it.

25 SEPTEMBER 1940.

P. S. to my letter of yesterday.

After my note to you of yesterday I spoke to Mort Deyo about telegrams back to the Fleet or other activities after the Secretary's visits.

Mort told me that the Secretary was preparing letters himself as a result of his visit out there so you may expect to hear from him.

My feeling is that a letter sometime after a visit can never take the place of an appreciative despatch and I have so told Mort. Of course in the last analysis the Secretary is the Boss but I have given Mort the thought—here's hopin'.

Until you wrote I had not seen the sheet which placed officer and enlisted personnel under the Assistant Secretary or at least that particular item escaped my attention. It was not in the original suggestions I made to the Secretary. I immediately took it up with the Secretary and it has been changed; personnel now coming directly under the Secretary which is the same as it has been. Of course you know that BuNav and OpNav usually settle these things pretty much themselves.

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. C. RICHARDSON, USN.

1 OCTOBER 1940.

DEAR J. O.: I hated to send you the despatch last night that the house would be full when you got here. Kit had not intended to return until two weeks from next Sunday when Harold Gillespie from Honolulu expected to be with us. However he has been again delayed; will not be here when planned, and as the only reason for Kit remaining at the Lake was for his coming, and his coming now being indefinite, they decided to come down this week. By they I mean Kit and Kewpie (our daughter) and her two children and nurse girl which will fill the house to about 100 percent complement.

The Secretary wants very much to see you. I told him of your letter. However, one of the things he wanted to talk to you about is the possibility of sending a detachment to the Far East; it is being urged here by some. I have opposed it and so has Ingersoll. Your thoughts are likely to be determinative.

The question of where to hold the Fleet Problem will also be on the agenda.

In addition the Secretary says he would just like to talk to you anyway; so there you are.

I more or less took the bull by the horns with regard to getting more men aboard ship quickly and while we had written you about it the Secretary took it up with the President before we had time to get your reply, that is, with regard to cutting the training period to three weeks. I felt I was on fairly sound ground in bringing this up as my feeling is that it is in accord with your wishes. I would prefer to get twice the number of men in a given period and get them quickly rather than have them spend an additional five weeks or so at the Training Station.

Frankly I do not like the trend of things and I would not be surprised at anything happening any day. Your statement that we can not stay half in this war and half out sizes up the thing pretty well and I have long felt that it is only a matter of time until we get in.

I am writing the District Commanders a letter pointing out the gravity of the situation as I see it and will send you a copy. In this letter I made no attempt to go into much detail—my objective being that they get the spirit of the situation as I see it which would leave no stone unturned towards our immediate readiness. God knows I hope I am wrong because I realize what a little additional time would mean to us but sometimes things get out of hand either from the other fellow's action or our own.

Personally, I am looking forward as always to seeing you. I will keep the decks clear and will arrange our evenings according to your desires. The feminine part of my family are good soldiers on retiring upstairs and turning over the downstairs to stag get-togethers which I find are so beneficial these days.

For next Tuesday, 8 October, I am tentatively slating the following for dinner: The Secretary, Comdr. Murphy, Admirals Sexton, Robinson, Nimitz, Ingersoll, Towers, Furlong, Moreell and General Holcomb.

I am sorry that you will not be putting up with us as our quiet, late evening talks helped me so much when you were last here.

With every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," San Pedro, California.

P. S. I see no reason in the world for any secrecy with regard to your coming to Washington.

JOR/clp

Confidential

9 OCTOBER 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Points covered in talk with the President

1. Go ahead with assembly of Train.
2. Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four (4) old light cruisers?
3. Give me a chart showing British and French Bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines or airplanes in Islands in the Pacific, east of the International Date Line.
4. The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the British Admiralty felt that they should have officers prepared for staff conferences.
5. The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain over land through Africa.
6. I (F. D. R.) can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.
7. The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.

/s/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01708

9827

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
 October 22, 1940

From:	The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.	06
To:	The Chief of Naval Operations.	
Subject:	War Plans - Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation.	06

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, 20 in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions: 20-A

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action; 21

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan; 22

Copy sent out advised.

*Copy sent to
 Captain's room
 July 11, 1940*

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CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

087/10

A16/01705

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, reportedly aimed at the United States.

5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WUSF 44 and WUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation, is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

- (a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient "to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands area in strength superior

CmC File No.

A16/01708

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

SFC/10

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940~~SECRET~~Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area."

While recognizing the qualifying phrase "at the earliest practicable date," it is firmly believed that we cannot, at this time, even with Great Britain assuming responsibility for our Atlantic interests, denude that ocean of sufficient forces to protect our coastal trade and to safeguard our more vital interests in South America. Nor can we neglect the protection of our own and the interdiction of Japanese trade in the Southeastern Pacific. With these commitments adequately cared for, our remaining force is barely superior to ORANGE at the beginning of our westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be subject to attrition losses en route.

- (b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone.
- (c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military operation requiring detailed knowledge of the area, detailed planning based on such knowledge, and the taking over, conversion, manning, training and organization of a large number of merchant ships. The establishment of the BASE, after its occupation, requires: (a), the transport of large quantities of material; (b), the organization, transport and maintenance of construction units capable of accomplishing the

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CmC File No.

ALG/01706

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipU. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 28, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

necessary development; and (c), the defense and supply of the base during the construction period. The Plan requires the completion of this BASE forty-five days after the arrival of the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the detailed knowledge of the area requisite for proper planning of these manifold activities. It is true that some knowledge, possibly sufficient for initiation of operations and general planning for the attack, may be obtained by reconnaissance after hostilities have commenced, and the Plan provides for such operations. However, it is not now known, nor can it be determined, until after actual occupation, whether or not the hydrography of the area permits the establishment of a fleet anchorage, what construction is possible on the land areas under consideration and whether or not adequate defensive installations, particularly air fields for land-based aircraft, can be established. Granting that the base seized offers possibilities for the establishment of these facilities, it appears certain that the assembly of material and the organization for construction must await the actual occupation. To the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, no material has as yet been assembled for this purpose, nor have any but the vaguest ideas for the ultimate accomplishment of this objective been advanced.

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A18/01706

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 23, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

- (d) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tables in Appendix II of WPL 14 and throughout the G-1 Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period of some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

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CinC File No.

A16/01705

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipU. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

(e) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

7. In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear

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CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

270/10

A16/01708

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

- (a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;
- (b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);
- (c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy.

CinC File No.

A16/01708

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & NEW MEXICO, FlagshipU. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.(4) In the light of information now available
to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the
conviction that the elements of a realistic
plan should embody:(1) Security and defense measures of
the Western Hemisphere;(2) Long-range interdiction of enemy
commerce;(3) Threats and raids against the
enemy;(4) Extension of operations as the
relative strength of the Naval
Establishment (may be influenced
by allied strength and freedom
of action) is built up to sup-
port them.11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by
despatch.12. It is hereby certified that the originator con-
siders it to be impracticable to phrase this document in
such a manner as will permit a classification other than
secret.13. The exigency of delivery of this document is
such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the
next available officer courier. The originator, therefore,
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered
mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. C. RICHMOND

36C 22a

[1] *Secret*

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR J. O.: You may think I have been unusually silent for the last couple of weeks,—and so I have. Truth of the matter is that a great part of this time was spent in making up an estimate of the international situation, together with a number of officers in Naval Operations and two from the General Board. As a start on this I sat down one early morning and drew up a twelve page rough estimate, working on it up till two o'clock the next morning, this in the effort to clear my own mind, as I sometimes do by drawing up a paper. After I finished the rough notes, I then got together Ingersoll, Turner, Savvy, Charlie Wellborn, Forrest Sherman, Hill, Sexton, Moore and Oscar Badger and we went to it, day and night, Saturdays and Sundays, for about ten consecutive days. The product which no one claims is perfect is now in the hands of the President. I am hoping he will give some definite pronouncement on it in order that I may send you something more authoritative than I otherwise could do.

You know that we have no definite commitments. Perhaps none can be made. The direction which things finally take may be forced upon us.

For example, as you stated in a recent letter:—Upon your first visit here you found us of the opinion that in the event of war, we should not become involved in the Pacific and that any major effort, we might make would be in what we considered the most vital theater, namely, in the Atlantic. I have never changed my viewpoint on that and I may say that so far as I know, neither has the State Department. I believe the Secretary of the Navy also holds this view. But no appeasement.

Nevertheless, we can not afford to neglect the possibility of hostilities in the Pacific and that is why in so many of my letters I always mention keeping a weather eye to the Westward.

I think the study which was made when you were here, has been highly beneficial; studies of this sort always are, whether or not they are implemented.

I had hoped before this to get to you the Navy end of RAINBOW III as a more thoroughly considered directive to meet the possibilities of the present situation in the Pacific. This RAINBOW III plan is nearing completion now and I expect to send it to you in a few days. I trust that you will find the tasks assigned to you are [2] within your power. We will await your comment.

We are pushing District preparation and degaussing work with all the speed we can command and if by any chance I could have until 1 April on this I would give a good deal. One January should see degaussing well along; one April much essential work accomplished in the Districts. Please do not construe that statement to mean that we might get into the war tomorrow, as I have nothing but my own thoughts on this. Nevertheless, you know I have felt right along that it is only a matter of time before we do get in (though I can not say this out loud). The chief question that concerns us is *where* we get in, and *whom* we will fight—and “tomorrow” or perhaps “today” is what I am working towards.

You have received the despatch directing the sending of submarines to Manila. There are no plans at present to send anything more in that direction. But present conditions are far from static, the Japanese appear to be making preparation for a definite move of some kind, and the answer we will give, if any, to the steps they may take in the future can not be predicted at this time.

Your letter regarding the retention of a part of the Fleet on the Coast beyond the date of its intended departure, and also holding another part in Hawaii, arrived at a time when the election prevented my presenting this question promptly to the President. Since the scheduled departure of the units from Hawaii was the day following my receipt of your letter, there was nothing for me to do other than to radio you to carry out the approved schedule. As you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate, and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in Washington. It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some good pretext.

Regarding this Winter's exercises there is no question as to the desirability of training both the Fleet and the troops in expeditionary operations which will simulate war as closely as possible. Therefore, I believe we should go ahead with the essential features of such a plan. As I understand the plan, you propose to assemble in Pearl Harbor an Expeditionary Force comprising most of the Fleet, plus transports in which are combat-loaded the west contingent of the Fleet Marine Force, plus tankers and supply ships. This expeditionary Force will then set out from Hawaii and will simulate the actual capture of an island, using Christmas Island or some other, perhaps San Clements for example—I have not received a copy of exactly what you plan to do and therefore this conception may be at fault.

We have all been greatly pleased over Churchills statement of recent British action against the Italian Fleet. Also we are more than pleased over the success of the Greeks,—even though it may prove in the end to be temporary. We have nothing more official to date on this than newspaper reports.

[3] Regarding the German claim that they had sunk every ship in the 39-ship convoy in approximately longitude 32, latitude 58: all but 6 of these ships have safely reached port.

Am expecting King to relieve Ellis shortly after the middle of December.

Hope the enclosed to Tommy Hart and Ghormley will be of some interest to you.

Best wishes as always.

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," c/o Postmaster,
Long Beach, California.

[1] Secret

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR TOMMY: We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the reelection of the President—which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between themselves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the fields of:

Command arrangements,

General objectives,

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

(a) Occupy Guam, and reenforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;

(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;

(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;

(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reinforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reinforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

You may will appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attache's to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.

You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, *U. S. Navy,*

Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

P. S. Am sixty today. Here's hoping! The first three score are the hardest!

18 NOVEMBER 1940.

ADMIRAL HART:

P. S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's hoping.

[1] Confidential

NOVEMBER 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: While you were here in early October we sent a despatch to Command fourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being afforded to the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian Department.

Admiral Bloch's answers to this despatch and to a second despatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did not provide basis for further action by the Department.

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My

object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

For instance, it is desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comments and those of Comfourteen on this question.

Antiaircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries; and possibly by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Units now available in the Pearl Harbor areas, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.

[2] Another aspect of local security which prompted the Department's original despatch was the security of the oil tanks against attack from the road passing near by.

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which will require remedial action here in Washington.

Much is being done by the Army, and by the Navy in support of the Army, to maintain security of the Panama Canal. Of at least equal importance is the security of our Fleet against sudden destructive attack. And the Fleet is, as usually must be the case, in a more exposed situation.

I have been in somewhat of a quandry whether to write this letter to you or to write one on similar lines to Admiral Bloch to take up with you and Army. It really is immaterial so long as we get the answer—but after all the Fleet—your command—is the subject. I am sending Admiral Bloch a copy.

My best to you both and to "all your works"—

Sincerely,

H. R. S.

Op-12-VED

Serial O50312 (SC)A16/FF1

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipLong Beach, California
November 28, 1940

Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

37C

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (See Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard on top of that. This, with the other four "CITY" class and the EXOCORDA, will give us six transports by February 1, if the dates now set are met. Allowing for an indoctrination and shakedown period, it does not appear possible to embark the Marines prior to about March 1, with the exercise actually starting in the Hawaiian area around March 10. By that time, the Marines inform me, they will have about 12,000 men, which would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six more transports. This brings up the question of the objectives of the exercise. As I originally understood them, they were to be a full dress rehearsal of an island attack, with the possibility that they might turn into the "real thing." Under this conception, we would, of course, want to carry the entire Force and all their equipment, including organic transportation and ground unit support for their aircraft.

If, however, they are to be largely training exercises, with definitely limited objectives, we can accomplish much needed training for marines, transports and supporting forces by limiting the numbers of men and the quantity of equipment to the facilities provided by the six transports, organizing the units into more or less complete combat teams -- one on each transport. We could, under this assumption, start the exercises much earlier (that is, earlier than waiting for six more transports) and perhaps follow the first ones with a second series applying the lessons learned the first time but utilizing the remaining troops.

Until a decision is reached on the foregoing, I can do little except study the problem and general planning.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Preliminary discussion along this line brings out the following:

- (a) The Marines will have only two squadrons of planes. These can be embarked on carriers, but, depending on the scope of the operations, a separate ship or ships (probably a cargo vessel) may be needed to accommodate the ground troops and equipment.
- (b) If the scope of the exercises includes readiness for further eventualities, at least one and probably two, extra cargo ships will be required to carry organic transportation, 90 days' ammunition, and supplies.
- (c) In any concept, something will have to be done about landing boats. I assume that all transports will carry the boats listed in your conversion letter. These will provide, roughly, about 500 boat spaces per ship, whereas 1100 are required per combat team. The remaining 600 boat spaces per transport must either be provided from the supporting ships (manifestly undesirable) or be carried into the transport area by special cargo vessels or boat carriers. I believe we should convert a special boat carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used at Shanghai by the Japanese.
- (d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat crews for boats carried, boat officers, and organized beach parties. A boat carrier, if provided, should carry the necessary boat crews as part of its complement.
- (e) Transport equipment should include either special tanks for fresh water capable of being carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to carry water for troops transported.
- (f) If further eventualities are to be provided for, I would want the AMERICAN SEALARK (Maritime Commission training ship, especially equipped as distilling ship) taken over and made available.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

- (g) The Marines' ammunition situation is critical. I feel sure this is known at Marine Corps headquarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. They also need pack howitzers, to replace their present heavy and unwieldy guns. *12-1-51*
- (h) An able, energetic Transport Group Commander must be assigned as soon as possible. This is a man-sized job, requiring ability to work with the Marines. There are many details which can be worked out only by close cooperation. It is my present intention to operate the transports, as soon as each is ready, in the San Diego area, training in loading, embarking, debarking and landing exercises. *1-1-52*
- (i) To be ready for real service we will have to have bombardment ammunition, preferably at Oahu, where it can be interchanged with service ammunition if found necessary. The only such ammunition now on the West Coast, to my knowledge, is 14"/50, 6"/53 and 5"/51, which would limit the gunfire support to BB's and CL's (7500), whereas CA's, CL's (10,000) and DD's are indicated for this type work. *1-1-52*

I have told the Marines, as a basis for their present planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as can be combat loaded on the six transports, and that these should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any operations that might be possible East of the 160° East Longitude. *1-1-52*

We have no reply, as yet, to our letter of October 31, relative to diplomatic arrangements for reconnaissance of CHRISTMAS and MAKIN Islands. Of course, decision as to the suitability of CHRISTMAS must await reconnaissance, and special diplomatic arrangements will have to be made if the landing is to be held there. General Upshur rather favors an exercise on Oahu or similar large island, where opportunity will be afforded for maneuvers after landing. This question, however, cannot be settled now. *1-1-52*

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

As I see it, the possibilities as to locale include:

Christmas Island -- if found suitable
Palmyra Island -- probably will limit force
that can be employed to
less than that available
in six transports.

One of Hawaiian
Islands

7. ✓ Please let me know as soon as possible your decision
as to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also
appreciate being informed as to the progress made in the con-
version of the transports, the provision of landing boats,
boat carriers, etc.

With best regards,


Sincerely,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

41

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, Dec. 17, 1940.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: War Plans—Status and Readiness of in View of Current International Situation.

Reference: (a) Cinc's Secret Letter A16/01705 of October 22, 1940.

1. In reply to your recommendation in the above letter that a new war plan be issued, you are informed that Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 3 (W. P. L. 44) has recently been completed. Four advance copies have been forwarded to you by officer messenger. The finished copies of this plan, plus such revisions of WPL-42, Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1, as have been found desirable for making parts of that plan usable with Rainbow No. 3, will be distributed as soon as practicable through the Registered Publication Section.

2. War Plan Rainbow No. 3 is designed to provide against the most imminent and difficult war situation which may confront the United States in the near future. It is, therefore requested that the Commander in Chief prepare as soon as practicable the operating plans for a war envisaged by Rainbow No. 3.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations has, in the past, kept the Commander in Chief advised as to all matters within his own knowledge which related to current national policy and pending national decisions. This past practice will be continued in the future. However, the Commander in Chief is doubtless aware that the changing world military situation will continue to affect policy, and thus will influence plans for the war operation of the naval forces. It is, of course, impracticable to draw up and to issue new Navy Basic War Plans when merely minor changes in policy occur. The Chief of Naval Operations considers that Rainbow No. 3 is, in its major aspects, suitable for all probable situations which may arise in the near future where the principal portion of the national effort is directed westward. Under study now by the naval and army officials are plans based on assumptions requiring the exertion of the principal portion of the national effort to the eastward (Rainbow No. 5), and also a plan, somewhat similar to Rainbow No. 1, involving the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere against attack from both the east and the west (Rainbow No. 4). So far as now can be foreseen, these three basic plans should be adequate to guide mobilization, initial deployment, and initial operations under all contingencies which are foreseeable at present.

4. In view of the above, it is believed unnecessary to comment on the present applicability of the Orange War Plan, as that Plan was drawn up to guide the prosecution of a war under circumstances which do not now exist.

5. The urgency of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

[1] Op-12A-fhg

Secret

23 DECEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: Your personal letter of November 28th, headed Long Beach, California, arrived here on the 14th of December. While Murphy was here he spoke of this letter as having been prepared before his visit to Washington, but we were unable to locate it. Apparently it was not actually mailed until after the arrival of the NEW MEXICO in Honolulu.

In the meantime undoubtedly Murphy has given you oral answers to some of the questions brought up. However, I have had prepared a memo covering some of the points set forth in your letter, from which I will quote later on.

First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent security measures should be prosecuted, namely, that while the extent of security measures required is increasing, it has not yet reached the demands of full war time security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on equipment, and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures should be given due weight.

In regard to the objective of the training exercises, the picture, of course, may change at any time. At present the main objective is the purely training aspect. I feel that it is desirable to conduct the exercises in an area sufficiently distant

from bases, such that the difficulties of the problem are concretely and unavoidably present. It is also desirable that the exercises be conducted on beaches where our probable problems are most closely paralleled. In addition, the islands utilized should provide sufficient area for the maneuvering of the land forces involved.

We desire, of course, to avoid conducting maneuvers which would appear unduly provocative to our friends across the way. On the other hand we also wish to avoid any change in our dispositions which would indicate a walking back of our position in the Pacific. Taking these various factors in mind, I think the use of San Clemente for the final full scale exercises would not be so desirable. One solution that suggests itself is conducting some of the exercises on the island of Lanai, and other part on Christmas or Palmyra, depending upon the results of your reconnaissance of Christmas.

Due to the delays in the transport program it appears necessary to carry out these exercises during the fourth quarter. We have encountered much difficulty in getting transports. The only ships that we have been able to acquire are very old ships—ships with machinery not in the best [2] condition, and in which conversions bring to light structural corrosion and defects which necessitate additional work in effecting satisfactory conversion. Consequently, completions in all cases have been delayed except in the case of the EXOCHORDA, the present HARRY LEE, which was the only fairly new ship. The following table shows the estimated readiness-for-sea dates of the transports now under conversion. (This includes a two-week period for fitting out after the completion of overhaul) :

Name	Readiness for sea	at Navy Yard
GEORGE F. ELLIOT.....	24 January.....	Norfolk.
HARRY LEE.....	3 January.....	New York.
HEYWOOD.....	15 February.....	Puget Sound.
ANTHONY P. BIDDLE.....	15 February.....	Mare Island.
FULLER.....	1 March.....	Puget Sound.
NEVILLE.....	28 February.....	Puget Sound.
HARRIS.....	31 May.....	Puget Sound.
ZEILIN.....	31 May.....	Puget Sound.

Six APD's will be ready for sea on 3 January. The MANLEY, McKEE and STRINGHAM are scheduled to depart Norfolk, on January 6, and the Canal Zone on January 15, and will then report to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for duty in the Base Force.

It appears that the HARRIS and ZEILIN will not be ready, even for exercises in the fourth quarter.

Referring to the various points in your letter designated by letters, the situation is about as follows: (I quote from memorandum giving me data in some instances) :

(a) Problems involved in having the Second Marine Aircraft Group participate have undergone some change in view of the pending transfer of the group from San Diego to Pearl Harbor. By the end of the third quarter all three combatant squadrons of Group 2 should be available at Pearl Harbor with effective types of aircraft. It seems practicable to distribute their combatant aircraft among the carriers that will be available. VMJ-2 will also be in Hawaii.

The memorandum submitted on this question states "It is estimated that if planes are carried on CV's there will be 61 officers and 180 enlisted men on board the latter, and that there will be 9 commissioned, 6 warrant officers and 456 enlisted men to be transported by other means. The material required, exclusive of aviation gasoline and oil, will be 460 tons (22,925 cubic feet) of general cargo, and 268 tons (7,320 cubic feet) of high explosives."

[3] In regard to additional ships to carry ground crews and equipment, and to meet the requirements set forth in your paragraph (b), we may have a few cargo ships available for employment during the latter part of March, which may fit in for use in these exercises. It seems, at present, that the ammunition ship recently taken over will not be available before June, because it will be hauling ammunition from the East Coast to the West Coast.

(c) *Availability of boats.*—It now appears probable that all transports will be equipped with landing boats at the time the ships are ready for sea, although it may be necessary initially to substitute 30' boats for 36' boats. In any event, it is anticipated that the boats will be delivered by 1 March. Tank lighters, however, will probably not be delivered before the middle of March. It is expected, however, that Artillery lighters (non-self-propelled) will be completed at Puget

Sound Navy Yard in January, and that these can be substituted for tank lighters until the latter are delivered.

(d) *Ships to act as boat carriers.*—There are no ships at present available to carry excess landing boats.

The question of a special boat carrier was discussed with Murphy during his last visit. Such a vessel, or such vessels, would be useful. However, we continue to encounter the usual difficulty of obtaining funds for the acquisition of auxiliaries of any kind.

(e) Quoting from memorandum: "*Fresh Water Facilities for Marines.* The Second Marine Brigade has adequate facilities for getting water from ship to shore storing and distributing to troops.

This includes:

For movement ship to shore: Tank and artillery lighters, double bottoms
5 gal. water cans.

For storage ashore: 14 canvas tanks—3000 gal. capacity.

For distribution to troops: 10 water carts, 5 gal. water cans.

The Brigade also has the necessary pumps, hose fittings, etc., for handling this water.

Also—they have one water purification unit for purifying water found ashore, if any.

[4] In addition, the Marine Corps has on order, four evaporating sets for experimental use—with the capacities as follows:

1—5000 gal. per day.

1—1000 gal. per day.

2—smaller, exact capacity not yet determined.

If satisfactory this equipment will be made standard and provided to Marine Brigades."

In addition to the above there are being procured and placed in storage, with other advanced base equipment, well-digging equipment and 13 sets of evaporator and water purifying apparatuses distributed as follows:

5 at San Francisco.

4 at Charleston.

4 at Panama.

This information can undoubtedly be obtained in the detail desired from the Fleet Marine Force at San Diego, California.

(f) *Use of the "American Seaman" as a distilling ship.*—The ship is at present at St. Petersburg, Florida, and is currently engaged in training personnel for the Maritime Commission. A sister ship, the AMERICAN SAILOR, will be completed about the middle of February 1941. Although these ships are suitable as distilling ships it is not desired to divert them from their present use in training merchantseamen unless a major emergency develops.

(g) Your statements about the Marine ammunition situation are well founded. We have been making strenuous efforts to remedy the Small Arms Ammunition situation, not only for the Marines but also for other Naval Small Arms, aircraft and ship, for many months. The situation has been brought to the attention of the Secretary many times. No satisfactory remedial action in the near future appears possible, but we will pry out of the Army all we can.

It is estimated that there are now between 5 and 10 units of fire of various calibers available on the West Coast.

The organization of the Second Marine Brigade calls for 12—Pack Howitzers or (75 m/m guns) for each of the two battalions. They have

12—Pack Howitzers.

12—3" (75 m/m) guns.

There is some shortage of fire control equipment, but the units can operate without it.

[5] (h) Captain Braisted has been designated by the Bureau of Navigation for duty in command of the Transports in the Pacific. He is due to report about January 3.

(i) The Bureau of Ordnance has been requested to provide in OAHU at the earliest date practicable, the following bombardment ammunition:

14"—500 rounds, loaded and fused.

8"—All available rounds of the 1000 now on order.

6"—1000 rounds, loaded and fused.

5"—5000 rounds, loaded and fused.

4"—5000 rounds, loaded, fused, and assembled.

The 14" ammunition is now on order and it is expected to be available about May or June.

The 8" ammunition is also on order, but delivery is not expected before the latter part of calendar year 1941.—In connection with bombardment however, you have available quite a bit of 8" ammunition still fitted with instantaneous fuses. The situation in this respect is as follows:

Ship or station:	<i>No. of 8" projectiles fitted with instantaneous fuses</i>
ASTORIA-----	110
INDIANAPOLIS-----	66
NEW ORLEANS-----	110
NORTH HAMPTON-----	126
PENSACOLA-----	105
MARE ISLAND (Note: Some fuses may have been changed)-----	324
OAHU-----	999
HINGHAM-----	1,000

NOTE.—These projectiles can be used in either the long chamber or short chamber.

The 6", 5", and 4" ammunition will be shipped to OAHU by the NITRO or the LASSEN in February or March.

The present estimated availability of bombardment ammunition is as follows:

14"—307 East Coast; 151 Mare Island.

8"—1000 rounds on order—Delivery from 6 to 10 mos.

6"/53—2657 East Coast; 300 Mare Island; 379 Puget Sound; 1989 Cavite.

5"/51—36,000 East Coast; 2000 Mare Island; 1300 Puget Sound; 167 Pearl Harbor; 777 Cavite.

It should be noted that the 5"/25 and 38 caliber service ammunition is considered to be suitable for use as bombardment ammunition.

[6] In regard to CHRISTMAS or MAKIN Islands—The State Department did not wish to ask permission to visit Christmas Island for fear of jeopardizing our claim but suggested that we proceed with the visit without permission and they would bear the brunt of any repercussions. However, we decided as a matter of courtesy to inform the British Naval Attache. The British Government replied by note to State saying the visit was agreeable but that it would in no way reflect on their claim which was unassailable. You therefore have permission to make a reconnaissance of Christmas Island. In the event that your reconnaissance indicated the suitability of Christmas Island for landing exercises, decision can be made later as to whether it is advisable to use Christmas Island and as to just what steps should be taken in advising with the British authorities.

Permission was obtained for reconnaissance flight over Makin on about November 15. However, we questioned the advisability of taking such an open step—a step that might indicate our future intentions. Therefore we did not communicate this permission to you. We postponed answering the letter because of the protracted correspondence regarding Christmas. There is, of course, a certain amount of information available in the Naval Air Pilot, H. O. No. 184, and in charts 2179 (consecutive 1632), and No. 121 (1631) which have been furnished you.

Murphy's visit was extremely profitable to all hands. I trust that on his return he was able to give answer to many of the questions that have arisen in your mind.

If there is anything which you have asked for and which is not included in this letter or supplied by Murphy—other than the answer to the Pye memorandum concerning which you will receive an answer in the near future—please let me know, and I will supply the answer if I can. We are continuing daily bulletins to you and have received the first semimonthly summary.

There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my own part, I would say at any time after the next 90 days. Our heads and our hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted exclusively to the business of war and keeping fit—and I don't mean maybe.

It may come anytime. All good wishes.

/s/ BETTY.

P. S. Referring to your recent dispatch on the subject, it does not appear on its face that the Captain of the destroyer concerned followed up his contact to the nth degree or even asked for additional help to locate. However, we will reserve all judgment on this episode until we hear further from you.

[1] Op-12A-drc

Secret

23 DECEMBER 1940.

Admiral THOMAS C. HART,

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet,
U. S. S. "Houston," Flagship, Manila, P. I.

DEAR TOMMY: Your letter of December 4 containing Purnell's report of his conference with the British arrived a day or two after McCrea's departure, en route for Honolulu and Manila. McCrea will be able to give you the answers to some of the questions raised in your letter. However, I will refer to them herein even though I may be duplicating.

I agree with the two big points in the situation that you outline. The location of the "command post" would, however, depend, in my opinion, very much on the conditions obtaining.

Purnell's report gives me an interesting and valuable atmospheric background for the consideration of the situation in that area.

To follow your letter on down, the Department realizes very acutely the limited capacity of the obsolete equipment at Cavite. Measures are under way to improve the situation by giving you better equipment, and perhaps more equipment.

The planners in the War Plans Division, and in the Districts Division are giving very close scrutiny to the problem of laying an anti-motor boat boom in 25 fathoms of rough water, and are looking into the question of supplying the large amount of material that will be required for nets, etc. [2] It is apparent that not only will it be a job to get the material to you, but also you will be confronted with a job of getting it put together and laid down.

The mine plan from Manila Bay has been recently received here and in the War Department, and is under study. In reaching an answer the planners will undoubtedly be guided by your requirements for ingress and egress of ships through the entrance.

In regard to your next paragraph, I am completely with you and have sought at every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might say in this connection that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should go in maintaining our position in the Philippines seems to be changing upward. While such a change is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final on questions that arise. In the mean time we will send you all of the material you ask for to the extent it can be made available and can be shipped.—Incidentally, send me a sample of your "britches". I'll send you a bale of cloth for their enlargement. More power to you!

We have already requested your advice as to sending out division of birdboat mine sweepers. The division will be fitted out for magnetic mine sweeping in late January or perhaps in February.

In regard to your various recommendations on air matters, I will say that I perhaps in at least some of the instances would have made recommendations similar to yours had I been in your place, with the knowledge then available to you and your staff. However, the recommendations from the ASIATIC must be considered in the light of our expanding aviation program as well as that of foreign countries, and in the light of our plans not only for Manila and the Philippines, but also for the rest of the naval establishment. For some time we had had it in our minds to increase the submarine force in the ASIATIC and to make this force more effective by adding to the patrol plane strength. An additional requisite, of course, has been an increase in the fighter strength of the Army. Only recently has the Army gone along with us on this [3] point. I might add, parenthetically, that as we have increased the patrol plane strength, we have decreased the amount of overhead per plane. Altogether, I hope that we have made available to you a substantial increase in your power to carry out possible war tasks.

I can thoroughly appreciate your difficulties in regard to the movement of dependents; and if the pressure on you gets too heavy just pass the responsibility for it on my shoulders. I could even with the babes yet unborn were on their way home.

I presume this letter will reach you before McCrea's departure. His orders indicate his remaining with you for nine days. However, you and he may find it desirable for him to remain sometimes longer, in which case I will of course be glad to have him extend his visit.

/s/ BETTY.

C-AL6-2/A7-2/MD14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

30 DEC 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
 To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

References: (a) Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
 (b) Opnav dispatch 162128 of October 1940.
 (c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).
 (d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
 (e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (e), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to

C-114-1/A7-2/HD14

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 DEC 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 180 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficiency of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualaba or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

↓ 3. **DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.**

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other

C-A16-1/A7-2/MD14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND

HONOLULU, HAWAII, U. S. A.

CONFIDENTIAL

306-1000

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine asts are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later. *a*

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. SUBOFAIR.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unrelissable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement

- 3 - 28

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C-116-1/17-2/MB14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICTCONFIDENTIAL AND
1400Y YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

30 DEC 1940

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 8,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 8,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the

(1)

C-416-1/A7-2/MD14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.**CONFIDENTIAL**

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the
Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet
Surprise Attacks.

Numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed
at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view
that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there
is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities
here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are press-
ing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/

Serial 022.

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
January 8, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Com 14 Conf. Ltr.
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and antiaircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range antiaircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or antiaircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

*Copies introduced
H. H. H. H. H.
Captains H. H.
Judge Advocate*

74) *U.S. Navy & Air Force*
ENSEMBLE
Secretariat Office

EX 28 420

Alc/

**UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship**

Serial 022.

CONFIDENTIAL

**Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.**

3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U.S. Fleet. It is further considered that the provision of adequate

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certified to be a true copy of file copy in cipher
[Signature]
ENSIGN H. E. BORMAN, USN
Secret Mail Officer

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should
be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where
both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much
less. *q*

J. O. RICHARDSON,

Copy to:
Com FOURTEEN

certified to be a true copy of file copy in message
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CinC File No.

A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipSECRETPearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.
References: (a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of
January, 1941.
(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-UTB
of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

- (a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

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CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipSECRET

A13/0129

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

- (4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:
- (a) Provide escort for important ships.
 - (b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.
 - (c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.
 - (d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.
 - (e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.
 - (f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).
- (5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:
- (a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.
 - (b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.
 - (c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.
- (6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

CinC File No.
A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

Additional Measures if Japan enters War

- (7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific. *C*
- (8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.
- (9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.
- (10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

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6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Cahu and in the Local Defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When fleet planes, fleet guns and fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the fleet are:

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DO'.

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- (a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A.A. guns while in port.
 - (b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.
 - (c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.
 - (d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain. ^

CinC File No.
A16/0129

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Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103(a)(5) of W.P.L. 44 (advance copy) be despatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to:
Rear Admiral H.E. Kimmel

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Op-12-CTB(SC) A16(R-3) Serial 014412

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 10 February 1941.*Secret*

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations Plan D.

References: (a) Cinc, U. S. Pacific Fleet, secret ltr. A16/0129 of January 25, 1941.

(b) SecNav secret ltr. to SecWar, Serial 09112 of January 24, 1941.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (a).

2. Since the plans to be prepared under the directives of WPL-44 will be applicable to a large extent to the situation presented by Plan D, the Chief of Naval Operations desires that planning under WPL-44 continue to have the highest priority.

3. The general concept, the assumptions, and the tasks under a Plan D situation, outlined in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of reference (a), are in accord with the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. In connection with the initial sweep for Japanese raiders in the Northern Pacific, mentioned in paragraph 5 (7), a suggestion may here be in order. The Chief of Naval Operations believes it possible that Japan for some time maintained a vessel about 500 miles north of Oahu. Indications are that some similar vessel is now stationed about 1,000 miles southwest of Oahu. In connection with reports of unidentified submarines near Oahu, Panama, the Mexican coast, and in the open sea, it may be surmised that the vessel mentioned above is a submarine tender, and that Japan may plan during war to base submarines on tenders in the open sea. It is considered most inadvisable that we indicate too much curiosity in this respect for the time being. It would be well, however, to keep track of such vessels, and to take immediate steps to sink them on the outbreak of war.

5. With reference to paragraph 7 of reference (a), the Chief of Naval Operations is cognizant of the condition of the defenses of Oahu, and, in view of the inadequacy of the Army defenses, the responsibility which must rest upon the fleet for its own protection while in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, your attention is invited to reference (b), a copy of which was furnished to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The War Department is taking steps to remedy the situation, but the Commander-in-Chief should constantly press the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to make all the improvements that lie within his own power.

6. It is noted that no provision is made in the Naval local Defense Force plans of the Fourteenth Naval District for the employment of vessels as a part of an aircraft warning net in the waters to the northward and southward of Oahu. It is suggested that in coordinating the plans of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, this matter be given consideration. It is possible the large sampans equipped with radio might prove useful for this purpose during war.

7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document be registered mail.

/s/ H. R. Stark.
H. R. STARK.

EXHIBIT NO. 10

Op-12B-9-McC (SC) A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 09112*Secret*

JAN. 24, 1941.

My DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be

initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

[2] The counter measures to be considered are:

- (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
- (b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
- (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
- (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
- (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26—3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

[3] The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Navy.

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Copies to: CINC, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Com 14

Op-22

Op-30

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

FEB 7, 1941

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

SECRET

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured -- forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

(2-8-41)

Op-12B-McC (SC) A7-2 (2)/FF1

Serial 015712

D-27446

Secret

FEB. 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Reference: (a) SecNav Secret Let. to SecWar, (SC) A7-2 (2)/FF1, Serial 09112 of January 24, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of SecWar Secret Let. to SecNavy dated February 7, 1941 in reply to reference (a).

1. In connection with reference (a), a copy of which was forwarded to you, there is forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A), a copy of the reply of the Secretary of War to reference (a).

Copy to: Op-22

Op-30

Via Air Mail

FEBRUARY 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the inclosed copy of letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War of January 24, 1941, relative to the above mentioned subject, together with copy of reply thereto from the Secretary of War, February 7, 1941.

2. It is desired that you cooperate with the local naval authorities in making effective the measures for joint defense, referred to in paragraph 6 of the reply to the Secretary of the Navy.

By order of the Secretary of War:

WM. W. DICK,

Adjutant General,

Reg. No. 900270, 2-8-41.

2 Inclosures—

Inc. 1—Copy, ltr. from Sec. of Navy to Sec. of War, 1-2-41.

Incl. 2—Copy, ltr. from Sec. of War to Sec. of Navy, 2-7-41.

13 FEB. 1941.

Subject: A. dse. o. ph. hwi.

Received of The Adjutant General, letter, February 7, 1941, subject as indicated above, together with two (2) inclosures noted therein.

(Signed) Carl Grosse,

CARL GROSSE,

Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General,

Office: Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

[Stamped notation: 45 AGO Feb 24 1941 Received]

NOTE: Please accomplish promptly and return to The A. G. O.

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01687

CPL/10

Long Beach, California
October 18, 1940

		01
From:	Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.	06
To:	Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet..	—
Subject:	International situation - Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.	06
Enclosures:	(A) Copy of assumptions.	11
	(B) Copy of tentative operations.	12
1.	During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken by Japan against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road, the following:	15
		16
(a)	Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peace-time move.	18-A
(b)	Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.	19
(c)	Attempting to stop <u>all</u> trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations's office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for	20
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		96

CinC File No.

ALB/01687

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

OFFICE

Long Beach, California
 October 16, 1940

Subject: International situation - Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

 submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.

2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in regard to the memorandum referred to above, but received a despatch today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to you via the HUSTON. It is believed that further study in the Department and in the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions might have a deterring effect on ORANGE full scale operations in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by the despatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations to the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department that no Army forces would be available and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or before it is not reached to despatch the Advance Detachment before that

1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Al6/01687

Oct/10

Long Beach, California
October 16, 1940Subject: International situation - Reinforcement of
the Asiatic Fleet.

01

05

06

time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise, utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is done, the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests. I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more fully developed.

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18-A

7. My secret serial Al6/01683 of this date, covering the composition and preparation of the tentative detachment slated for reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to you by clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON with this letter.

19

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8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

20-A

21

J. O. RICHARDSON

22

Copy to: (..a airmail)

23

OpNAV (This copy ~~deleted~~ by OpNAV despatch
192000 of Oct 6)

75

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Op-128-2-McC

10-11-40

Sec 11MEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. FLEET

1. Mobilize U.S. Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
 - a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U.S. Shipping.
 - b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing locally or at Panama.
 - c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U.S. Shipping as follows:-
 - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
 - 5 to San Francisco
 - 4 to Hawaii
 - d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport, plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
 - e. Move PatWing 5 (____planes) with tenders to San Diego for local coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).

1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Op-128-2-McC

10-11-40

Plan I

3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
 - a. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
 - b. Reinforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.
 - c. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender, to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.
 - d. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area, consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 9 DD, 4 AMD, (Desdiv 51), 1 AC, 1 AD. (This force will reinforce U.S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (NOTE: If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the completion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the Mid-Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force exposed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.
5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii and Alutians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with mobilization requirements.
6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reinforced Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.

00-428-4-400

10-11-40

SECRET

7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -
 - a. Reinforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrols, 4 OSS, 1 ASR.
 - b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.
 - c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patrol with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND, provide small Marine listening post.
 - d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 SS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.
 - e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.
 - f. Dispatch 2 Patrols of Patroling ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patroling FIVE.
8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 24 SS) to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.
9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.
10. Assist in defense of U.S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. ~~In the~~ the Pacific this will be comprise: -

4 DM to HAWAII

3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.

SECRET

October 11, 1940

U.S. FLEET Dispositions and Operations to meet special situation in Western Pacific.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.
3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce co-operation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.
5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.
6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.
7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific, - in Australia and Singapore, - and Dutch Forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.
8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.
9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.
10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.

EXHIBIT NO. 12

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AND RETURN TO

NEOS:CHB/3-In



14 November 1945


Hon. Frank B. Keefe,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Keefe:

I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to be substituted for the one enclosed with the Secretary of the Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.

This revised statement was prepared after collaboration between this office and the Bureau of the Budget in studying the records of the years in question, and the figures appearing thereon will agree with those furnished you by the Bureau of the Budget. While the records concerning the regular Naval Appropriation Bills for each year were complete, information concerning deficiency and supplemental estimates requested by the Navy Department was lacking in many cases and required extended search through the files for the years in question.

Sincerely yours,


E. G. ALLEN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Budget and Reports.

(Enclosure)

1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive

Fiscal year	Appropriations requested by the Navy Department	Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract authority
1932				
Annual appropriation act.....	\$354,809,746	\$347,794,248	\$358,262,123	\$7,700,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	354,809,746	347,794,248	358,262,123	7,700,000
1933				
Annual appropriation act.....	399,139,886	341,677,450	317,583,591	5,715,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	0
Total.....	409,139,886	351,677,450	327,583,591	5,715,000
1934				
Annual appropriation act.....	352,717,786	308,669,562	308,669,562	8,100,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	352,717,786	308,669,562	308,669,562	8,100,000
1935				
Annual appropriation act.....	318,324,414	286,332,392	284,658,799	2,800,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	17,086,504	17,075,257	17,075,257	0
Total.....	335,410,918	303,407,649	301,734,056	2,800,000
1936				
Annual appropriation act.....	502,855,817	485,443,847	458,684,379	6,590,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	23,931,725	23,931,725	23,915,851	0
Total.....	526,787,542	509,375,572	482,600,230	6,590,000
1937				
Annual appropriation act.....	585,010,984	548,591,299	529,546,532	13,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	1,921,300	1,921,300	1,921,300	0
Total.....	586,932,284	551,512,599	528,467,832	13,000,000
1938				
Annual appropriation act.....	594,269,223	562,425,709	516,258,808	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	4,766,000	4,766,000	2,881,000	0
Total.....	599,035,223	567,191,709	519,139,808	15,000,000
1939				
Annual appropriation act.....	629,665,104	564,406,461	546,866,494	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	89,714,905	85,839,950	76,659,700	0
Total.....	719,380,009	650,246,411	623,526,194	15,000,000
1940				
Annual appropriation act.....	788,775,549	790,342,453	773,049,151	20,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	288,602,340	186,088,316	170,326,098	2,450,000
Total.....	1,077,377,889	976,430,769	943,375,249	22,450,000

Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive—Continued

Fiscal Year	Appropriations Requested by the Navy De- partment	Budget Esti- mate of Appro- priations sub- mitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract Authority
1941				
Annual appropriation act	1,384,442,202	1,337,311,577	1,274,171,138	148,741,612
Supplemental and deficiency appro- priation acts	3,862,187,700	2,224,094,342	2,275,212,207	797,356,500
Total	5,236,629,902	3,561,405,919	3,549,383,345	946,098,112
Total asked	9,434,271,533	7,428,240,190	7,256,896,276	1,029,038,112
1934-1941 inclusive:			Total	
Budget cut requests	2,006,031,343	-----	8,285,934,388	
Congress executed budget by	857,694,198	-----		

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1945


Honorable Frank B. Keefe
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Keefe:

Attached is a statement which contains for the War Department Military Establishment, data on amounts requested of the Bureau of the Budget, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and funds and contract authorizations made available to the War Department for the fiscal years 1932 through 1941. These data were requested by you on October 19th for use as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee.

Insofar as can be determined, there is no copy in the files of the War Department, of a speech delivered by the President of the Philippine Islands, Mr. Quezon, in Manila some time in November, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'R. P. Patterson', followed by a long horizontal line.

ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War

Incl.
Stat

Appropriations, War Department military establishment, fiscal years 1932 through 1941

Fiscal year	Requested by War Department		Requested by the Bureau of the Budget		Appropriated by the Congress	
	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations
1932						
Annual appropriation act.....	\$347,856,137	\$3,000,000	\$339,725,859	\$3,000,000	\$335,475,965	\$3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	3,448,157	0	3,444,951	0	4,291,679	0
Total.....	351,304,294	3,000,000	343,170,810	3,000,000	339,767,644	3,000,000
1933						
Annual appropriation act.....	316,079,255	0	301,030,642	0	289,500,024	0
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	15,164,468	0	15,164,468	0	15,461,468	0
Total.....	331,243,723	0	316,195,110	0	304,961,492	0
1934						
Annual appropriation act.....	320,884,513	0	277,730,841	3,000,000	277,050,381	3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	16,000	0	16,000	0	16,000	0
Total.....	320,900,513	0	277,746,841	3,000,000	277,066,381	3,000,000
1935						
Annual appropriation act.....	279,913,374	0	260,624,208	3,000,000	255,526,147	3,000,000
Second and deficiency appropriation acts.....	25,357,947	0	25,335,947	0	25,335,947	0
Total.....	305,271,321	0	285,960,155	3,000,000	280,862,094	3,000,000
1936						
Annual appropriation act.....	346,723,362	0	317,459,277	0	341,348,204	7,686,753
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	14,627,792	0	14,340,000	0	14,190,000	0
Total.....	361,351,154	0	331,799,277	0	355,538,204	7,686,753
1937						
Annual appropriation act.....	458,193,897	0	375,025,510	8,000,000	383,104,859	10,669,786
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	8,829,018	0	8,040,000	0	5,140,000	3,000,000
Total.....	467,022,915	0	383,065,510	8,000,000	388,244,859	13,669,786

EXHIBIT NO. 13

CONFIDENTIAL**HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE**

Office of the Air Force Commander

HICKAM FIELD, T. H.

(T-3)

In reply refer to:

20 August 1941

SUBJECT: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan).

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is

CONFIDENTIALuv
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Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii, cont 'd:

considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support on the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the difference above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

Barking Sands	2
Morse Field	2
Hilo	1
Lanai.....	1
Parker Ranch	1

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii, Cont'd:

10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls-

Incl #1 - Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu.
(In triplicate).

Incl #2 - Personnel Requirement Recapitulation. (In triplicate).

Incl #3 - Air Force Housing Facilities.
(In triplicate).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~3
44

C O N F I D E N T I A LPLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF BOMBARDMENT AVIATION IN THE DEFENSE OF OAHUI. GENERAL:

1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search and thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for an attack.

2. The most difficult problem presents itself when it is necessary to search through 360°. This might occur daily and it is the only one considered in this study. It is possible, of course, that intelligence obtained from advanced naval bases and ships at sea might implement this plan and reduce the search area to 270°, 180° or even 90°. In this case, the striking force would be augmented by those planes not required for search.

3. All computations in connection with air operations under this plan are based on the B-17D airplane. This type of airplane is considered available for either a search mission or an attack mission and consequently no reference is made to reconnaissance or bombardment aviation as such but to the search or the attack forces. The combat crew training of both will be identical and search and attack missions will be rotated for the purpose of resting crews and maintaining aircraft.

II. THE PROBLEM:

1. To analyze the mission of heavy bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu with a view to promulgating a plan in accordance therewith.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE:1. Facts:

a. The Army mission is: "To defend the Naval Base of Oahu".

b. The bombardment mission is:

(1) When Navy reconnaissance is adequate:

"To attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action."

(2) When Navy is absent or not present with equipment in Numbers or Quality:

"To search for, attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action."

c. *Capabilities of B-17D type airplanes are:

	<u>Gal Fuel used</u>	<u>Miles flown</u>
(1) <u>Search at 45% Power at 5,000' Altitude</u>		
(No bombs-2500 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operations	432	214
Two hour fuel reserve	272	
Climb	30	10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr	1766	1910
	<u>2500</u>	<u>2134</u>
Radius of Action in nautical miles		<u>1067</u>

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

	Gal Fuel used	Miles flown
(2) Search - Attack at 45% at 5,000'		
(4 - 600# bombs - 2100 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation	432	214
Two hours fuel reserve	272	
Climb	30	10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr	1366	1485
	<u>2100</u>	<u>1709</u>
Radius of Action in nautical miles		<u>854</u>
(3) Attack at 65% Power - Return at 45% Power at 15,000'		
(4 - 600# bombs - 2100 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power	272	
Climb	90	27
65% Power - 193 knots at 208 gal/hr	687	643
45% Power - 150 knots at 136 gal/hr	612	643
	<u>2093</u>	<u>1549</u>
Radius of Action in nautical miles		<u>775</u>
(4) Attack at 65% Power - Return at 45% Power at 15,000'		
(8 - 600# bombs - 1700 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power	272	
Climb	90	27
65% Power - 193 knots at 208 gal/hr	485	450
45% Power - 150 knots at 136 gal/hr	408	450
	<u>1687</u>	<u>1163</u>
Radius of Action in nautical miles	<u>1700</u>	<u>581</u>

*Note— The above capabilities were taken from curves in the B-17D handbook and checked by actual flight tests.

d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base.

e. If the solution to a problem is designed to meet the most adverse conditions, any less adverse condition will facilitate the solution.

f. Army Air Force units at present are not charged with the reconnaissance mission for the defense of Oahu.

g. The combatant force having the longer range weapon has a basic advantage, other factors being equal.

h. The bombardment airplane is the longest range weapon which the Department Commander has at his disposal.

2. Assumptions:

a. The following are the assumed or known maximum capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) Some of his carriers can steam at 30 knots for at least 24 hours. (Best available intelligence indicates ORANGE has three carriers with this performance).

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (based on perfor-

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

mance data of the U. S. Navy carrier planes and no allowance is made for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

b. The following are the assumed probable capabilities of enemy equipment:

- (1) His carriers steam at 27 knots for 24 hours.
(28 knots is the mean top speed of his carriers; 1 knot reduction is made for four bottoms).
- (2) His carrier bombing planes have 400 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (reduction in range from 600 to 400 nautical miles is made to allow for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

Note: In the discussion that follows it is assumed that hostile carriers operating under conditions a and b above once committed to action will steam straight in to their launching radius. Any manouvering by the enemy when within our search area will ~~simplify~~ our problem for it will give the search force more time in which to locate the enemy.

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu.

d. An enemy will not venture an attack against the Hawaiian Islands until control of sea lanes of communication is obtained. Then as the enemy fleet approaches these islands, raids by surface vessels, submarines and carrier-based aircraft, may be expected.

e. Our most likely enemy, ORANGE, can probably employ a maximum of 6 carriers against Oahu.

f. A 25-mile visibility is assumed. This assumption is based on standard U. S. Navy search and patrol methods employed in this area.

g. For the purpose of this problem the day is divided into 13 hours of daylight and 11 hours of darkness. These assumptions are based on the following computations:

(1) June 22, 20° N. Lat., Sunrise	0521
Sunset	1842
Hours of daylight	1321
Add: Morning Twilight	25
Evening Twilight	24
Total hours of daylight	<u>14:10</u>
(2) December 21, 20° N. Lat., Sunrise	0630
Sunset	1750
Hours of daylight	1120
Add: Morning Twilight	24
Evening Twilight	24
Total hours daylight	<u>12:08</u>
Average (1) and (2)	<u>13:09</u>

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

IV. DISCUSSION:Part 1: The Search:

1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100% coverage through 360°. A method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius of 833 nautical miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes is indicated in Chart No. 1. It will be noted that the outside lines of visibility for the diverging tracks cross at the 600 nautical mile circle, the overlap area inside of that distance becoming a non-covered area beyond that distance. The width of the non-covered area increases as the distance increases beyond 600 nautical miles with the corollary that the probability of finding the target decreases as the search continues out. However, as can be seen on the chart, each search plane on the search back covers the area not covered between any two planes on the search out and, in addition, covers the area previously searched by the plane on its loft on the search out but uncovered on the search back. 100% coverage of the area is, therefore, obtained on the search out and back.

2. In order to have available for ready reference a means of determining coverage and non-coverage of areas on the search out using 3°, 4° and 5° sectors, there is attached Chart No. 2. The method of constructing the curves thereon is indicated on the chart. It will be observed that, with the assumed visibility of 25 miles, 100% coverage on the search out is obtained to a radius of:

- a. 600 nautical miles with airplanes in 5° sectors.
- b. 750 nautical miles with airplanes in 4° sectors.
- c. 1000 nautical miles with airplanes in 3° sectors.

3. Under any given set of operating data for the search planes and enemy carrier, the radius of action of the search force is determined by:

- a. Rate of closure of the carrier and search planes.
- b. Minimum distance the carrier can be offshore and allow the search force to make interception and relay the information to the attack force.
- c. Minimum time required for the attack force to make interception beyond the radius of action of the carrier planes.

4. In developing this plan, all search aircraft take off at daylight. They might take off during darkness in order to be at a certain location at dawn if definite information as to the movements of enemy surface vessels is reported from some source such as our search of a previous day, friendly surface vessels or Navy patrol.

Part 2: This part of the discussions deals with the maximum capabilities of enemy equipment namely, his carriers steam at 30 knots and his bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots. See Chart No. 3.

1. Section No. 1:

- a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illus-

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

trates four possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. In each case the distance out for dusk and dawn is computed from the most distant aircraft launching circle, or 350 nautical miles. This figure is based on the fact that after launching, the carrier planes will be in the air 3:20 and during that time the carrier steams in 100 nautical miles to recover its planes.

b. 1A shows the carrier launching its aircraft at midnight, attacking and recovering during darkness; 1B shows the launching at dusk with the attack and recovery during darkness; 1C shows the launching at noon with the attack and recovery during daylight; and 1D shows the launching at dawn with the attack and recovery during daylight.

c. It will be noted that each time schedule has a daylight period within the radius of action of the attack force but that 1D permits the least time interval for our forces to operate against an enemy and requires it to attack at the longest range. The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.

d. It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This Headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons:

- (1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
- (2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D Day at close range.
- (3) The enemy will be more concerned with delivering a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful.

2. Section No. 2:

a. This section illustrates a routine daily search by the search force which will be made in order to prevent an enemy from making an undetected approach on Oahu.

b. Specifically, with the carrier approaching at 30 knots and the search force taking off at dawn, interception must be made no closer to Oahu than 435 nautical miles and no later than 3:03 after dawn on D Day. This permits 40 minutes to send a radio message to the home base and get the attack force in the air and 2:10 for it to intercept and deliver its attack before the carrier can launch its planes. The attack force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 5:34 D Day, 359 nautical miles out.

c. On a time distance basis, dawn D Day for a carrier is 526 nautical miles from Oahu; dusk D Day-1 is 856 nautical miles out and dawn D Day-1 is 1246 nautical miles from Oahu. Solving the rate of closure problem for the two forces 1246 nautical miles apart, it is found that contact will be made at 1030 nautical miles from Oahu at carrier's dawn plus 7:12 on D Day-1.

d. It must be pointed out that this solution is the maximum radius of action for the search force, yet not necessarily the most difficult problem presented to our attack force. While a carrier arriving at

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

the 1030 nautical mile circle at dawn plus 7:12 on D Day-1 cannot be attacked that day, it can be attacked the following day as shown in b above when it must come within easy range of the attack force if it is to attempt to steam to within its launching radius.

3. Section No. 3:

a. This section illustrates the most difficult problem which the attack force has to solve. It is the same problem that is illustrated in Section No. 1D. The critical point here is the carrier's position at his launching radius at dawn. Under these circumstances he is able to launch his aircraft before we intercept him and deliver an attack against him on D Day. Therefore, we must hit him D Day-1, or the day before he arrives at this position.

b. Specifically, if his dawn position D Day is 350 nautical miles from Oahu, his dusk position D Day-1 must be 680 nautical miles out and his dawn position D Day-1 must be 1070 nautical miles out. If he makes good this schedule, interception by the search force will be made at 884 nautical miles out at his dawn plus 6:11 on D Day-1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit a message and to get the attack force in the air, the attacking force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 10:43 D Day-1 at a distance of 748 nautical miles from Oahu and can operate against it during the remaining 2:16 before dusk. Under the most favorable condition for the enemy, the enemy carrier can be subjected to attack by our attacking force during a period of 2:16 on D Day-1.

4. Section No. 4: This section shows the radius of action of the B-17D type airplane with full load of bombs and 1700 gallons of fuel.

5. Effect of Visibility (See Chart No. 2):

a. To cover the required search area under the above conditions 120 airplanes, each covering a 3° sector, would be needed to operate to a distance of 1030 nautical miles. This number of planes would permit 100% coverage of the entire 360° on the search out.

b. Obviously any decrease in the number of planes employed will increase the factor to be searched by each plane and therefore reduces the probability of finding the target. Any uncovered area would, however, with a lesser number of search planes be covered on the search back, and depending upon the location of the carrier and the hour of the day, might permit an attack to be made on D Day-1 or D Day.

- Part 3: This part of the discussion deals with the assumed probable capabilities of enemy equipment (see Chart No. 4). It is believed that his maximum capabilities will be reduced from those assumed for Sections 1 to 4, inclusive, (Chart No. 3) by the following factors:

1. His average carrier top speed will be 27 knots. This statement is predicated upon the fact that the average top speed of ORANGE carriers is 28 knots, and the belief that on his run across the Pacific, foul bottoms will probably further reduce his speed.

2. The cruising range of his carrier aircraft will be 400 nautical miles. No allowance is made in previous computations for full throttle operation, for fuel reserve, or for time required to take off from, and land aboard, the carrier.

3. He will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.

4. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0° counter-clockwise to 180° around Oahu; the next most probable, the quadrant 180° counter-clockwise to 90°; the least probable, 90° to 0°.

c. The tactical search enunciated above is not the only source of information as to his movements. Office Naval Intelligence, surface scouting forces, commercial ships at sea, radio intercept and proposed advance naval line patrol, will tend to disclose his general location and might, therefore, reduce the search area for our forces.

d. He will want to take the shortest distance to his objective, although this will be of minor consideration if his range is sufficient to permit him the long approach.

4. Section No. 5:

a. This section has been drawn to show one possible plan of attack of the enemy under his assumed probable capabilities. Here consideration has been given to the factors enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 immediately above, with the result that his performance characteristics have been reduced to 27 knots speed for his carrier and to 400 nautical miles range for his airplanes. Under these conditions it will be necessary for the carrier to approach within 233 nautical miles of Oahu before it can launch its aircraft; recovery would be made at 167 nautical miles. Accordingly, the radius of search can be reduced to 833 nautical miles and still permit the search force to locate the carrier and the attack force make its attack before the carrier-based aircraft can be launched. These assumed characteristics can reduce the required search radius to 833 nautical miles and still permit the carrier being attacked before it reaches the position from which aircraft can be launched.

b. If on D Day-1 the carrier force is at a distance of 991 nautical miles steaming in at 27 knots and the search force takes off at dawn, interception will occur at the carrier's dawn plus 5:49, 833 nautical miles away, the maximum radius of search under these conditions. Allowing 40 minutes to order the attack force out and 3:42 for the flight, the carrier can be attacked at its dawn plus 10:11 D Day-1, 715 nautical miles out and can operate against it during the remaining 2:49 before dusk.

c. Further, should the carrier be missed on D Day-1 there still remains an opportunity to attack it on D Day. Interception must be made by the search force not nearer than carrier's dawn plus 2:02, 288 nautical miles out on D Day in order to make an attack prior to launching. This attack would occur at dawn plus 3:56, 237 nautical miles out.

5. Section No. 6: The problem here is the same as that shown in paragraph 3, Part 2 above, i.e., the most favorable plan of action open to an enemy. With the carrier making good its time schedule to arrive at its airplane launching position at daylight, interception by the search force will be made at dawn plus 5:11 of carrier's D Day-1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit the message to the home base and for the attack force to take off, the attack force can reach the carrier at dawn plus 9:08 of carrier's D Day-1 and can operate against the carrier during the remaining 3:42 before dusk. Under the most probable plan of action of an enemy carrier, a B-17 attacking force can operate against the carrier for 3:42 of the day prior to his attack on Oahu.

6. Effect of Visibility:

a. In Section No. 5, a 5° search spread should give adequate coverage. The search time schedule is such that if interception is not made on the search out it can be made on the search back in time to transmit the information and to deliver an attack by the striking force before

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd;

dusk on D Day-1. There is 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles on the search out, but on the search out and back there is 100% coverage. 72 airplanes would be used for the search.

b. In Section No. 6, with 5° search sectors, the probability of finding the target at 740 nautical miles is 85% for the search out and as stated in a above, 100% for the search out and back. 72 airplanes would be sufficient for complete coverage in this case, for if interception is not made on the way out, it can be made on the search back in time to transmit information and deliver an attack.

V. CONCLUSION:

1. Action by enemy carrier-based bombing planes against Oahu should be figured on the basis of their having 400 nautical miles range and a speed of 180 knots.

2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

- (1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack.
- (2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack.
- (3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.
- (4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the day of the attack.

b. Any variation from the above time schedule permits our attack force to strike the enemy during daylight of the day before his attack over a greater time interval and at a shorter range; or, permits our attack force to strike him during daylight of the day he attacks but before he is within his radius of action of Oahu. If an enemy carrier succeeded in slipping in undetected by our search force and launched an attack, we could and would, of course, attack as soon as possible in order to destroy or disable the carrier prior to, or during, the recovery of its planes.

3. The area between the circles with radii 530 nautical miles and 833 nautical miles from Oahu is the operating area for the solution of this problem under its most adverse condition.

4. a. With the Army Air Force responsible for its own reconnaissance, 72 B-17D airplanes will be required to search daily the area within the circle of 833 nautical miles radius from Oahu, each plane covering a 5° sector.

b. Based upon the assumption of visibility used in this study, 72 airplanes employed to search a 360° sector should result in 100% coverage with some overlap to 600 nautical miles, 85% coverage at 700 nautical miles and 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles in the search out. In every case, the search out and in would permit 100% coverage within the time interval which would allow the launching of the bombing attack prior to dusk on D Day-1.

5. If a similar search could be conducted from Dutch Harbor, Midway, Johnston or Palmyra the possibility of enemy surface ships approaching Hawaii and the west coast of the United States undetected would be practically non-existent.

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

6. Search must be conducted during daylight hours because of the extreme difficulty of locating what will be an unlighted objective proceeding under cover of darkness. The B-17D airplane is capable of searching for, and attacking, an enemy force the day prior to its arrival within its striking distance of Oahu.

7. With this plan in actual operation the defenses of these islands can be assured without assistance from the Navy. This will permit complete freedom of action of the Pacific Fleet.

8. The B-17D airplane is capable of operating beyond the combat range of any known enemy carrier-based aviation.

9. Attack must be conducted during daylight hours because it is considered impracticable to locate and bomb a maneuvering precision target during darkness.

10. Based on the worst situation that could arise, i.e., the employment of 6 enemy carriers against Oahu simultaneously each approaching on a different course, an attack force of 36 B-17D's would be required to disable or destroy the carriers. It is expected that 6 B-17D's with bomb loads of seven 600# bombs would be sufficient to accomplish the desired result (see Study No. 1). It is contemplated that this attack force will be augmented by 36 additional B-17D's of the maintenance and reserve force if in commission.

11. This attack force should be further augmented by a minimum of 36 long-range planes of the B-26 or similar type, capable of carrying torpedoes to be used as the striking force under conditions of low ceiling and visibility when high altitude level bombing technique is not practicable. (See Study No. 2).

12. A reserve of 72 planes will be needed to provide for maintenance, replacement and reserve for both the search and attack forces. As was stated in paragraph 10 above, 36 of this number may be employed as part of the attack force if in commission.

13. In order to operate the above number of B-17D's, a minimum of 216 combat crews will be needed as indicated in Chart No. 5.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that the War Department give immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 833 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows:

72 for daily search missions.

36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs, for a mission).

72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the attack force.

180 total B-17D's.

36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.

2. While this number of bombardment airplanes could not be accommodated at Hickam Field and there are no other suitable bases available on Oahu, it should be only a matter of time until projects submitted to the War Department for the construction of airdromes on outlying islands of

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Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:

the Hawaiian group are completed which, with Hickam Field, will be adequate for operations of the above number of planes. Existing plans for the dispersion of the 18th Bombardment Wing (H) provide for units of one and two squadrons to operate from dispersed airdromes. Modification of the plan to apply to operations therefrom are anticipated and will be made.

3. It is further recommended that in making future allotments of officers and enlisted men to the Hawaiian Air Force consideration be given to providing a minimum of 216 B-17D combat crews and 36 medium bomber-torpedo combat crews. In this connection, see paragraph 8, basic letter.

4. Our leading tacticians and strategists here concur in the opinion that this plan will solve the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and that to their knowledge it is the best and only means that can be devised to locate enemy carriers and make attacks thereon before said carriers can come within launching distance of Oahu. The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. The best defense is an aggressive and well-organized offense. The basis of this plan is offensive action. We have had clearly demonstrated to us in Europe the fallacy of depending upon passive measures of defense. We must not base our plans of action on the "Defense of Hawaii", but rather upon a vigorous offensive. We must forget out the enemy and destroy him before he can take action to destroy us.

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action.

In order to initiate offensive action, the Hawaiian Air Force must have at its immediate command well-organized, equipped and trained combat crews. It should be remembered that while reinforcements from the Mainland can be made available on short notice their expeditious presence here will not solve the problem. Upon their arrival they must be given an opportunity to undergo a certain amount of indispensable indoctrination and training in the plan of action of the Hawaiian Air Force. If this plan is to be effective the force recommended above must be made a reality and maintained in existence in Hawaii for combat at any time. With the United States living and working under a condition of unlimited National Emergency, Japan making its southward movement and the world in general in a complete state of turmoil we must be prepared for D Day at any time. Reinforcements, therefore, must be considered from the standpoint of replacements for losses only. Any delay in placing this plan in operation, such as would be necessary for the above reasons, would mitigate against its success.

It is believed that a force of 180 four-motored aircraft with 36 long-range torpedo airplanes is a small force when compared with the importance of this outpost. This force can be provided at less cost to the Government than the cost of one modern battleship. It is further believed that this force should be made available as soon as possible even at the expense of other units on the Mainland.

C O N F I D E N T I A LSTUDY OF THE BOMBS REQUIRED TO DISABLE AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER

1. It is assumed that two direct hits by 500 lb. or 600 lb. demolition bombs will be sufficient to disable an aircraft carrier.

2. From the tables of probability of direct hits by bombing, results obtained by units of the Hawaiian Air Force in bombing sleds towed by Navy surface craft and from previous experiences by bombardiers who have made attacks of this nature, it is determined that about 90% probability of two direct hits may be expected from 6 B-17D's or similar type airplanes attacking a maneuvering carrier from 15,000 feet, each dropping seven 600 lb. bombs in train. Bombardiers are assumed to be capable of at least a 20 mil accuracy.

3. In arriving at the number of bombs and airplanes required, several methods of attack are considered:

a. Attack by individual airplanes from different directions, attacking in close succession.

b. Formation attacks by three plane elements from different directions and in close succession.

c. Formation attack in a 6-plane flight.

In all cases bombs are assumed to have been dropped in train by each airplane with a spacing of 80 feet between bombs. The number of bombs (42) and airplanes (6) required to give a 90% probability of two effective hits was determined to be nearly the same for each type of attack.

STUDY NO. 1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A LNEED FOR TORPEDO PLANES IN THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

1. a. Any or all of the following factors could be expected to partially or wholly prevent the successful accomplishment of the bombardment mission:

- (1) Inability to find enemy force (navigation).
- (2) Lack of bombing accuracy.
- (3) Enemy fighter action.
- (4) Hostile anti-aircraft artillery fire.
- (5) Weather obscuring the objective.

b. Consideration of these factors:

- (1 and 2) Navigational and bombing accuracy are primarily matters of training and practice. Efficient standards can be and are being attained by the training of combat crews in the Hawaiian Air Force.
- (3) The critical altitude, high speed and defensive armament of the present heavy bombardment aircraft is such as to provide excellent defense against enemy fighters. It is not believed that carrier-based fighters will be very effective against the B-17D's at high altitudes.
- (4) Reports from abroad indicate that anti-aircraft fire will be only partially effective and will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission.
- (5) The weather of the Hawaiian Islands is probably the best in the world from a standpoint of flying conditions and yet a very definite percentage of bombing missions fail because of overcast conditions which obscure the objective. Heavy bombardment as such is useless against surface craft when low ceilings (200 - 1,000 feet) prevail, and it is doubtful if it could be used below 5,000 feet without prohibitive losses from anti-aircraft fire before reaching the bomb release line. Enemy surface craft may be expected to take full advantage of all cloudiness conditions and even to wait until such conditions occur before launching an attack. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has no weapon to effectively combat surface craft under such conditions.

2. The following is submitted as a solution to this problem:

a. The most effective action against surface craft under poor weather conditions is believed to be a torpedo attack from low flying aircraft. This is substantiated by results from abroad, i.e., Bismarck sinking, Taranto attack, etc.. A torpedo plane flying just off the water can operate under a very low ceiling and with guaranteed accuracy

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Need for Torpedo Planes in the Hawaiian Air Force, cont'd:

against all surface craft. The torpedo plane should be land-based, of long range, fast and capable of being accurately navigated. It should operate in conjunction with heavy bombardment.

3. a. The only type airplane that could be adapted to this purpose at present in the Hawaiian Department is the A-20A. It is believed that this adaptation can be made and the problem is under consideration and test at present.

b. It is believed that the medium bombardment airplane of the B-26 type will be even more satisfactory because of its longer range.

c. It is recommended that adaptation of some such airplane be made, preferably in such a manner as not to interfere with the normal bombardment mission.

STUDY NO. 2

- 2 -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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(In addition to the foregoing sections of the Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii dated 20 August 1941, Exhibit No. 13, there are included in the Exhibit the following charts:

Chart 1. A Method of Searching 5° Sectors Through 360° to a Radius of 833 Miles from Oahu Employing 72 B-17D Airplanes.

Chart 2. Relation of 25 Miles Visibility to Distance.

Chart 3. Radius of Action of B-17D Airplane Under Various Load Conditions in Relation to Possible Plans of Action of Carrier Group Attacking Oahu, Assuming Carrier Speed of 30 Knots and Carrier Planes Performance 600 Mile Range.

Chart 4. Radius of Action of B-17D Airplane Under Various Load Conditions in Relation to Possible Plans of Action of Carrier Group Attacking Oahu, Assuming Carrier Speed of 27 Knots and Carrier Planes Performance 400 Mile Range.

Chart 5. Schedule for B-17D Combat Crews.

The above five charts are reproduced as Items Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 respectively in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

STRENGTH OF HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE
(Air Corps Troops Only)

HICKAM FIELD

Units	Auth	Actual	Over	Short
Hq Haw'n Air Force				
Hq & Hq Sq Haw'n Air Force	200	*203	3	
19th Transport Sq	161	158		3
Tow Target Det	139	4		135
Total Hq Haw'n Air Force	500	365	3	138
18th Bombardment Wing				
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing	158	194	36	
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
23rd Bomb Sq (H)	206	218	13	
31st Bomb Sq (H)	206	217	11	
72nd Bomb Sq (H)	206	222	16	
4th Recon Sq (H)	232	238	6	
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
14th Bomb Sq (H)	206	217	11	
25th Bomb Sq (H)	206	215	9	
42nd Bomb Sq (H)	206	223	17	
50th Recon Sq (H)	232	232		1
Hq & Hq Sq 17th AB Gp (R)	131	216	85	
18th AB Sq	145	259	114	
22nd Mat Sq	203	291	88	
23rd Mat Sq	203	304	101	
58th Bomb Sq (L)	152	223	31	
Air Corps Det., Weather	20	26	6	
Air Corps Det., Communications	20	25	3	
Total 18th Bombardment Wing	3238	3795	558	1
Total Hickam Field	3738	4160	561	139

WHEELER FIELD

14th Pursuit Wing				
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wg	158	142		16
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Gp (F)	204	202		2
45th Pur Sq (F)	175	174		1
46th Pur Sq (F)	175	171		4
47th Pur Sq (F)	175	169		6

CONFIDENTIAL

22
30

Units	Auth	Actual	Over	Short
Sq & Sq Sq 18th Pur Sq (Int)	204	167		17
6th Pur Sq (Int)	167	161	4	
19th Pur Sq (Int)	157	155		2
44th Pur Sq (Int)	157	154		3
75th Pur Sq (Int)	147	170	13	
Sq & Sq Sq 18th Air Base Gp (R)	131	353	227	
17th Air Base Sq	145	193	48	
24th Mat Sq	203	162		21
25th Mat Sq	203	137		66
Total 14th Pur Gp and Wheeler Field	2401	2355	292	139

EHLERS . WLD

86th Obsn Sq (C, D)	142	141		1
Casual Detachment		306	306	
Total fellows Field	142	147	306	1
TOTAL AVAILABLE AIR FORCE	2261	7100	1269	279
Net surplus			561	

1. 1st. Group of 1st Air Base Group (1)	473
(1) 1st Air Base Group (1) - 1st Air Base Group (1)	
2 Air Base Groups (1) required.	500
1 - 1st Air Base Group (1)	
1 - 1st Air Base Group (1) - 1st Air Base Group (1)	

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS

216 combat crews (less 70 now present)	146
180 maintenance crews (less 70 now present)	110
146 combat crews @ 5 men each	730
110 maintenance crews @ 14 men each	1540
2 medium bombardment-torpedo squadrons @ 217 men each	434
5 air base squadrons @ 145 men each	725
1 observation squadron	155
1 dive bomber squadron	210
7 air base groups (a)	<u>958</u>
Total	4752
Less present over-strength	<u>881</u>
Net total requirement	3871

24

134

AIR FORCE HOUSING FACILITIES

Present strength of Air Force personnel	7,182
Increase as result of this study	3,471
Present strength other services	1,500
Projected increase other services (Bellows + Kipapa)	250

Total	<u>12,813</u>
-------	---------------

<u>HOUSING AVAILABLE:</u>	<u>Permanent</u>	<u>Mobilization</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hickam Field	3,279	1,512	4,790
Wheeler Field	1,837	441	1,978
Bellows Field		1,008	1,008
New Air Base 15th Paratroop Group (Kipapa Gulch)		1,294	1,294
Outlying Fields (other islands) now being constructed or projected.		3,218	3,218
		Grand Total	<u>12,288</u>
(difference) Housing to be provided			525

Inclosure #325
403

EXHIBIT NO. 14

SECRET

FORM 100-100-100-100

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

14 APR 1941

IS: 100-100-100-100
AO 100-100-100-100

14 April 1941

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to secret letter from The Adjutant General to Headquarters Hawaiian Department, above subject, dated 7 February 1941, file AO 381 (1-24-41)M. There are inclosed herewith for your information copies of the principal directives, orders, and estimates which have been issued, in cooperation with the local naval authorities, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids of air attacks.

2. Inclosure 1, joint letter HMD - 14th ED, dated 14 February 1941, initiated the study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problem of the defense which was mentioned in the correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy, inclosed in the letter referred to in paragraph 1 above, and also included study of additional problems which were raised by Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

3. Inclosure 2, Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCF-39) is a new joint agreement with the local naval authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Attention is particularly invited to Section II of this document which relates to joint air operations. This joint agreement covers the major points which were studied by the joint committees organized in inclosure 1. Inclosure 3 to this Annex No. VII has not yet been completed, however tests are now being conducted to determine the most effective means of positive identification of friendly aircraft and insure its protection from anti-aircraft artillery fire.

4. Inclosure 3, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force and Patrol Wing TWO (Naval Base Defense Air Force) is self explanatory and will serve as the basis of joint air operations orders to be issued in the near future. These joint orders are required since it will be noted that, in the conduct of air operations, aircraft of one service passes to the tactical control of the other service.

SECRET

5. Inclosure 4, Field Order No. 1 NB (Naval Security) is a new operations order for this Department covering the measures which will be taken during an alert period and initially upon a sudden raid or air attack. This order has been coordinated with comparable security orders of the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Base Defense Force. This order is in addition to and does not replace the existing Field Orders No. 1 and No. 1 W which are contained in ORD-38.

1c & G.O.

For the Commanding General:

APR 18 1941

Received

4-Incl.

Incl. # 394 w/d
4 the W.B. with
revisions plans
and 2 detached copies

Copy to Commandant, 14th Naval District.

CARL CHASSE,

Major, U. S. A.

Assistant Adjutant General.

APR 26 1941

From: Plans Division

To: Assistant Commandant

for the 1st


REC'D-W.P.B. APR 23 1941 7-77

ALL APR 30 1941
[Signature]

EXHIBIT NO. 15

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM



KD


This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo

Dated January 27, 1941

Rec'd. 6:38 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



125, January 27, 6 p.m.

My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise ~~mass~~ attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information.

GREW.

711.94/1935

RS/FF

CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly
Confidential

PARAPHRASE

The following is the substance of a confidential telegram (no. 125) dated January 27, 1941, from the American Embassy in Tokyo:

Although the following report seemed to the Peruvian Minister to Japan to be fantastic, he nevertheless repeated it to a member of my staff because he had heard it from so many different sources, including a Japanese informant. The report was to the effect that should "trouble" break out between Japan and the United States the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor en masse. They would employ in this attack their entire military equipment.

TD AC
FE:JD:HNS
1/28

FE

1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Op-16-F-2
(SC) A16-3/EF37
Serial No. 09716

Feb. 1, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

10465

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:

"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."

2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Op-16-F

Jules James,
By direction

Op-16-F-2 Dictated Jan. 31, 1941

" by Lieut. Comdr. A.H. McCollum

Typed by H.E. Morse

CC - Com 14 10466

(SC) A16-3/EF37

*Paraphrasing the telegram must
not be "Commander Wells," OVI,
syllabism on 11-8, 1941.*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS

Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Dated November 3, 1941
FROM


Rec'd 6:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY ONLY.



One. I telegraphed textually on November 1
(please see Embassy's 1729, November 1, 4 p.m.)
a translation of the leading article in that morning's
NICHU NICHU which under the banner headline "Empire
approaches its greatest crisis" preceded a New York
despatch summarizing a statement reportedly given
to the NEW YORK TIMES by the Japanese Embassy at
Washington with regard to the need for putting a
stop to the economic war between the United States
and Japan. That article and the paper's editorial
also telegraphed textually (Embassy's 173, November
1, 7 p.m.) closely reflect the atmosphere now pre-
vailing in this country as we sense it.

Two. There is nothing to add to my analyses
as presented in the telegrams over the past several
months of the factors which affect Japan's policy;

nor do I

711.94/2406

PS/WHM

Confidential

APR 22 1943

-2- #1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Tokyo.

nor do I see need for substantially revising them.

I believe that Japan's position can conclusively
be estimated by applying.

GREW

HSM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEV

Tokyo

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:29 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1736, November 3, 3 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

to the situation which now seem to be shaping up certain considerations as follows:

(a) Japan cannot dissociate either herself or the China conflict from the European war and its fluctuations.

(b) Unlike public opinion in the democracies where there exists a homogeneous body of principles directing or influencing foreign policies and where differences of opinion are more likely to arise from consideration of methods rather than of principles public opinion in Japan where political thought varies from medievalism to liberalism is a variable quantity and at any given time only that school of thought predominates which is brought to the top by the impact of conditions and events outside the country. It was the impact of the German victories in Western Europe last year which brought to power the pro-Axis elements;

-2-

1736, November 3, 3 p. m., (SECTION IV), from the
elements; the failure of Germany to take the proper
thereby creating doubt concerning the ultimate vic-
tory of Germany,

GREY

RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Secretary of State,
Washington.

C. The Efforts of Prince Kanoye, who has
efforts which the present Cabinet promises to put
forward, to adjust relations with the United States
and thus to open up a way to conclude peace with
China, represent an attempt to correct last year's
error. If that attempt should fail, and if Ger-
man arms should continue to be successful, I look
to see a final and closer alliance of Japan
with the Axis.

D. The theory put forward by many of our leading economists that depletion and eventual exhaustion of economic and financial resources would

-- 1745, November 8, 3 p.m., (SECTION THREE), from Tokyo

which in short will bring about the collapse of

which will have never been seen

GREW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS

Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

FROM Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:44 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1736, November 3, 4 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

states appeared to be futile and unwise. As previously pointed out, it was the subsequent foreign policy of the United States which, combined, added to the impact upon Japan of political developments abroad, that brought the Japanese government to seek conciliation with the United States. Should these efforts fail, the pendulum in Japan will in all probability swing back once more to its former position, or still farther back, leading to what I have called "an all out, in all out" attempt to revive Japan the virtues of isolation from the outside world, even risking national honor and life rather than give to foreign pressure. To set of course, feed the national psychology and temper from day to day reality showed her government that such a contingency was not only possible but probable.

Fair. (The following is a copy of the telegram received from Tokyo on November 3, 1941.)

(The following is a copy of the telegram received from Tokyo on November 3, 1941.)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (SC)

Tokyo

FROM

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 3:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1736

November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the con-
sidered policy and measures of the United States.
Our own view is that such a course if taken would
not (repeat not) avert war. Nevertheless both
views are no more than opinion, and it is therefore
our belief that it would be contrary to our national
interests to postulate the correctness of either
opinion and to erect thereon a definitive policy.
To do so would be to put the cart before the horse.
The primary point for decision would appear to in-
volve the question as to whether our national needs,
policies and objectives justify war with Japan in
the event that diplomacy, our first line of nation-
al defense, should fail, for only on the basis of
such decision could the administration follow a
course divested so far as possible of elements of
opinion, speculation and uncertainty. I do not
doubt that such decision, which might well prove

to be

FW 711.34/2406 (SECTIONS 6, 7) Confidential File

-2- #1737, November 3, 3 p.m. from Tokyo

to be irrevocable, has already been fully debated and adopted, for the sands are running fast.

FIVE. Please realize that in discussing the foregoing grave and momentous subject I am out of touch with the Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon and that it is far from my intention to imply that

GREW

EMP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram was received from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C., on December 1, 1941, at 4:10 P. M. The telegram was received from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C., on December 1, 1941, at 4:10 P. M.

FROM

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, Japan.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 3111 (SECTION 2-101)

An uncalculated policy is being followed in Washington. It is equally far from a intention for a single moment to advocate so-called "appeasement" on the part of the United States or that our Government should in the slightest degree recede from the fundamental principles which it has laid down as a basis for the adjustment and conduct of international relations including our relations with Japan. Methods may be flexible but with principles there should be no compromise. My purpose is only to ensure against my country's getting into war with Japan through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic. We need not be over-concerned by the present bellicose tone and substance of the Japanese press which has attacked the United States in recurrent waves of intensity during the past several years, but it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious

preparations

-2- #1736, November 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN) from Tokyo

preparations for a program to be implemented if her alternative program for peace should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's high pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might war with the United States inevitably may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED





CS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased but
not being communicated
to anyone. (50)

Tokyo

Dated November 17, 1941

Rec'd 8:00 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1814, November 17, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY ONLY.

Reference Embassy's 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.,
last sentence.

In emphasizing need for guarding against
sudden military or naval actions by Japan in
areas not at present involved in the China con-
flict, I am taking into account as a probability
that the Japanese would exploit all available
tactical advantages, including those of initia-
tive and surprise. It is important, however,
that our Government not (repeat not) place upon
us, including the military and naval attaches,
major responsibility for giving prior warning.
The control in Japan over military information,
both primary and secondary is extremely effective,
and we have no expectation that any advance in-
formation would be obtained either through the

PRESS

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HMS

-2- #1814, November 17, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

press or from personal contacts with Japanese; the few Americans left in Japan are mostly concentrated in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe, and are in no position to observe military movements; and the absence of American and other foreign vessels in adjacent waters almost assures to the Japanese the ability to despatch troop transports in various directions without foreign observation. Recent reports from our consuls at Taihoku and at Harbin point to Japanese troop concentrations in both Taiwan and Manchuria, and all other available indications are that since the general mobilization of July last, troop dispositions have been made to enable new operations to be carried out on the shortest possible notice in either Siberia or the southwest Pacific or in both.

We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for premonitory indications of military movements which might be forthcoming against such areas, and we are taking every precaution to guard against surprises. However, our
field

-3- #1814, November 17, 8 p.m., from Tokyo.

field of military and naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that our government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning.

GREW .

LMS

EXHIBIT NO. 16

Secret

Serial 0130012

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington, November 5, 1941.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all¹ naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing² plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increas-

¹ Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically".

² Two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted.

ing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations.

THE JOINT BOARD

WASHINGTON

Secret

MINUTES OF MEETING, NOVEMBER 3, 1941

At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 3:40 p. m.

Present: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding; General G. C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff; Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; Major General William Bryden, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff; Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air; Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics; Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division; Captain O. M. Read, U. S. N., War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, in absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. A., Secretary.

Additional Officers Present: Major General R. C. Moore, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff; Colonel C. W. Bundy, U. S. A., War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; Commander F. P. Sherman, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; and Lieutenant Commander A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved.

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being Established.—Revision requested by the British.

Discussion—Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.

Discussion—Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to the Far East.

Action taken on the several subjects was as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of airplane ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1 and 723, the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23, 1941, and directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report was approved.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October 30, 1941, was accepted and the Committee of Experts' report was approved.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The Secretary announced that the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recommended certain revisions in the United States—United Kingdom initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19, 1941; and that the revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by the United States representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of October 29, 1941.

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.

c. A U. S. war in the Pacific would materially affect United States aid to England.

d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

Admiral Ingersoll gave a summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Following these discussions the Board adopted the following proposal submitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Marshall:

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines:

Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

At this point, General Marshall presented a list of items of equipment considered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials and difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related to Great Britain, Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other countries. In the case of Russia, a large amount of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via Archangel, Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of communications, and the difficult transport situation from the ports of debarkation might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipment to its final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused equipment at various localities, while at the same time other localities would suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions incident thereto, is a strategic decision which should be made by The Joint Board. Since the matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items and is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt that Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with The Joint Board in deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral Land should be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint Planning Committee on reports involving the disposition of Lend-Lease materials. Navy members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral Land of this request.

Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral Stark felt that merchant tonnage is so short and prospective requirements are so great that an effort should be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an A-1-a priority.

At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the *Normandie* be acquired to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion; and that delivery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea trains plus the two sea trains U. S. S. Kitty Hawk and U. S. S. Hammondport, already acquired and converted for Navy use. Copy of this report was furnished to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Alternate route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes.—Following a discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be given to the Joint Planning Committee:

It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the action to be taken to complete the establishment of an additional landplane route between Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional airdromes and landing fields acquired.

W. P. SCOBEE,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary.

NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

I. Discussion.

1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials and Captain Schuirmann, U. S. N. The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the Magruder radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of U. S. forces in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures were discussed, such as sending U. S. Army Air Forces to China, which might lead to immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of Chiang Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and that this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted.

2. a. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward Kunming. G-2 believes that: the movement if contemplated will not be initiated in less than two months; the movement will be very difficult over nearly 300 miles of roadless, broken country; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone.

b. G-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder statement that with the fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to Japan would be very seriously affected.

c. The G-2 estimate also covers the broader viewpoint of expected Japanese action.

3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab B) brings out the following: the most effective air aid to China can be given by units based in the Philippines; there are at present, many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply which will militate against a sustained effort; logical difficulties, aside from general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of United States Army Air Force units in China.

4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is shown in Tab C.

5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves in the Philippine Department is shown in Tab D. The garrison has not reached the effective strength desired by General MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch of personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating the training and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present combined air and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. The dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison to China would leave Luzon open to serious risk of capture.

6. Informal contact with officers of the local British Staff Mission indicate that the British have incomplete air forces for the defense of Singapore, would refuse to allow units of the Royal Air Force to support Chinese troops in Yunnan, and are of the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff would strongly disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with Japan.

7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion that:

a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain sound, viz:

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.

(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.

(3) Military counter-action against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan:

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war." It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator east of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

b. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision is not reached. The means to defeat Japan (Army, Navy, and tonnage), must be withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany. To defeat Germany will require the utmost total effort.

c. It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in China. However, from the larger viewpoint, prospective Chinese defeat would not warrant involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan.

d. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter Japanese action.

e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

f. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.

g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.

II. Recommendations.

Substitution of the words "War Department" for "War Plans Division" in paragraph 7 above and approval of that paragraph as a statement of the War Department's position on the Far East situation at this time.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

6 Incls.*

#1—Tab A—G-2 Estimate

#2—Tab B—Air Estimate

#3—Tab C—Lend-Lease Program for China.

#4—Tab D—Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept.

#5—Tab E—Ground Reinforcement, Phil. Dept.

#6—Tab F—Rad. fr. Gen. Magruder (10-28-41)

*Tab A is included in Exhibit No. 33: other tabs not included.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

[Faint, illegible handwritten text]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1846.

I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst.
and in reply to inform you that the same
has been forwarded to the proper authorities.

L. H. ...
H. B. ...
J. M. ...

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

13
November 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There are enclosed for your consideration a copy of a message from the Secretary of the Navy dated October 10, 1917, and a copy of the report of the Secretary of the Navy dated October 10, 1917, and a copy of the report of the Secretary of the Navy dated October 10, 1917. It is suggested that you take the necessary action thereon as soon as possible. The report of the Secretary of the Navy dated October 10, 1917, is being submitted to you for your consideration. It is suggested that you take the necessary action thereon as soon as possible. The report of the Secretary of the Navy dated October 10, 1917, is being submitted to you for your consideration. It is suggested that you take the necessary action thereon as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

76

74-8

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunning from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunning had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate issuance of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain

and

-2-

and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use.

Meanwhile

● 45-70

Japan on every appropriate occasion.

[illegible]

-5-

I assure you that the situation and the conditions
which are the subject of this correspondence will con-
tinue to have my best and my country's constant consideration.

EXHIBIT NO. 16A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C.H.

Can we do any thing
along this line?

How about telling Japan
a bit about the
the

795.000/1690-014


THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1941


My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed message from General Chiang Kai-Shek has just been handed to me at 11:15 o'clock this morning by Mr. T. V. Soong.

Yours sincerely,



The President,
The White House.



MESSAGE FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK RECEIVED TODAY,
OCTOBER 30.

DEFINITE INFORMATION REACHED ME JAPANESE DESIGN ATTACK
YUNNAN IN NOVEMBER (STOP) THIS MOVE MAY POSSIBLY BE
AVERTED IF AMERICA TAKES IMMEDIATE ACTION BY INFORMING
JAPAN THAT ATTACK YUNNAN THROUGH INDO-CHINA WOULD BE
VIEWED BY AMERICA AS DEFINITE STEP IN SOUTHEAST EXPANSION
AND THAT AMERICA CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT (STOP)
SIMULTANEOUSLY MILITARY PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO
MEET THIS EVENTUALITY (STOP) I MUST EMPHASIZE THE
CRITICAL NATURE OF THE YUNNAN SITUATION SINCE IF YUNNAN
IS LOST AND LAST LIFE LINE FOR MATERIALS FROM THE OUTSIDE
WORLD SEVERED THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND ARMY MATERIALLY
AND MORALLY WOULD BE UNABLE TO OFFER FURTHER ARMED
RESISTANCE (STOP) I AM CONFIDENT WITH FORCES IN YUNNAN
AND AVAILABLE NEARBY CHINESE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR OWN LAND
FIGHTING IF REINFORCED AIRWARD (STOP) CURRENTLY CHINA
HAS ONLY 40 PILOTS CONSEQUENTLY STRONG AIR REINFORCEMENT
ESSENTIAL (STOP) URGE AMERICA USE STRONG PRESSURE ON
BRITAIN TO SEND 31. ABOVE AIR FORCE TO COOPERATE WITH
COLONEL CHENNAULT IN ORDER SAVE DOMESTIC POSITION IN
FAR EAST (STOP) BRITAIN AND AMERICA LOYALLY CONCEIVED

- 2 -

TO PREVENT LOSS OF YUNNAN AS CHINESE BECAUSE IF JAPANESE OCCUPY YUNNAN THEIR NEXT STOP WOULD INVOLVE ATTACK ON BRITISH FAR EAST COLONIAL POSSESSIONS AND PRECIPITATE WAR IN THE PACIFIC (STOP) IF IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY BRITAIN IN SENDING AIR REINFORCEMENT THESE POSSESSIONS WOULD BE SAVED AT A FRACTION OF THE COST THAT THEIR DEFENCE WOULD INVOLVE LATER ON AND PACIFIC PROBLEM WOULD THUS BE SOLVED (STOP) JAPANESE WILL CONCENTRATE LARGEST AIR FORCE IN INDO-CHINA AND IF DESTROYED COMBINED AIR FORCES THREAT TO FAR EAST FINALLY REMOVED.

EXHIBIT NO. 16B

PREPARE TO TRANSMIT
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect: Day letter
Night letter

Charge: Day letter

PARTIAL
PLAIN
"3C"

Department of State

Washington,

November 7, 1941.

9 P.M.

Charge to: AMERICAN EMBASSY,

\$

LONDON.

5035

Yan BONG, November 6, 5 a.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Could we have very much in mind the situation to
which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal is addressed. While we
feel that it will be a serious error to underestimate
the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we
ought together to maintain the Japanese land campaign
against Kwantung. Have advance to a point which would
enable us to advance to the Japanese against Yunnan in the
immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we
can to increase and expedite the military aid to China
and to facilitate the mobilization of the American
volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment.
We have noted that you would be prepared to send pilots
and other planes to China.

We feel that something such as the foregoing and
to send the message to that along the lines we are

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect (Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

§ taking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an opposite effect.

This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study and effort.

I shall probably not repeat not make express reply to General Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close official circle that I have said above. UNQUOTE.

Inc

PERSONAL

TO

IA/H

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

EXHIBIT NO. 17

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.

The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.

Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives involving less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly within the means available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful, the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, might relieve internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, Thailand, or the Philippines can not now be forecast.

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these Islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

It is recommended that:

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military, counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL

/S/ H. R. STARK

25-66654-200

EXHIBIT NO. 18

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Draft Suggestions (Nov. 11, 1941) to the Secretary of State prepared by Far Eastern Division concerning proposed "*Modus Vivendi*." No action was taken on these suggestions.
2. Memorandum dated Nov. 19, 1941 from Mr. Hamilton to the Secretary of State concerning an attached revision of a proposal by Secretary Morgenthau for an agreement between the United States and Japan.
3. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow for the Chief of Staff concerning the "Far Eastern Situation."
4. Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1941 by Admiral H. R. Stark for the Secretary of the Navy concerning "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan, of Nov. 19, 1941 (See Item No. 2, supra)."
5. Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1941 by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow for the Secretary of State concerning the "Far Eastern Situation."
6. Pencilled memorandum given by the President to the Secretary of State (Not dated but probably written shortly after Nov. 20, 1941).
7. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 22, 1941 of a proposed oral statement and *Modus Vivendi* to be handed Japanese Ambassadors.
8. Tentative draft dated Nov. 22, 1941 of an "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan."
9. Memorandum dated Nov. 22, 1941 of a conversation between Secretary Hull, British Ambassador, Australian Minister, Netherlands Minister and Chinese Ambassador concerning "Japanese Proposal for a *Modus Vivendi* and suggested reply."
10. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 24, 1941 of a proposed *Modus Vivendi*.
11. Tentative draft dated November 24, 1941 of an "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan."
12. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 by Secretary Hull for the President with an attached draft of message from the President to the British Prime Minister describing the Japanese proposal for a *Modus Vivendi* and a suggested alternate *Modus Vivendi*, and closing sentences added by the President.
13. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 of a conversation between Secretary Hull, British Ambassador, Chinese Ambassador, Australian Minister and Netherlands Minister, concerning "Proposed *Modus Vivendi* for Submission to Japanese Ambassador."
14. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 25, 1941 of a proposed *Modus Vivendi* to be submitted to the Japanese Ambassador, and attached "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan."
15. Message dated Nov. 25, 1941 from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, to Lauchlin Currie.
16. Copy of Message from General Chiang Kai-Shek transmitted to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong, under cover of a letter dated Nov. 25, 1941.
17. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversation between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador concerning "Suggested Changes in *Modus Vivendi*," and an attached memorandum from the Ambassador commenting on the Japanese proposal (of Nov. 20, 1941).
18. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Chinese Ambassador concerning the "Opposition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to *Modus Vivendi*," with attached copy of telegram dated Nov. 24, 1941 from Minister Quo Tai-Chi, Chungking, to Ambassador Hu Shih.
19. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversations between the Chinese Ambassador and the Netherlands Minister, and Stanley K. Hornbeck.
20. Memorandum for the President dated Nov. 26, 1941 from the Secretary of State suggesting withholding *Modus Vivendi*, and proposes handing Japanese Ambassador "a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement."
21. Memorandum from the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to Secretary Hull on Nov. 27, 1941.
22. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 27, 1941 between the British Ambassador and Sumner Welles concerning "Japanese-American Relations."
23. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 27, 1941 between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister concerning "Proposed *Modus Vivendi*."
24. Message dated Nov. 27, 1941 from Secretary of State to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo.
25. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 28, 1941 between British Minister and Stanley K. Hornbeck.
26. Message dated Nov. 28, 1941 from Secretary of State to United States Ambassador, Chungking, China.
27. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 29, 1941 between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador concerning "United States-Japanese Conversations."
28. Memorandum handed to Secretary Hull by the Chinese Ambassador on Dec. 2, 1941.


DRAFT SUGGESTIONS (NOVEMBER 11, 1941) TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN ON THESE
SUGGESTIONS. PREPARED IN FE.

711.94/2540-5/35

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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If, as seems almost certain, there is no possibility at the present time of reaching with Japan a comprehensive settlement covering the entire Pacific area, it is highly probable that after a certain point further efforts to reconcile differences on the essentials of such a comprehensive settlement will lead only to a rupture of the conversations followed by a further and perhaps sudden deterioration of relations. Such a prospect prompts the question whether it might not be possible to propose some tentative or transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to, but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from Japan.

With these thoughts in mind, there is suggested for consideration a proposal along the lines of the attached draft.

It is probable that the Japanese will not agree to the attached proposal as it stands without considerable modification, and it is even more probable that negotiations between Japan and China under these circumstances will

come

Confidential File

-2-

come to nothing. Nevertheless, it is hoped that a proposal along the suggested lines might offer a basis which might keep conversations going for sometime longer than otherwise, and if accepted by the Japanese might lead to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a nature compatible with our principles.

It is suggested that the foregoing proposal would have more chance of receiving consideration by the Japanese (and of thus gaining time) if it were presented to them before feelings had become further aroused over fruitless discussion of matters we assume will not be agreed upon.

In presenting the proposal to the Japanese we might say that we offer it with reluctance as we realize that it is of a patchwork nature and imperfect, but that we feel that under the circumstances it is better to have something on which we can hope to build in the future than to end with no agreement at all, as would seem to be otherwise inevitable in view of our present divergences of views on certain fundamentals.

If the Japanese should decline to consider such a proposal we should be no worse off than we otherwise would have been. At the same time, it is believed that by presenting a proposal of this sort, we should make

clear

clear on the record our effort to do everything possible to reach a settlement with Japan. If they do consider it, one point on which they would be most likely to seek modifications would be a provision which would enable them to obtain oil sooner than contemplated in the proposal that we offer them.

In regard to that point, it might be possible to work out an arrangement whereby we could allow them to have petroleum in amounts equivalent to amounts of petroleum products released in Japan for normal peacetime consumption. This would make possible the normal functioning in Japan of buses, commercial trucks, taxis and private automobiles as well as Japanese fishing launches and commercial boats and would emphasize to the Japanese public the advantages of conditions of peace.

(DRAFT)

I.

A. The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a mutual understanding and declaration of intention and policy for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

B. Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

C. It is the earnest hope of both Governments that by cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area.

D. Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both countries.

E. Both Governments further affirm that in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with

all

-2-

all other Governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
- (4) The principle of non-disturbance of the status quo except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

F. Both Governments have agreed that in order to promote stable peace and to eliminate chronic political instability and recurrent economic collapse, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic co-operation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations through international agreement regulating supply of commodities.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance that may lead to the essential externalities and the continuous development of all countries, and may permit separate national processes of trade consistent with the welfare of all countries.

(In

-3-

(In drafting the abstract principles on which commitments are to be exchanged, an effort has been made to embody those principles to which it is believed the Japanese are readily willing to agree.)

II.

A. As initial steps toward the implementation and practical application of the fundamental principles agreed upon, both Governments have agreed to take the following measures:

(1) The Government of the United States will suggest to the Governments of China and of Japan that they immediately enter into direct amicable negotiation for a peaceful settlement of their differences.

(In offering to extend advice to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they enter into direct negotiations for a settlement of their differences, we would not ask the Japanese to tell us their peace terms. We should, therefore, be in a position to tell the Chinese that our suggestion contains no implication of approval of terms which the Japanese might offer; that we intend to continue our policy of aid to countries which are victims of aggression; and that if the hostilities should be resumed after the armistice, we shall again extend to China all possible aid. In our approach to the Chinese we would make it clear that following a peaceful settlement with Japan, we should expect to extend in the fullest possible measure material and technical assistance to China during the period of reconstruction.)

(2) The Government of Japan will offer to the Government of China an armistice during the period of amicable negotiation.

(3) The Government of the United States during the course

-4-

course of amicable negotiations between China and Japan under an armistice will hold in abeyance shipment of supplies of a military character to China.

(4) The Government of Japan during the course of amicable negotiations between Japan and China under an armistice will refrain from further reenforcement of its expeditionary forces in China and French Indochina and will hold in abeyance shipment of supplies of a military character to those forces.

(5) The Government of the United States upon the conclusion of a peace settlement between Japan and China will immediately enter into negotiations with the Governments of Japan and of China for the resumption of normal trade relations with these Governments; and will undertake new negotiations with Japan for a resumption in trade and commerce in certain commodities and services other than those essential to warfare with a view to reconstruction of normal peacetime industry in Japan.

(The negotiations with Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations, following a peace settlement between Japan and China, would look to an arrangement whereby trade would be restored according to a graduated scale and in proportion with the evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indochina and from China and with the re-establishment of nondiscriminatory trade in areas now under Japanese military occupation. For example, there might be provision that with the completion of Japanese evacuation of certain areas such as Indochina or China south of the Yangtze River we might let Japan have certain quantities of desired commodities such as oil and iron.

In the

-5-

In the negotiations for an immediate resumption of limited trade in commodities other than war supplies, we should have in mind the dual purpose of setting Japanese factories and shipping facilities to production and services which would aid in meeting our present needs, would assist the transition in Japan from a war to a peace economy, and which would augment the natural popular reaction in favor of peaceful and profitable pursuits. Such a reaction might be expected once hostilities with China have ended and the threat of extended hostilities with the United States somewhat abated. A beginning in this direction might consist of arrangements for the exchange of such Japanese products such as canned crab meat, menthol, camphor, pyrethrum flowers, plants for hat making, tea and batteries for American products such as fertilizers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, cotton and tobacco. Arrangements might also be made for the charter of Japanese vessels, if agreeable to Japan, and for the construction of vessels to American order in Japanese shipyards with steel and other material supplied from the United States.)

(C) The Governments of Japan and of the United States mutually guarantee that they will not undertake military offensive operations in any direction in the Pacific area.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

I. Commitments to be given mutually by the Governments of the United States and Japan.

(a) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan subscribe to and actively support the following principles and the practical application thereof as the foundation upon which their relations with all other nations are based:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

(4) Non-disturbance of the status quo except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

(b) The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the
other

-2-

other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its own economy. They furthermore agree to cooperate each with the other especially toward obtaining commercial access, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.

(c) The Governments of the United States and Japan mutually pledge that they will not seek in any part of the Pacific area political expansion in any direction or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or preferences by force.

II. Commitments on the part of the Japanese Government.

(a) The Japanese Government, following the cessation of hostilities between China and Japan, will withdraw all of its troops immediately from French Indochina.

(b) The Japanese Government will begin at once to put into effect a program for the rapid and progressive restoration

-3-

restoration of all of the normal activities of nationals of the United States in China and Manchuria and for the progressive relaxation and removal of all restrictions on the activities of nationals of the United States in China which have been imposed directly or indirectly as a result of Japanese military activities in China, and will complete this program as rapidly as possible in order to provide full implementation and practical application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial affairs.

III. Commitments on the part of the Government of the United States.

The Government of the United States will, pari passu with the removal or alterations of those conditions and situations in the Pacific area which gave rise to the taking by it of certain political and economic measures, alter or discontinue those political and economic measures.

F.E.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 19, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Secretary:

There is attached a revision of the proposal which was sent to you by Mr. Monaghan. (The proposal still of course needs further revision and elaboration.)

I think that the proposal is the most constructive one which I have yet seen. I have shown the proposal to all of the senior officers of FE, and all of them regard it in that view.

I have been most careful in considering the proposal to make it as broad as possible. To that end I have had the proposal reviewed by the senior officers of FE, and all of them regard it in that view. I have also had the proposal reviewed by the senior officers of the Department, and all of them regard it in that view.

Very truly,
 [Signature]
 [Name]
 [Title]

RE: [Name]

711.34/23-0-20/30

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIALTENTATIVE,
WITHOUT COMMITMENTOUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS
FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

A

On its part the Government of the United States proposes to take the following steps:

1. To reduce to a normal footing American naval forces now in Pacific waters, without of course limiting in any way the freedom of action and of decision of the Government of the United States with regard to the disposition of naval forces of the United States.

2. To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with Japan, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and Soviet Russia.

3. To suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.

4. To enter into negotiations with the British, Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Governments for the conclusion of an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be

-2-

deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories most-favored-nation treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

5. To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British Government to give up British extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

To use its influence toward causing the British Government to cede Hong Kong to China. (This provision might take the form of an undertaking to use our influence with the British Government to cause the British Government to sell Hong Kong to China, the purchase price to be loaned China by the United States.)

6. To recommend to Congress enactment of legislation to amend the Immigration Act of 1924 so as to place all peoples of all races on a quota basis.

7. To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giving Japan (a) most-favored-nation treatment and (b) such concessions on Japanese imports into the United States

-3-

as can be mutually satisfactorily arranged, including an agreement to bind raw silk on the free list.

To enter into a joint declaration between the United States and Japan with regard to commercial policy along the lines of the draft handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 15.

8. To extend to Japan a \$2,000,000,000 20-year credit at 2 percent interest, to be drawn upon at the rate not to exceed \$200,000,000 a year except with approval of the President of the United States.

(NOTE: The United States should be prepared to extend a similar credit to China.)

(NOTE: This provision presumably would require Congressional approval.)

9. To set up a \$500,000,000 stabilization fund half supplied by Japan and half by the United States, to be used for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

(NOTE: The United States would be prepared to act similarly in regard to China.)

(NOTE: This provision may require Congressional approval.)

10. To remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.

-4-

B

On its part the Government of Japan proposes to take the following steps:

1. To withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria -- see separate provisions) and from Indochina.

2. To withdraw all support -- military, political, economic -- from any government or regime in China other than the Government of the National Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

3. To replace with yen currency at a rate to be agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, Great Britain and the United States all Japanese military scrip, yen and local reserve notes circulating in China.

4. To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and rights under the Boxer Protocol.

5. To withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a minimum necessary as a police force, and to withdraw all her troops from the Far East and from extent Far East except as a police force.

6. To send to the United States _____ tons of Japanese munitions and to deliver to the United States _____ tons of Japanese munitions and to send to the United States _____ tons of Japanese munitions.

-5-

up to 50 percent of Japan's current output of shipping, including naval and commercial ships, on a cost-plus-50-percent basis as the United States may select, it being understood that the United States will sell Japan such raw materials as it may be necessary for Japan to import for these purposes.

7. To negotiate a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and Soviet Russia.

8. To remove the freezing restrictions on American funds in Japan.

NOVEMBER 24, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

A conference was held in the State Department at 9:45 a. m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark and General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy representatives to express their informal views from a military standpoint on a draft of a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan. (Tab A). He explained that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted by the State Department.

The various provisions were discussed. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were of the opinion that, in general; the document was satisfactory from a military viewpoint. They requested, however, an opportunity to make a more detailed study of its possible effect on the military situation. It was agreed that comments would be submitted early the same afternoon.

The comments of Admiral Stark (Tab B) and my own (Tab C) are attached. I informed Admiral Stark verbally that I regretted the reference to Army forces in the Navy comments on provision A 1. I feel that no restrictions should be placed on Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure.

I informed the Secretary of War and General Bryden verbally of the conference.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

3 Incls:

Tab A.

Tab B.

Tab C.

[Pencilled notation:] Enclosures not recd in Records Sec for recording. JRB.

[Pencilled notation in margin of first paragraph:] Gen. Marshall was out of town. (Initials illegible.)

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In reply refer to Initials
and No.


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NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

21 November 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Comment on "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan, of November 19, 1941."

I respectfully submit the following. Reference is made to similarly numbered sections and paragraphs. Where paragraphs are not mentioned, concurrence is implied.

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Par. A-1. Further study of this paragraph confirms the feeling I expressed to you this morning that it is unacceptable. It commits the United States to naval restrictions without imposing compensating naval restrictions on Japan. I think under no circumstances the word "reduce" should be employed, since our naval forces in the Pacific are inadequate and should not have to undergo additional loss of strength. I again note that this paragraph makes no reference to land or air components; I assume this was intentional and of course I wish we could get away with it but I doubt it. If some such paragraph is necessary I suggest a wording approximately as follows:

"Not to increase United States combatant naval (and military) forces in the Philippines".

I included the (and military) in case they bring the point up and we have to acquiesce. I strongly hope that present plans for Army increases in planes, which will be largely carried out by 1 March, could be excluded from any limitation agreement but this too might have to be accepted.

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Par. A-5. As I mentioned this morning I just don't like the idea of our buying Hongkong from the British and giving it to China. If this is to be done I think the British at least ought to make this contribution to a cause more important for the British Commonwealth than for the United States. Portugal should likewise give up Macao.

Par. A-8 & 9. This is somewhat out of Navy province but I assume that in view of the present unfavorable financial status it has been considered these two paragraphs should be inserted. I can realize their great importance and the desire to have them form an integral part of any agreement that might be reached.

Par. B-1. Change the period to a comma and add the words "including Hainan, Macao and the islands of the China Sea to the southward of Formosa." This would include among others the highly important Spratley Islands.

Par. B-2. Suggest the following addition to this paragraph:

"To refrain from establishing or supporting any government or regime in Indo-China, other than the regularly established French Government."

This is to make clear our objection to any puppet regime, etc.

Par. B-5. I doubt the usefulness of this paragraph believing that it would prove unacceptable to both Russia and Japan. This morning I expressed it - "If I were a Russian I would not trust them." If good faith could be assured there might be something to it. I believe it might better be left out.

Par. B-6. I confirm my comment this morning. I do not believe Japan could accept it and certainly not with regard to their naval vessels; it would be a humiliating procedure from their standpoint; I would not mention it. There might be some chance of utilization of some of their present shipping if world conditions prevent their full utilization of it. However, this merchant shipping is an integral part of Japan's economic system and was built at great expense and difficulty. At the most the only proposal I would submit would be to buy a specific total of merchant ship tonnage; this might refer only to future construction if present construction could not be obtained. Chartering, as mentioned by some one this morning, might be considered.

General. Not in the paper. The provisions of the paper may be assumed to abrogate the tri-partite treaty on the part of Japan, but if it could be specifically so stated it would be helpful on this side of the water.

H. R. Spach.


WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF A. C. OF S., WPD

Date
November 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.



War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement between the United States and Japan," and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives -- the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific, would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British -- both of which are highly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B. - 5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia. The geographical lay-out in the Manchurian-Siberian area is such that military time and space factors are all in favor of Japan. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to reach an agreement as to what are "equivalent forces" and the measures to be taken to insure that no unauthorized increases are made in those forces. Such an arrangement would increase the vulnerability of the Russian position, particularly in the Maritime Provinces, and at the same time remove the very real threat to Japanese cities of the Russian Air based therein. From the U. S. viewpoint, it is greatly to our advantage to have the possibility of access to Siberian airfields securely guarded by a potential ally.

The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such changes.

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The Chief of Staff is out of the city and consequently this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views expressed above.


L. T. Snow

L. T. SNOW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

PENCILLED MEMORANDUM GIVEN BY THE
PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
(NOT DATED BUT PROBABLY WRITTEN SHORTLY
AFTER NOVEMBER 20, 1941)

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6 m. 1898

1. Mr. T. means more in later on -
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 2. T. means to send a report of 7
Sub. in. in March 1898
place such kind of a report
3. T. means to report not to make any
later not even if Mr. T. is in
European war
 4. Mr. T. introduce J. T. Thayer
T. told things in last week
T. report in this conversation
- Later on Pacific agreements

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~
~~REMITTANCE AND WITHOUT~~
~~COMMITMENT~~

Not Used

November 22, 1941.

ORAL

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of the questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

On

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On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador indicated that the Government of Japan is desirous of going ahead with such a program; that the domestic political situation within Japan is urgent; and that, in order to give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop and promote public sentiment in Japan in support of a comprehensive and liberal program of peace such as has been under discussion between our two Governments, it would be helpful if there could be taken some initial steps toward resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States. At that time the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to create an atmosphere favorable to pursuing the conversations which have been taking place. These proposals contain features which from the point of view of the Government of the United States present difficulties in reference to the broad-gauge principles the practical application of which represents the desires of both Governments as manifested in current conversations. In as much as the Government of
the

-5-

the United States desires to contribute to the peace of the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government suggestions as follows:

-4-

MODUS VIVENDI

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein. They undertake reciprocally not to make by force or threat of force, unless they are attacked, any advancement, from points at which they have military establishments, across any international border in the Pacific area.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina, not to engage in any further military activities there, including the construction of military facilities, and to limit Japanese military forces in northern French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case would not exceed 25,000 and which number would not be subject to replacement.

3. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain subject to the respective export control

-5-

control measures which each country may have in effect for reasons of national defense.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the British and the Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments' taking, on a basis of reciprocity with Japan, measures similar to those provided for in paragraph three above.

5. The Government of the United States would not look with disfavor upon the inauguration of conversations between the Government of China and the Government of Japan directed toward a peaceful settlement of their differences nor would the Government of the United States look with disfavor upon an armistice during the period of any such discussions. The fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any such discussions is simply that they be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.

In case any such discussions are entered into between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, the Government of the United States is agreeable to such discussions taking place in the Philippine Islands, if so
desired

-6-

desired by both China and Japan.

6. It is understood that this modus vivendi is of a temporary nature and shall not remain in effect for a period longer than three months unless renewed by common agreement.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
INITIATIVE AND WITHOUT
COMMITMENT

November 22, 1941.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4)

-2-

- (4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

-3-

Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan. Respectively

A

The Government of the United States proposes to take steps as follows:

1. To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with Japan, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.

2. To suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.

3. To enter into negotiations with the British, Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Governments for the conclusion of an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

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-4-

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

4. To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

5. To enter into negotiations with Japan for the conclusion of a trade agreement between the two countries, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

6.

-5-

6. To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds up to \$500,000,000 for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

7. To remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.

8. To take steps, upon the conclusion of this agreement and upon the signing of the multilateral non-aggression pact mentioned under item one above, directed toward termination of the Nine Power Treaty relating to Principles and Policies concerning China signed at Washington, February 6, 1922.

-6-

B

The Government of Japan proposes to take steps as follows:

1. To withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria -- see separate provision A-2) and from Indochina.

2. To withdraw all support -- military, political, economic -- from any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

3. To give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and concessions and rights under the Boxer Protocol.

4. To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Soviet Union.

5. To remove the freezing restrictions on American funds in Japan.

6. To agree that the provisions of the treaty concluded on September 27, 1940 among Japan, Germany and Italy shall not be interpreted by Japan in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 22, 1941

SUBJECT: JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A MODUS VIVENDI AND SUGGESTED REPLY

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL, THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX,
THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER, RICHARD G. CASEY, THE
NETHERLANDS MINISTER, DR. A. LOUDON, AND THE
CHINESE AMBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIH

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister and the Netherlands Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during that time and need not be repeated here.

I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi. I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal. There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute

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was more desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese. Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision in our proposed modus vivendi which would block a Japanese attack on China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations looking toward a general agreement on the basic questions.

C.H.

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Not Used!

November 24, 1941

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which have been taken place. These proposals contain features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad range program of peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus vivendi, as follows:

-4-

MODUS VIVENDI

1. The Government of the United States, and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.

2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northwestern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case shall not exceed 25,000; and not to send additional forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the

United

-5-

United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:

(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.

(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities

-6-

commodities in short supply in the United States.

(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of \$600,000 in value per month.

(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum upon a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs to be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution

-7-

solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph four above.

7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of three months with the understanding that the

two

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two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
TENTATIVE AND WITHOUT
COMMITMENT

November 24, 1941

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3)

-3-

- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- (4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of economic discrimination expressed in restrictive trade regulations.
- (3) The principle of non-discrimination between all nations in commercial relations.
- (4) The principle of full participation of all nations in economic activity and the elimination of economic discrimination and economic cooperation in economic relations.
- (5) The principle of international economic cooperation and the elimination of economic discrimination and economic cooperation in economic relations.

-3-

Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a bilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereby each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of India. In addition, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of India, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan would enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and desirable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would require the first step of the Government to enter into agreement with the United States or Japan (intermittent) to discuss or to discuss relations with the United States.

-2-

will maintain the principle of equality of treatment in trade and commerce with all other nations.

3. The Government of China will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China (excluding Manchuria -- see separate translation, paragraph six) and from Mongolia.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, financially -- any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with limited territory at Cheekiang.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, subject only under the 1901 Protocol of 1901.

6. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the 1901 Protocol of 1901.

-5-

6. The Government of the United States will suggest to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government that those Governments enter into peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status of Manchuria.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to include raw silk on the free list.

8. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the existing restrictions on Japanese goods in the United States and on American goods in Japan.

9. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the evacuation of the Japanese race, with the understanding that the Japanese for 1942 already held to be eligible for immigration into the United States.

10. Both Governments will agree that a permanent international organization is being organized by the United States.

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and a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

11. Both Governments will use their influence to induce other Governments to agree to act in accordance with the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1917



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

RECEIVED, 1941

Embassy, Tokyo, 12/12/41

I am pleased for your consideration a draft of a telegram to the British Prime Minister containing a notation of approval for modus vivendi made by the Japanese Government to this Government and of a similar letter to modus vivendi which this Government wishes to offer to the Japanese Government.

If you approve of the draft telegram, I shall arrange to have it forwarded.

Enclosure:
Draft telegram.

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Charge Department

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Department of State

Washington, November 24, 1941

AFRICAN EMBASSY,

LC DC (ENGLAND).

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SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Quote On November 23 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a modus vivendi. He has represented that the conclusion of such a modus vivendi might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that the domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal. The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending the restoration of peace between Japan and China on the establishment of general peace in the Pacific and when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to suspend Japanese importation of petroleum products and to refrain from measures prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China and mutual commitments to make no new commitment in the southeastern Asiatic and southern Pacific areas. The proposals offered would apparently not exclude cooperation in China (from Indochina), to cooperate

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Sent by operator

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Department of State

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Washington.

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This Government proposes to inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. It is also proposed to offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposal for a modus vivendi which will contain mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number shall not be subject to replacement and shall not in any case exceed 25,000 and not to send additional forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of sundries and other supplies, and products of the pharmaceutical

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

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PREPARED OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Washington,

Charge to

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For the purpose of facilitating the purchase of the goods and services of the United States for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, this Government will undertake to pay the British, Dutch and Australian Governments as to the question of their taking similar economic measures. Provision is made that the Wang Wang shall remain in force for three months with the understanding that at the instance of either party the two parties shall confer to determine whether the prospects of peace in a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area warrant extension of the Wang Wang.

The British Ambassador has been informed and is informing your Foreign Minister.

Add (A)

Review

Enclosed by

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PA/N

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(A)

Add at close

This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful ~~that~~ and we must all be prepared for that trouble, possibly soon

Roosevelt

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not recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur - any day after this week - unless a temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general agreement.

The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course for three months and set forth the

advantages

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the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record.


C.H.

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~~EXHIBIT~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 25, 1941

Final Draft



The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been engaged during the past several months in formal and informal conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement of questions relating to the Far East on the basis of the principles of peace, justice and self-determination. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality; the principle of equality of commercial opportunity; the principle of reliance upon international law and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of international disputes and for the maintenance of international order and peace.

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It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus vivendi include as one of its provisions some initial and temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.

On November 2, the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken reciprocally by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been decided upon to establish

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the purposes have indicated. These materials contain lectures which, in the opinion of this Government, conform with the general principles which form part of the general settlement under consideration, and the United States Government has no objection to its admission.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific Ocean, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward the realization of a peace program of peace throughout the Pacific region. With these views, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for the early modus vivendi, as follows:

-4-

HOUSE VERBALS

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.

2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.

3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the position of the Government of the United States with regard to the presence of foreign troops in that area.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export

-4-

should be restricted to the extent necessary to permit the following transportation of goods between the United States and foreign countries for the economic needs of their peoples:

(a) Except from Japan to be freely admitted and the proceeds of the sale to be paid into a fund to be used for the purchase of the cotton and the other goods listed below, and at Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese debt to it within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds of the value of the exports shall be devoted to new ships. It is understood that all American-owned vessels now in Japan to transport cotton to be transported to the United States shall be transported as follows: the portion of the cotton to be transported forthwith to the United States.

(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be restricted as follows:

(1) Exports of raw silk for vessels exported to the United States provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trade as the two Governments may agree.

(2) Exports of raw silk from the United States to Japan to be limited to the quantity of raw silk required for the production of goods in Japan for the use of the United States.

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commodities in short supply in the United States.

(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of \$600,000 in value per month.

(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.

(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

(vi) The above stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two governments as it may seem to them that the limitation of this agreement is necessary to the peace, and equitable solution

-8-

two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period.

There is attached in tentative form a plan of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of the kind of program which this Government has in mind to be worked out during the further conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States while this modus vivendi would be in effect.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL,
TENTATIVE AND WITHOUT
COMMITMENT

November 25, 1941.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

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- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- (4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

-3-

Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and

-4-

and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, economically -- any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the
Government

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Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

Lauchlin Currie.

Chungking, November 25, 1941.

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "Modus Vivendi" now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

Lattimore.

SECRET

[illegible][illegible]

"We could therefore not prevent the United States Government to be ungenerous in its attitude towards the withdrawal of Chinese troops from China. As it is not settled, the Chinese will relax the policy of freezing Chinese goods and will be considered. If, on the other hand, the Americans will take positive action to force the Chinese to withdraw their troops, the Chinese will have to pay the cost to them. The Government will support the withdrawal of our resistance. Our war is a struggle to deal with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history. We are determined to win. The certain collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world. We are indeed glad to witness the Chinese resistance to the Japanese aggression."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1941

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MODUS VIVENDI

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me a memorandum, a copy of which is hereto attached. I commented briefly on the impossibility of not letting the Japanese have some oil for strictly civilian use, if we, in turn, are to secure the tremendously valuable commitment by the Japanese not to move on any aggressive course outside of China proper during the next three months. I pointed out to the Ambassador the advantages to China with respect to the Burma Road and its possible destruction and the removal of any menace to the South Sea area which would be of great interest and advantage to Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States as well.

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PS/WHA

-2-

I emphasized that this proposed modus vivendi was really a part of what the Japanese claimed to be a continuance of the same conversations held heretofore relative to a permanent agreement on a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area. I also pointed out the utter impracticability of requesting a suspension of further military advances in China in addition to the preceding assurances.

The Ambassador referred to the provision in the proposed draft of a modus vivendi limiting the Japanese troops in Indochina to 25,000 and urged that that number be reduced in our draft. I said that we would do the best we could in the matter, that our Army and Navy experts feel that 25,000 in North Indochina would not be a menace to the Burma Road, and that even double that number would not be a serious menace.

C.H.

S:CH:MA:AR

Japanese proposal is clearly unacceptable and the only question appears to be whether:-

- (a) To reject it and (while making it clear that a limited agreement is not ruled out) to leave it to the Japanese to produce a better offer, or
- (b) to make a counter proposal.

We have complete confidence in Mr. Hull's handling of these negotiations and he is in the best position to judge which of these two courses is the better tactics. We feel sure that he fully understands that the Japanese will try to force a hurried decision by magnifying the dangers of delay. If having taken this into account he feels it best to put forward a counter proposal we will support this course.

The Japanese proposal should, we feel, be regarded as the first movement in a process of bargaining. It puts the Japanese demands at a maximum and the price at a minimum. If a counter proposal is to be made we suggest that this process should be reversed and that our demands should be pitched high and our price low.

The removal of merely "the bulk" of Japanese troops from Indo China would allow too wide a loophole. It is doubtful whether we should be justified in accepting this as satisfactory, and still less in suggesting it. Apart from the desirability of pitching a counter proposal higher than we may obtain, it seems advisable from the Chinese angle so to frame it as to frustrate the possibility of any attack on Kuming during the currency of an interim agreement.

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On this basis we would suggest for the consideration of the United States Government that any counter proposal should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo China not merely of the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval military and air forces with their equipment and for the disposition of further military advances in China in addition to satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Eastern Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of existing economic measures to as to allow the export of limited quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar nature from Japan if we required them.

Mr. Hill has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned.

The above represents our immediate reaction, sent without consultation with the Dominion Governments who as in the case of the Netherlands and the Chinese Governments

as have all the other nations.

These reasons for restricting the scope of the Government's authority to be delegated to the negotiators were considered in connection with the question of how to facilitate the United States' efforts in all these ways. But our economic structure is complicated (in particular by the necessity of co-ordinating with other parts of the Government) that we do not think it practicable at this time to give carte blanche to diplomatic representatives. If the United States Government favors the suggestion which we have made above, it will be necessary to define more closely the distinction between goods of importance to the welfare of the Japanese civilian population and those of direct importance to Japan's war potential, and to consider whether restriction of economic pressure should be operated by financial control or by barter. After this stage we would be prepared to consider the question of discretion afresh.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1941

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION OF GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO MODUS VIVENDIPARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND ~~THE~~ CHINESE AMBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIH

COPIES TO:

The Chinese Ambassador called at his request. He sought to make profuse preliminary explanations, stating among other things that the Foreign Minister of China understood very well the broad international aspects of the Japanese situation as it relates to several countries, including China and the United States, but that the Generalissimo was not so well acquainted with the situation, and hence his reported opposition to our modus vivendi. He then handed me a telegram, dated November 24, 1941, from his Foreign Minister, a copy of which is hereto attached.

I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan
until

-2-

until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on conversations and making some progress thus far; and the Japanese are urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the proposed modus vivendi is really a part and parcel of the efforts to carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador and to others.

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation

-3-

situation which we have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area, including Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and also the United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes. All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward.

The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly spirit.

C.H.

S:CHINA:AR

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TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR TO CHINA
 TO MR. CAGAN NO 1111
 CHUNGKING, NOVEMBER 24, 1941.

Reference is made to your telegram of November 22.

After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction. He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese question in its conversation with Japan instead of seeking a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China. I have explained to him that the Secretary of State has always had the greatest respect for the fundamental principles, and that I believe he has made no concession to Japan. The fact that he inquires of the possibility of a modus vivendi shows that he has not yet revealed anything to the Japanese. He was, however, firmly opposed to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China.

Please inform the Secretary of State.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 25, 1941.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador
 Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
 Dr. A. Loudon, Netherlands Minister
 Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck

COPIES TO:



The Chinese Ambassador called on me last evening, at his request.

The Ambassador referred to the conference which had been held yesterday afternoon at which the Secretary of State had informed representatives of the B, C and D powers of the latest developments leading toward possible conclusion between the United States and Japan of a modus vivendi. The Ambassador said that he had a very real appreciation of the seriousness and difficulty of the problem which confronts the American Government and concerns all the countries represented; and he expressed appreciation of the attitude of the Secretary of State and complete confidence that the American Government would yield nothing in the field of

principles

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principles and pursue no course of "appeasement". He said the he wished, however, to repeat to me what he had said in the conference regarding articles II and III of the American draft proposal. Article II, he said, presumably does not apply in reference to the conflict between Japan and China: it presumably leaves Japan free to continue her operations against China; and, article III leaves Japan free to maintain as much as 25,000 troops in Indochina and to conduct operations against China from Indochina. He went on to say that in the conversations that were held on Saturday, the Secretary had spoken of permitting the Japanese to maintain in China "a few thousand" troops; and that in his report to his Government he had used that expression, and he understood that the other representatives had reported in the same terms to their Governments. Now, it seemed to him, a force of 25,000 Japanese troops in northern Indochina would constitute a menace to China. Suppose, he said, the Japanese should scrupulously live up to the letter of this provision--which, if they did, ^{he said} would be surprising--; and suppose they were to cause that number of troops to consist largely if not altogether of mechanics, engineers and aviation pilots, -- such a force could seriously menace the Burma Road and terrifically harass Chinese land forces in Yunnan. If the Japanese should choose to conduct land operations

-11-

of the United States from joint outside Indochina
 but the French Government with the air force
 in Indochina, these would be just as much a
 part of the whole picture as the French Indochina.
 The Ambassador therefore hoped, he said, that
 the United States would consider whether or not the
 reasons were restrictive.

It then remained to explain to the Ambassador the
 various considerations which have led to the formulation of
 the United States position on the setting up of
 articles II and III in a form in which they appear. The
 Ambassador's speech is a reflection of the difficulty of
 the problem and is a warning that we will do no unnecessary
 damage. He said that the situation cannot
 be exactly the same for all and every government, because
 each government views it from a different angle and in a
 different atmosphere. The Chinese Government is, he said,
 not prepared and is not responsive about the Indochina situation.
 It feels keenly its lack of the right types of equipment for
 effective protection of its lifeline, the Burma Road, the
 security of which is of vital importance to it and
 more of great concern to the other powers, especially the
 United States, which are sending in aid via that Road. He
 said that he realized that it would be very helpful to keep
 the

-4-

the Japanese in suspense for another three months, but he doubted whether that could be achieved. He concluded with an assurance that he would try to cause his Government to see the problem in the light in which the American Government sees it. He expressed hope that, if he did not succeed completely in that effort, we would realize that difficulties which confront China inevitably look somewhat different when viewed from Chungking than when viewed from Washington.

Later in the evening the Netherlands Minister dropped in on me. He made with regard to article III observations not dissimilar to those which the Chinese Ambassador had made, as regarding the question of the number of Japanese troops that might be left in Indochina. He also raised a question whether the matter of matériel might not be quite as important as or even more important than the question of the number of troops. He said that he had on Saturday made a long report to his Government, that he had received since then several telegrams, and that he expected to send to the Department today two or three memoranda.

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COPY OF MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
DATED NOVEMBER 26, 1941

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Copy
November 26, 1941MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese Government, namely:

(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad basic peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on, if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject.

(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations.

In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the

modus vivendi.

-2-

modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.

Cordell Hull

Handed to the Secretary by
the Netherlands Minister,
November 27, 1941.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 27, 1941

SUBJECT: Japanese-American relations.

PARTICIPANTS: The Honorable the Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador;
Mr. Welles, Under Secretary.

COPIES TO: S, RA/1, 2, 3.



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The British Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request.

The Ambassador said that Secretary Hull had called him on the telephone last night to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys. The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Government with a document other than the exquisitely document which had so recently been under discussion.

I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was the half-hearted support

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given by the British Government to the earlier proposal which had been under discussion and the raising of repeated questions by the British Government in regard thereto.

Lord Halifax said he could not understand this in as much as it had been communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British Government.

To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the President yesterday could hardly be regarded as "full support", but on the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed.

Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended primarily to express the objections on the part of the British Government. I went on to say that he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the British objections to that effect, in fact, quoted to the Chinese Ambassador that to the British Government all the organs of the United States Government were ignorant of the British Government's intention to prevent the dispatch of the armada, in answer to this, Lord Halifax, at the correct moment, Secretary Hull gave positive assurances to the British Government that the United States Government would support the British Government in the event of a Japanese attack on the United States. I then said that the British Government had been very much surprised to find that the United States Government had been so long in coming to a decision on this matter, and that the British Government had been very much surprised to find that the United States Government had been so long in coming to a decision on this matter, and that the British Government had been very much surprised to find that the United States Government had been so long in coming to a decision on this matter.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 27, 1941

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MODUS VIVENDI

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER,
THE RIGHT HONORABLE RICHARD T. CASEY

COPIES TO:

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The Minister of Australia called at his request. His purpose was to inquire whether the proposed modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently, to which I replied that I so considered it. He expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further consideration of the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British communications on the subject, adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong for the proposal all the way and that I sympathized with his situation but I did not feel that the communications from Churchill and Eden, with qualifications such as

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were in them, would be very helpful in a bitter fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and carried forward by all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here, would be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their liking in every way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be feasible to take up this matter further with the Chinese and I replied that I did not think so, so far as I am concerned. I thanked the Minister for his cooperation and that of his Government.

C.I.

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Washington

November 27, 1941.

TOKYO (JAPAN).

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CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

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In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu when they were handed on November 26 for consideration the document described in a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions up to the present time have not repeat not yet afforded any basis which gives much promise of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement. It is of course too early to adopt any definitive opinion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but the probability that they may lapse should not repeat not be lost sight of.

The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give some advance consideration to various problems which may as a consequence arise in connection with our Foreign Service establishments in Japanese territory. As lapse of the conversations

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Department of State

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Washington,

Charge to

might result in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan, it would seem to us that, without any intention of being alarmist or of too hastily envisaging serious contingencies, this question should be brought to your attention so that you may have it well in mind in case it should become necessary for the Department to consult you in regard to the making of arrangements for the packing of official and personal effects and the expeditious handling of other matters which would be involved in the closing of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desired that all phases of the matter be considered confidential and that discussion of it be kept to a minimum.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 28, 1941.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister of the British Embassy

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

COPIES TO:

Sir Ronald Campbell called on me at his request.

In the course of the conversation he stated that the British armed authorities have received a message from our armed authorities stating that in as much as the United States-Japan negotiations have "broken down", it now becomes necessary to issue certain instructions to the armed forces; and that the British Government wishes to inquire of us whether the negotiations have "broken down". I said in reply that so far as I am aware neither the American Government nor the Japanese Government has declared or indicated that the negotiations are terminated, but that I was not in a position to confirm or deny statements attributed to any American official agency that the negotiations have "broken down".

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1964. I still remember an afternoon trip that I took with the Bureau staff to the White House. I was one of the people who went to the White House to see the President. I was with the President and remembered that he likes to see all callers after his return from his office. [This story, I understand, is alleged to have originated from the Japanese Embassy.]

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Department of State

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Washington.

November 27, 1941

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CHUNGKING (CHINA).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY.

On November 20 the Japanese presented a five-point proposal for a temporary agreement in substance as follows:

One. The United States to refrain from actions prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China.

Two. Both countries to remove freezing restrictions and to restore commercial relations. The United States to furnish Japan a required amount of petroleum.

Three. Both countries to cooperate in obtaining necessary commodities from the Dutch East Indies.

Four. Both countries not repeat not to make any armed encroachment into areas of southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific except Japanese-occupied French Indochina.

Five. Japan to withdraw its troops from Indochina following either peaceful settlement between Japan and China or establishment of equitable peace in the Pacific area. In the interim Japan to remove its troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina upon conclusion of this arrangement which would later be a part of a final agreement.

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Department of State

Washington,

The Department gave consideration to a number of alternate proposals and counterpropositions or combinations thereof which suggested themselves to the Department for possible presentation to the Japanese Government. At one time the Department considered the question of presenting to the Japanese Government, simultaneously, with the proposal which was actually given them in November '36, an alternate offer for a temporary modus vivendi. The draft under consideration at that time called for a temporary modus vivendi to be in effect for a period of three months during which time conversations would continue toward the working out of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. At the end of the period of the term of the modus vivendi both Governments would at the request of either confer to determine whether the extension of the modus vivendi was justified by the prospects of reaching a settlement of the sort sought.

The draft modus vivendi which we were considering contained mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement in northwestern Asia and the northern Pacific area, and in East Asia and the

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Department of State

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Washington,

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§ southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to \$600,000 monthly, a small amount of petroleum within categories now permitted general export on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitutes at least two thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to

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Department of State

approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments
on the question of their taking similar measures.

At a certain point in our consideration of the modus vivendi the representatives in Washington of the British, Dutch, Australian and Chinese Governments were assembled.

On November 27 the Chinese Ambassador at this point called on the Secretary and sought to make certain preliminary explanations of the attitude of his Government. He had expressed in several addresses through several channels to several audiences in regard to the draft modus vivendi which we were considering. The Ambassador wanted the Secretary a copy of a telegram from the Chinese Foreign Minister stating that the Government felt the American Government had not solved the Chinese question and that it is still inclined to pursue Japan's policy of hostile excesses. In that telegram the Foreign Minister said he had told the Legation that the Secretary of State had always evidenced the greatest respect for international principles, that the Secretary's attitude regarding the feasibility of a modus vivendi indicated that the

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Department of State

The Department of State has received information from the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government has decided to withdraw its forces from the Philippines and to return them to Japan. This decision was announced on December 1, 1941, and is a significant development in the Pacific War. The Japanese Government has stated that this decision is based on the fact that the United States has decided to withdraw its forces from the Philippines and to return them to the United States. This decision is a direct result of the Japanese Government's policy of non-interference in the affairs of other nations. The Japanese Government has also stated that it will continue to maintain its forces in the Philippines and to protect its interests in the region. This decision is a clear indication of the Japanese Government's commitment to the principles of non-interference and self-determination. The Japanese Government has also stated that it will continue to maintain its forces in the Philippines and to protect its interests in the region. This decision is a clear indication of the Japanese Government's commitment to the principles of non-interference and self-determination.

Very truly yours,
The Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 29, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE CONVERSATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

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The British Ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered that he had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations between the President and myself and the Japanese with special reference to the question of the proposed modus vivendi. This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek,

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For example, the recent rumors as to the cable messages
 illustrating cabinet differences and the officials in the
 Government other than the State Department, and so on
 times even leaked to the President, illustrating into a deli-
 cate and serious situation with the possibility of what the
 facts are. I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-
 law, located here in Washington, disseminating
 reports at times to the press and others, apparently with
 no particular purpose in mind; that we have correspond-
 ents from London who interview different officials here,
 which is entirely their privilege to do, except that at
 times we all have too fast without fully understanding
 each other's views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that
 this was well illustrated in the case of the recent out-
 burst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I re-
 minded that it might have been better if, when Churchill
 publicly criticized Chiang Kai-shek's long protest about the sit-
 uation here with Japan, instead of giving the protest
 any publicity or attention in his part, thereby humiliat-
 ing us virtually, which was what we knew were the indi-
 vidual views of the British Government toward these ne-
 gotiations, he had sent a private cable back to Chiang
 Kai-shek telling him that we were all at work with the same
 zeal

-3-

zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into with China.

I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked and to whom I have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and ports before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet

-1-

these new conditions; that this was the only way that the Japanese recognize that their present limited conquest now renewed all along the line, that is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost of nerve and risk.

I also said to the Ambassador that a calm, deliberate Japanese Government would more than ever desire to wait another thirty days to see whether the German army is driven out of Russia by winter. I added that the extreme fire-eating elements in Japan, who have created a general forward movement supported by the army and navy have influenced a vast portion of the Japanese public to clamor for such a movement, would probably take no serious notice of the Russian-German situation, but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have advocated for some time; that at least it would be a mistake not to consider this possibility as entirely real, rather than to assume that they would virtually halt and enter in some movements into palliatives and into the furthest while waiting the results on the Russian front. The Ambassador, I think, had his reservations on this latter point. He did not also recollect what I said about the well confused mechanics for the conduct of diplomatic relations between several great countries in these critical times.

S CHINE

Handed me by the Chinese Ambassador,
December 2, 1941.

In three telegrams dated November 27 and 28, Mr. Quo Tai-chi and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek expressed their confidence in the President and the Secretary of State and in the fundamental principles of their foreign policy.

Both of them have studied my long telegram of November 24 reporting the discussions between the Secretary and the four envoys at the office of the Secretary, and also my report of the conversation between the Secretary and myself in his apartment on the evening of the 25th. Both the Generalissimo and the foreign minister were reassured by the sympathetic and helpful spirit underlying these conversations.

I wish me to point out to the United States Government the following facts which, because of very great distance, might not have been fully appreciated on this side of the ocean:

(1) The almost incredibly great faith of the Chinese people in the efficacy of the economic pressure on our enemy which has been in force for the last four months is such that the mere rumor of any possibility of its relaxation has already begun to produce a truly panicky feeling throughout China.

(2) Such panicky feeling has been caused partly by the false propaganda which, during the past week (especially on November 21, 22, 23),

- 2 -

and broadcast reports of an approaching general relaxation of freezing and trade restrictions by the United States and Japanese Governments on the understanding that Japan would undertake not to move southward and that the United States would not interfere with the war in China.

(3) The whole question is psychological and spiritual: It is a question of the morale of a whole people which has been fighting a very hard war for four years and a half, and which, in its hardship and long suffering, has pinned its great hope on the international situation turning in our favor and, in particular, on the economic sanctions that the democratic powers have been able to put into force during the last months. It is no exaggeration to say that this question fundamentally affects the spirit of our fighting forces and our people.


(4) In a telegram to me, the Foreign Minister tells me that the Government has information that a certain leader in the North (not specified by name) might be so shaken by a possible weakening of our international position as to make moves detrimental to the prosecution of our war of resistance.

- 3 -

Gen.issimo Chiang Kai-shek is expected to convey to the Secretary of State their observation that Japan has been so weakened by the long war in China and by the economic pressure of the democratic powers that she cannot afford to risk a war with the great naval powers.

In a latest telegram to Mr. Hull expressing great gratification in the latest report of the Secretary to the Japanese envoy, which, he understands, reaffirms the fundamental principles repeatedly enunciated by the United States Government.

EXHIBIT NO. 19





THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material contributions, and the officers of the Department made further contributions, which together comprise the draft of the proposed message.

In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week-end and give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions.

I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such

complications

communications as Col. Robinson and I referred to on yesterday.

If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress until the best state of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.

I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor translated in code by Ambassador Brew for communication by him to the Emperor through appropriate channels.



China. It was then that the American Government took its stand on the principle of the "open door" and declared that it was its policy to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent peace to China ... protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Since 1898, the American Government has been conducting in the Philippines the unprecedented experiment of acquainting an Asiatic people with the methods of personal freedom and national self-government that are practiced by our own Republic. Our constant aim has been to develop the Filipino people into a self-governing and independent commonwealth. At the same time, this farsighted experiment has been and is of far reaching importance to us and to other peoples. It is important to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in the western Pacific a nation friendly to us by virtue of close association and profitable relations with us. Our presence in the Philippines has helped make known to the peoples of the Orient the name, the culture, the commerce and the good repute of the United States. It has helped to establish and to stabilize our relations in general with those regions

The nine powers possessed of interests in the Pacific, China, Japan and the United States among them met in conference in Washington. The all-comprehensive objective of the conference was maintenance of peace. The methods envisaged were (1) reduction of armament and (2) regulation of competition in the Pacific

and

-4-

and for tests. These, too, witnessed the flooding in character and magnitude upon the Pacific West Coast. Especially important among these were the two power plants which contained devices to respond to emergency conditions and the maintenance of such emergency for the power plant. These at all nations, particularly Japan, and for the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan, no limitation of power (power).

In 1921 the nations of the world entered into a treaty--the Pact of Paris, or Kellogg Pact--wherein all agreed to resolve controversies among and between themselves by open but peaceful means.

In 1924, the Japanese army began its seizure of Manchuria. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations endeavored to induce Japan to revert to peaceful intentions, and the Government of the United States took the subject to that effect. While the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese armed forces was still in progress, the Government of the United States went to the League and British Governments on January 7, 1935, jointly declaring that the United States would not permit its rights and its interest to Manchuria and the region to be impaired by any action which might be taken by any Government contrary to the provisions of the Pact of Paris.

In 1937 the Japanese administration announced an agreement whereby the Japanese Government in the case of a recently concluded with the Chinese Government was that the United States and the United Kingdom had no intention of entering into any relations with the Japanese Government which would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States and the United Kingdom. The Japanese Government had been informed that the United States and the United Kingdom had no intention of entering into any relations with the Japanese Government which would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the process of their military operations against
and in China, Japan's armed forces have taken American
lives, wounded or otherwise physically abused American
citizens (men, women and children), sunk American
vessels--including a naval vessel--immolated other

American

American vessels, torched American hospitals and churches and schools, destroyed a great deal of American property, ruined much American business, greatly interfered with American trade, and, in general, shown utter disrespect for our rights--in law and under treaties: all this over and above and in addition to the incalculable damage that they have done to China and the suffering which they have caused to the Chinese people, to say nothing of the injuries which they have done to other nations and to civilization and to the peace of the world and good will among men.

-10A-

And while all this is going on, Japan, bound to Germany and Italy in a treaty wherein those three powers pledged one another that if any one of them is "attacked" by an outside power not already at war, the other allies will assist that one of their members by economic, political and military means; and Japan's militant leaders declare that they will interpret their obligations under this commitment in whatever manner they may deem best suited to their own needs and purposes.

-11-

Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repetition of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe. The methods which Hitler has used with temporary success and which are being faithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and control over neighboring peoples by a carefully planned and executed progressive infiltration, penetration and encirclement through which one nation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threats of force.

After this fashion and pursuing this policy of conquest by force, Japan established herself in Korea; worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria; has sought for the past four and a half years to subjugate China; has, during the period of our negotiations with her, invaded Indochina; and now, threatens with imminent attack various neighboring areas including even the Philippines.

This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds unmistakable threats to our interests especially our interest in peace and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon

supplies

-12-

supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go practical Japanese control of the Pacific.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and considerations of justice, humanity and fair dealing are restored, we will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force.

A program on the part of any country for subjugation and exploitation of a huge population and a vast portion of the world is of incalculable concern to every other nation.

Throughout the period in which Japan has been making it clear that such is her program, the Government of the United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes.

For

-13-

For the past eight months, conversations have been carried on between the Secretary of State and the President, on behalf of the United States, and the Foreign Minister and Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments.

Throughout this entire period, the Government of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we have stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows:

-14-

--The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. Basically these are the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations.

12

It is a matter of fact that the United States has not only the right to defend itself but also the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers. The United States has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Axis powers, and it has the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers. The United States has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Axis powers, and it has the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers. The United States has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Axis powers, and it has the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers.

The United States has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Axis powers, and it has the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers. The United States has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Axis powers, and it has the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers. The United States has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Axis powers, and it has the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers. The United States has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Axis powers, and it has the right to defend the world against the aggression of the Axis powers.

The supreme question presented to this country along with every other countries by the Hitler-dominated movement of world conquest is that of self-defense.

The fundamental issue between this country and Japan is not very different from the fundamental issue between
this

16

this country and Nazi Germany. Concisely stated, it is an issue of autocracy versus self-determination, an issue of master and slave relationship among the peoples of the earth versus independence of nations and freedom of peoples.

The whole world is presented with the issue whether Germany, Italy and Japan are to conquer and rule the earth or are to be dissuaded or prevented, by whatever processes may be necessary, from pursuit of policies of conquest.

The question immediately presented in our Far Eastern affairs is whether the United States is or is not to stand by while Japan goes forward with a program of conquest by force--in disregard of law, in disregard of treaties, in disregard of others' rights and interest, in disregard of any and all conventions or considerations of morality and of humanity--now in eastern Asia and the western Pacific, ultimately further afield. In our own councils there are a ~~diversity~~ ^{variety} and a composite of issues:

There are issues between principles and opportunism; between confidence and fear; between reality and illusion; between clear understanding and confused misunderstanding; between wisdom and folly; between being farsighted and

being

-17-

being shortsighted; between the concept of peace at any price and a concept of peace at a price commensurate with the value of peace; between accurate appraisal and inaccurate appraisal of our own strength; between full use and fractional use of our material and moral resources.

Japan's policy of conquest and exploitation which is now being carried out in China has already utterly destroyed in the portions of China occupied by Japan the peaceful and profitable commercial relations which the United States had previously enjoyed there. It has devastated a nation which for many centuries by its devotion to the arts of peace and commerce was the most stabilizing influence on the western side of the Pacific Ocean. It threatens to transform a peaceful continent into one dominated by the military and leadership of Japan and devoted to the practice of war.

-18-

of the Philippines now depends. It would ruin the lifelong efforts and investments of thousands of American citizens who have transferred their homes and business activities to the Philippines on the faith that American principles of freedom and American methods of government would continue in those Islands. It would forever terminate the prestige and influence of the United States which the American experiment in the Philippine Islands has been establishing throughout the Orient.

If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon and were to succeed in conquering the regions which they are menacing in the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic.

We do not want war with Japan, and Japan does not want war with this country. If, however, war should come, the fault and the responsibility will be those of Japan. The primary cause will have been pursuit by Japan of a
policy

-19-

policy of aggression--in the course of which Japan's militant militaristic leadership has disregarded law, violated treaties, impaired rights, destroyed property and lives of our nationals, inflicted horrible sufferings upon peoples who are our friends, interfered with our trade, ruined the legitimate business of many of our nationals, compelled us to make huge expenditures for defensive armament, made threats against us, put and kept many of our people in a constant state of anxiety, and, in general, made Japan a world nuisance and made of Japan a menace to our security and to the cause of peace, of freedom and of justice.

Our policy in relations with Japan should be and is influenced not by fear of what attacks Japan, acting unlawfully and with resort to force may make upon us but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and security and justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it is within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make upon us because of our pursuit of that course.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

November 29, 1941

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending the offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples, the sound character of their respective institutions and national structures, and the wisdom of their leaders and rulers -- especially in Japan your illustrious grandfather the Emperor Meiji -- have prospered and risen to a position of being able substantially to influence humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all
humanity

-2-

humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their enlightened decisions and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and better courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other lands.

Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

EXHIBIT NO. 20

COPY OF A MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT COVERING
A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN. THIS MEMORANDUM WAS SENT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON OCTOBER 17, 1941. THE PROPOSED
MESSAGE WAS NOT SENT AND NO FURTHER ACTION WAS
TAKEN.

100-204170

October 17, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a redraft of your proposed message to the Emperor of Japan.

In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory conversations with us, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister is, at his request, coming to call again this afternoon for a further extended discussion, (b) the message received by Ambassador Grew from Prince Konoye (through Prince Konoye's private secretary) (reported in Mr. Grew's telegram ^{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 1646, October 17, 11 a.m.) that the new Japanese cabinet would be one sincerely desirous of improving relations with the United States and of continuing the exploratory conversations, and (c) the word we have that General Tojo, a Konoye adherent and a "moderate",

-2-

"moderate", has been designated by the Emperor to form a new cabinet, we incline to the view that it would be premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor pending further clarification of the situation in Japan and of the probable attitude of the new government.

Enclosure:
Redraft of
proposed
message.

FE:MMH:NES

FE
my/PA/E
11/11
11/11

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty on matters of state. I feel I should again address Your Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency which appears to be in the process of formation. As Your Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the great purpose of Your Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against the Soviet Union or against British or Dutch or independent territory

-2-

territory in the south, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near Eastern theaters of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas maintained and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned and would have to seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to prevent any extension of such condition of war.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

December 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the substance of the "stand-still" arrangement which you contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your message.

Enclosure:
Draft message to
the Emperor of Japan.

FL:MMH:MS

FE

PA H

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

December 8, 1941.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our two countries for almost a century. Those developments are suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be overlooked which might

serve

-2-

serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.

In

-3-

In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or materiel to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the
amount

-4-

amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan's leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State


Washington

Department of Education

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Roddy
 I hope this to show
 I think can go in
 Gray code - saves time -
 I don't mind if it gets
 printed if

J. L. G.



The Board of Directors of the United States Trust Company
has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
10th inst. and in reply to inform you that the same has been
forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.
The Board of Directors of the United States Trust Company
has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
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forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.
The Board of Directors of the United States Trust Company
has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
10th inst. and in reply to inform you that the same has been
forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

EXHIBIT NO. 21

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

London

Date: December 6, 1941

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased and
no further communication
to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State
Washington.



URGENT PRIORITY AIR POST JAPAN.

591B, December 6, 4 p.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE

SECRET.

British Admiralty reports that at 5 a.m. on
this morning two parties were off Cambodia
coast, sailing slowly westward toward KRA at
different in time. First party of 10 transports, 1 cruiser,
12 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 1 cruiser,
12 destroyers.

740. COI I F. W. / 684

DEC 12 1941
Confidential F. W.

FILED

BS/WHA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TRB

London

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Dated December 6, 1941

FROM:

DIRECTOR'S STAMP
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 8 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY AND MOST URGENT.

5093, December 6, 7 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY.

By number 5010 December 6, 4 p.m.

Again from Caden. A directly conference

information just forwarded, Caden attending.

The above uncertainties as to whether destination of
this is Kiro by Bangkok. Letter would not be
sent until before launch.

There is a direct line to the rear end of my

the report on the New York Dispatch, letter

12:00 a.m. Greenwich time, and 12:00 a.m. to

12:00 a.m. London time. Below for comment.

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

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740.0011 PACIFIC MAIL/72-

CITIZENSHIP

C/S/MIA

1943, December 6, 7 p.m., from London.

Dear Mr. Tolson, Mr. Egan, Mr. Clegg.

Leaving to the Navy Mr. Egan in order to go over with the Navy staff on 6/12, I regret that I had not previously agreed on the subject of the points you outlined and which I feel that your staff with the exception of the program which I have is not able to handle. I will clear up the points which remain. I want you to know that I am nothing to do with the insertion of the word "or" to the I.L.G.

I have just lunch with the Prime Minister at his usual place in the country and I am constantly in contact with the Embassy and private wires in case you wish to communicate with me.

YINANT

CSB

7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE

SUBJECT

PARTICIPANTS

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador called at my request and handed me the accompanying memorandum, which is self-explanatory. He was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus. I said that the President was returning tomorrow morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador with respect to his inquiry. Previously the Ambassador had sent me a telegram (copy attached) received from his Foreign Office on this

same

 12
 740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/674

PS/ATE

more than.

The Government is anxious to get the
 - the way for the Government to make operations to
 exist in the public eye. It is possible that the
 statement would be in keeping with any steps we might
 have to take.

G. .

S. J. :A

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/674

Confidential File

PS/ATB

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PASTAIR
PLAIN

Collect Full rate
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Charge Department:
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Department of State

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M.

19

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

EXHIBIT NO. 22

(Seal of Prime Minister)

10, DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL.

DRAFT OF PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Declaration by U. S. Government that:

1. Any further encroachment by JAPAN in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and JAPAN.

2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by JAPAN in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

Declaration by H. M. G.

Same as above, *mutatis mutandis*, the last phrase reading:—"* * * their support of them, H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such Power."

Declaration by Dutch Government.

Same as that by H. M. G.

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

AUGUST 10, 1941.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

N. C. S. 387

SRS

From: The President

To: OPNAV "160115"

RESTRICTED

For Secretary Hull X I land Saturday afternoon and hope to reach Washington Sunday morning. I suggest you come to White House about eleven or eleven thirty Sunday and that you ask Nomura to see us at White House about four thirty in afternoon. All well best regards

ROOSEVELT.

ATLANTIC FLEET

Outgoing

121645

Routine

Secret Secret

It seems highly desirable that you and I should see Nomura as soon as I get back X Please ask the Ambassador to be ready to come to the White House either Saturday or Sunday X I shall let you know the exact time as soon as possible X White Twenty X For Secretary of State from the President.

TOD:

From: AUGUSTA	Date Aug 12, 1941	Originated	Released
Action: OPNAV, Washington	Routine:..... Priority:.....	All Despatches considered DEFERRED Unless Originator Checks Higher Classification.	

Formation:

Draft of a proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to the Department by Mr. Welles following conference between the President and Mr. Winston Churchill

NOTE

This draft was not given to the Japanese Ambassador. See communications given by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

FW 711.94/2177

August 15, 1941

111.94/277

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I am in receipt of your letter of August 14, 1941, regarding the

Government's interest in the activities of the Japanese Consulate in

San Francisco, California.

The information furnished to me by the Japanese Consulate in San Francisco

on August 14, 1941, is being reviewed by the Department of Justice.

I am sure that you will be satisfied with the results of this review.

Very truly yours,

W. J. Clegg, Special Agent in Charge

San Francisco, California

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a letterhead memorandum

dated August 14, 1941, and captioned as above.


Very truly yours,


W. J. Clegg, Special Agent in Charge

San Francisco, California

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a letterhead memorandum

dated August 14, 1941, and captioned as above.





- 4 -

It is recommended that the military air

be given priority.

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It is recommended that the military air be given priority in the allocation of aircraft and personnel.

- 5 -

the use of force or the threat of force in the
conduct of such conversations are in progress.




EXHIBIT NO. 22A

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netherlands, and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indochina and that they would agree that the products and raw materials of Indochina should be available to all powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the Government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indochina.

Subsequently,

Subsequently, the President informed the Japanese Government of Japan that the proposal made by the President should be regarded as being made to the Japanese Government as well.

The President has now been informed that the Japanese Government is fully disposed to support the proposal made by the President.

On August 8 the Japanese Government informed the Government of the United States through the Secretary of State of a proposal which it preferred as a reply to the suggestion made by the President on July 24.

The proposal of the Japanese Government states in the first paragraph that the Japanese Government undertakes, provided the Government of the United States undertakes various steps set forth in the said proposal, that the Government of Japan, "will not further station

its

-3-

its troops in the southwestern Pacific areas except French Indochina and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident".

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations. These conversations had envisaged the ultimate reaching of agreements based upon certain principles and policies. The principles and policies which formed the basis for the conversations under reference were altogether at variance with the adoption by either Government of any measures involving military expansion on the part of either power through the use of force or through the threat of force. Notwithstanding these facts, the Government of Japan has already

- 4 -

... supplied Indochina with its military, air and
naval forces.

Nevertheless, in view of the statement made to the
Secretary of State on August 6 by the Japanese Ambassador
in Washington, that the Japanese Government is desirous of
providing a fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding
on which mutual negotiations have been carried on during
the past months, and, although the Government of the
United States finds it necessary to state simply and
briefly the suggestions contained in the proposal of the
Japanese Government of August 6 the United States Government
it will be prepared to undertake a further study of
the scope of this proposal, and the United States Government
represented by the Government of Japan that Japan will
undertake no further action in the matter of military
operations in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.

by use of force or threats of force of Japanese control of areas outside of the Japanese Empire while such conversations are in progress.

The Government of the United States cannot again enter upon conversations of this character with the Government of Japan if the Japanese Government has in contemplation any further steps such as that which it has recently taken with regard to Indochina or if it intends to use the position which it has attained in Indochina in furtherance of hostile action against any neighboring area; and should such conversations again be entered upon, the Government of the United States would, in case the Japanese Government gave indication of a contrary intention, be compelled immediately to withdraw from the said conversations.

Assurances on these points by the Government of Japan are regarded by the Government of the United States as an indispensable prerequisite to entry upon any discussion of any new proposals which the Japanese Government may feel moved to make looking toward conclusion of an agreement for
the

- 3 -

Improvement of Relations Between Japan and the United States.

The Government of the United States shares the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding. Its patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such understanding has been demonstrated time and time again during recent years and notably so during recent months. It believes that only complete candor on its part at this moment will tend to further the objective sought.

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring areas in the Pacific, including the mainland of Asia, the Government of the United States will be forced to take immediately any and all steps of whatsoever character

- 7 -

character it may deem necessary in its own security.

EXHIBIT NO. 22B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

Sunday, August 10, 1941
At sea.

SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation.

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary of State.

COPIES TO:

I accompanied the President this morning to attend the religious services and the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the PRINCE OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance with the conversation which was had between the President, the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific and of a proposed joint declaration to be made by the President and the Prime Minister when their present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read

as

14007-2/5
Confidential File

PS/SF

-2-

as follows:

"Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government.

"Declaration by the United States Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power."

"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, His

Majesty's

-3-

Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

"Declaration by the Netherlands Government:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the Netherlands and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, Her Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

The draft of the proposed joint declaration reads as follows:

"The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the

means

-4-

means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of speech and of thought without which such choosing must be illusory;

Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of essential produce not only within their territorial jurisdiction but between the nations of the world.

Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security

within

-5-

within their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting burdensome armaments."

As I was leaving the ship to accompany the President back to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declaration of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large number of cruisers to seize or to destroy all of the British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States herself entered the war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands

and

-6-

and possibly the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were not done, the blow to the British Government might be almost decisive.

Sumner Welles

U SW.3AM

EXHIBIT NO. 22C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

Monday, August 11, 1941.
At sea.

SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation.

PARTICIPANTS: The President.
The British Prime Minister.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Honorable Harry Hopkins.
The Under Secretary of State.

COPIES TO:

The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the AUGUSTA at 11:00 a.m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins and myself.

I

The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prime Minister of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the contents of the letter were highly satisfactory and made possible without any difficulty the carrying out of arrangements for the occupation of the Azores as a means of assurance that the islands would not be occupied by Germany.

Mr.*lie charter*

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JCH: [illegible]

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- 2 -

Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation had been ~~attended~~^{decided} upon by the British Government, namely, the occupation of the Canary Islands during the days immediately after the September full moon. This date, as Mr. Churchill remembered it, would be about the 15th of September. The British Government were undertaking this operation with full knowledge that the islands had been recently heavily fortified and that a very large number of German officers were engaged there in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops. It was undertaken with the further realization that this step would almost inevitably involve a Spanish attack either in conjunction with or upon the instigation of German military forces and that such attack would render untenable by the British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar. The British Government, however, had decided upon the step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain from the British standpoint was going from bad to worse and that Hitler almost inevitably would undertake the occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent penetration of North Africa if any collapse took place on the part of the Russian Army or even if a winter stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated Gibraltar would be isolated anyway and the occupation by Great Britain of the Canary Islands was of the utmost importance

- 3 -

importance in guarding a southern Atlantic convoy route into the British Isles.

In view of this operation, the British Government would not be in a position conveniently to carry out the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Government to assist in the defense of the Azores.

In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to the President, it was therefore agreed that the British Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British Government could not conveniently undertake to assist in the defense of the Azores and would further inform Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request the United States for such assistance. It was agreed on the part of the President that immediately upon the receipt of such notification from Dr. Salazar the United States would send the necessary forces of occupation to the Azores and that the Brazilian Government would be simultaneously requested to send at least a token force to take part in the expedition.

The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view of our present military situation if the United States undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a position in the near future at least to undertake the protection

- 4 -

protection of the Cape Verde Islands. Mr. Churchill stated that the British Government would be in a position to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the understanding that it would later turn over the protection of those islands to the United States at such time as the United States was in a position to take those measures. Mr. Churchill further stated that during the time that the United States was landing the necessary forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a large force between the Azores and the mainland of Portugal in order to render impossible the sending of any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that time be already occupied by Germany.

II

The Prime Minister then said that he desired to discuss the situation in the Far East. He had with him a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had already given the President a copy and which suggested that the United States, British and Dutch Governments simultaneously warn Japan that further military expansion by Japan in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter measures by the countries named even though such counter measures might result in hostilities between them and Japan, and, second, provided that the United States declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the assistance

- 5 -

assistance of the Netherlands East Indies as a result of aggression against the latter on the part of Japan the President would request from the Congress of the United States authority to assist the British and Dutch Governments in their defense against Japanese aggression.

The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unadvisable.

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, that he felt very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do was to request Secretary Hull by radio to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see the Ambassador immediately upon his return. The

President

- 6 -

President stated that in that interview he would inform the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese Government would give the commitment contained in the first paragraph of the proposal of the Japanese Government of August 6, namely, that the Japanese Government "will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will be withdrawn", specifically and not contingently, the United States Government, while making it clear that the other conditions set forth by the Japanese Government were in general unacceptable, the United States would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to explore the possibilities inherent in the various proposals made by Japan for the reaching of a friendly understanding between the two Governments. The President would further state that should Japan refuse to consider this procedure and undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, the President desired the Japanese Government to know that in such event in his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking of such further measures might result in war between the United States and Japan.

Mr.

- 7 -

Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the procedure suggested appeared to him to cover the situation very well. He said it had in it an element of "face-saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would constitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the consequences involved in a continuation by Japan of her present course.

There was then discussed the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union.

I stated that in my judgment the real issue which was involved was the continuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area. I said it seemed to me that the statement which the President intended to make to the Japanese Government might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific area.

The

- 8 -

The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this and it was decided that the step to be taken by the President would be taken in that sense.

The question then arose as to the desirability of the President's making reference in his proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador to British policy in the southern Pacific region and specifically with regard to Thailand. The President said that he thought it would be advantageous for him to be in a position at that time to state that he had been informed by the British Government that Great Britain had no aggressive intentions whatever upon Thailand. Mr. Churchill said that in this he heartily concurred.

I asked whether it would not be better for the President to be in a position to state not only that Great Britain had no intentions of an aggressive character with regard to Thailand, but also that the British Government had informed the United States Government that it supported wholeheartedly the President's proposal for the neutralization of Indochina and of Thailand.

Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would be well to make an all-inclusive statement of that character with respect to British policy, that he trusted that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese Ambassador that he had consulted the British Government,

and

- 3 -

and that the British Government was in complete accord with the neutralization proposal, and that it had likewise informed the President that it would in no event undertake any initiative in the occupation of Thailand.

It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after further consultation with Mr. Churchill, would give me in writing a statement which the British Government was prepared to make with regard to this issue.

The President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be held off for at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if negotiations or conversations actually took place between the United States and Japan on the basis which had been formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific might be averted.

III

Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring up for discussion the proposed joint declaration by the President and himself.

The President said that he believed the best solution of this problem was for an identical statement to be made in London and in the United States, probably on Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime

Minister

- 10 -

Minister and the President had met at sea, accompanied by the various members of their respective staffs; that these members of the two Governments had discussed the question of aid under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act to nations resisting aggression, and that these military and naval conversations had in no way involved any future commitments between the two Governments, except as authorized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act; that the Prime Minister and the President had between them discussed certain principles relating to a better future for the world and had agreed upon a joint declaration which would then be quoted verbatim.

Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form in which the President had desired to make it clear that no future commitments had been entered into. The President stated that that portion of the proposed statement was of extreme importance from his standpoint inasmuch as a statement of that character would make it impossible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United States to allege that every kind of secret agreement had been entered into during the course of these conversations.

Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side of the question, but that he believed that any categorical statement of that character would prove deeply

discouraging

- 11 -

discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries and would have a very serious effect upon their morale. He likewise made it clear that a similar effect would be created by British public opinion. He asked if the statement could not be worded in such a way as to make it positive rather than negative, namely, that the members of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of the President had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act. The President replied that he believed that the statement could be drawn up in that way and that if he then were queried in the United States he need merely reply that nothing had been discussed or agreed upon other than that which had already been indicated in his public statement.

I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan copies of a redraft which I had made this morning of the proposed joint declaration before Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of going over it with the President, and the latter had approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to read it. He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the third point before the word "self-government" the words "sovereign rights and". This was agreed upon.

Mr.

- 12 -

Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read as follows: "Fourth, they will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

He immediately inquired whether this was meant to apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied that, of course, it did, since the policy which the United States Government had been pursuing for the better part of nine years had been addressed primarily towards the removal of all of those artificial restrictions and controls upon international trade which had created such tragic havoc to world economy during the past generation. I said I understood fully the immediate difficulties which this occasioned him, but I pointed out that the phraseology was "they will endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on the part of his Government. The President stated that he believed the point was of very great importance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and equal opportunity of an economic character.

The

- 13 -

The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was without any power himself to agree upon this point. He set forth in considerable detail the position of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the Dominions and emphasized his inability, without the agreement of the Dominions, to enter into the proposed declaration insofar as this point was concerned. He said that insofar as he himself was concerned the issue was one with which his own personal life history was connected. He referred to the days at the outset of the century when Joseph Chamberlain first brought up the proposal for Empire preferences and the predominant part which this issue had played in the political history of Great Britain during the past forty years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now phrased would have the enthusiastic support of all the liberals everywhere. He said that he himself was heartily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa agreements. He said, however, that it would be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to this question.

Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander Cadogan and I be requested to draft new phraseology which would take care of those difficulties and prevent the de-

lay

- 14 -

lay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was inconceivable that the issuance of the joint declaration should be held up by a matter of this kind.

I said that in my own judgment further modification of that article would destroy completely any value in that portion of the proposed declaration. I said that it was not a question of phraseology, that it was a question of a vital principle which was involved. I said that if the British and the United States Governments could not agree to do everything within their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war world. I said that the trade policies of the British Empire during the latter portion of the nineteenth century had, I felt, contributed enormously to the sane and prosperous condition of the world at that time, and that, of course, I realized that the tariff policies pursued by the United States and many other countries during that period had played an important part in the creation of the evils which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however, that it seemed to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive sanity in world

economics

- 15 -

economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new and better world and that except through an agreement upon such a policy by our two governments there would be no hindrance whatever to a continuation later to the present German practices of utilizing their trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends.

Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this policy. He and Sir Alexander Cadogan both agreed that it was not a question of phraseology, but that they were up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had already indicated. The Dominions would have to be consulted. It might well be that an agreement could not be had from the Dominions and that consequently the proposed joint declaration could only be issued some time after news of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill suggested that the inclusion before the phrase "they will endeavor to further" of the phrase which would read "with due regard for our present obligations" might ease the situation.

The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed, that the latter would try and draft some phraseology which would make that situation easier, and it was arranged that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime Minister and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them such redraft as they might have in mind.

Mr.

- 16 -

Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points five and six.

He then read point seven and after discussion at the meeting of this point it was agreed that the phrase "to use force" be replaced by the word "aggression" in the second sentence of the seventh point.

Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily and enthusiastically in favor of this point seven, which had been initiated by the President. He inquired, however, whether the President would not agree to support some kind of "effective international organization" as suggested by the Prime Minister in his original draft of the proposed joint declaration.

The President replied that he did not feel that he could agree to this because of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favor of the creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time had transpired and during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr. Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express to the President his feeling that point seven would create a great deal of opposition

- 17 -

opposition from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized that, but that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr. Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and shared the President's view.

The meeting then broke up and I arranged with the President that I would drop by to see him after my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able to leave until at least 5:00 p.m., tomorrow, August 12, and that as he felt it of importance to reach a complete meeting of minds with the President upon all of the issues involved, that he would be willing to spend an additional twenty-four hours should that be necessary.

Sumner Welles

U S W.G.M.

EXHIBIT NO. 22D

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

Monday, August 11, 1941
At sea

SUBJECT: British-American Cooperation.

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary.

COPIES TO:

I went by arrangement to see Sir Alexander Cadogan on the PRINCE OF WALES this afternoon. He gave me to read memoranda which he had already completed on the conference between the Prime Minister and the President this morning and, with a few changes which I indicated, they appeared to be a correct presentation of the discussion and of the agreements reached.

With regard to the draft of the joint declaration, Sir Alexander told me that the Prime Minister had already radioed to London the text of the proposed joint declaration incorporating therein modifications of points four and seven. Sir Alexander gave me the revised text to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's draft of point

7-20-41 EUROPEAN WAR 100 / 14007-4/5

Confidential File PS/SF

-2-

point four was far broader and more satisfactory than the minimum which the President had instructed me, after our conference of the morning, to accept, I raised no objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change in point seven I stated that while it was completely satisfactory to me and entirely in accord with my own way of thinking I had no idea what the President's decision might be. I said that I would have to submit it to him.

Sir Alexander stated that the Prime Minister felt very strongly--perhaps exaggeratedly--the opposition which would be created on the part of a certain pro-League-of-Nations group in England to the contents of point seven declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say that while he believed there would not be the amount of opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he nevertheless thought that it would be a tragic thing to concentrate solely upon the transition period after the war was ended when some kind of joint police power would have to be exercised by the British and by the United States Governments and omit any reference to the need of the creation of some effective and practicable international organization which would function after the transition period was concluded. I said that as

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-3-

I had already indicated while I was in full agreement with his own views the matter would have to be determined by the President.

We discussed the desirability of informing the Chinese Government of the steps which the United States Government in the person of the President was taking with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very definitely that every effort should be made to keep China closely informed of what was being done in her interest by Great Britain and by the United States I wondered whether telling China of what the President intended to state to the Japanese Government at this particular moment would not mean that the Government at Chungking for its own interests would make public the information so received. If publicity resulted, I stated I feared that the extreme militaristic element in Tokio and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled by Germany would immediately take advantage of the situation so created to inflame sentiment in Japan to such an extent as to make any possibility remote, as it might anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through negotiation with Japan. Sir Alexander said he was entirely in accord and would be governed by those views. He said, of course, I realized how terribly persistent the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in

London

-4-

London, Dr. Wallington Koo, would undoubtedly press him day in and day out to know what had transpired at the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President with regard to China. He said that he felt that the best solution was for him merely to say in general terms that the two governments had agreed that every step should be taken that was practicable at this time for China and its defense and avoid going into any details.

I subsequently went to see the President. The President said that he was entirely in accord with the redraft of point four which was better than he had thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He also accepted without question the amendment made by Mr. Churchill to point seven and the President said that it seemed to him entirely desirable since the amendment made it clear that once the war was over a transition period would have to take place and that the permanent international organization would only be set up after that experimental period had passed. He had jotted down certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint declaration, most of which were merely verbal changes for the purpose of clarification.

I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him whether he did not believe that a very considerable
opposition

-5-

opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the United States would result from that portion of point seven which declares in the judgment of the United States that it is essential that aggressor nations be disarmed. I said that if a great Power like the United States publicly declares that something is essential, the inference is that that Power is going to do something itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than likely that the isolationists will insist that this public statement by the President meant that the United States would go to war in order to disarm not only Germany but even possibly Japan and theoretically, at least, even the Soviet Union if that country should later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors. The President replied that the whole intent of point seven, as he saw it, was to make clear what the objective would be if the war was won and that he believed people in the United States would take that point of view. He further said he felt the realism inherent in article seven was one which would be apparent to the enormous majority of the American people and that they would enthusiastically support the need for the disarmament of aggressor nations.

I said I also had been surprised and somewhat discouraged by a remark that the President had casually

made

-6-

made in our morning's conference--if I had understood him correctly--which was that nothing could be more futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of the need for a transition period upon the termination of the war during which period Great Britain and the United States would undertake the policing of the world, it seemed to me that it would be enormously desirable for the smaller Powers to have available to them an Assembly in which they would all be represented and in which they could make their complaints known and join in recommendations as to the policy to be pursued by the major Powers who were doing the police work. I said it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the most effective safety valve that could be devised.

The President said that he agreed fully with what I said and that all that he had intended by the remark he made this morning was to make clear his belief that a transition period was necessary and that during that transition period no organizations such as the Council or the Assembly of the League could undertake the powers and prerogatives with which they had been entrusted during the existence of the League of Nations.

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-7-

I further said that while from the practical standpoint I was in agreement that the United States and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or would exercise the police trusteeship and that it seemed to me that it would be impossible if such a trusteeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other American republics or for that matter the countries at present occupied such as Norway, the Netherlands, and even Belgium. The President said that he felt that a solution for this difficulty could probably be found through the ostensible joining with Great Britain and the United States of those Powers, but it would have to be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of the nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or, at least, considerable part in the task involved.

I said that it seemed to me that now that the text of the joint declaration had been agreed upon, since I assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that the British Government would support his recommendations with regard thereto, all that was left to do in the way of drafting was the preparation of the brief statement which would be issued simultaneously in London and at Washington announcing that the President and the Prime Minister had met, referring to the discussions under

the

-8-

the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination thereof of the text of the joint declaration. I said that Mr. Churchill had told me that he had cabled his Government that he was not leaving Argentina until Wednesday afternoon and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely agreed upon and cleared up by 1:00 p.m. tomorrow, and I could see no practical reason for waiting another twenty-four hours. The President agreed and said that he would try and get a decision reached in that sense when he saw Mr. Churchill this evening.

Sumner Welles

U SW.GAM

EXHIBIT NO. 23

HM: This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated November 23, 1941.

Rec'd 12:55 a. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Triple Priority
5670, November 26, 6 a. m.

MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

'Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously encrease. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.'

HM

WINANT.

EXHIBIT NO. 24

CJ: This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON,

Dated November 30, 1941.

Rec'd 1:28 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

5770, November 30, 4 p. m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress "or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war".

EDA

WINANT.

EXHIBIT NO. 25

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BF

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

Dated December 1, 1941

Rec'd. 3:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1941, December 1, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND

UNDER SECRETARY.

One. During the past few days I have talked with several prominent Japanese most of whom appear to be already familiar with the terms of the Department's recent draft proposal and some of whom have been in direct personal touch with the Foreign Minister. They generally reflect a pessimistic reaction, emphasizing what they purport to regard as the uncompromising "tone" of the draft and the difficulty of bridging over the Japanese and American positions. They all, however, appear to desire continuance of the Japanese overtures.

Two. In all recent talks I have emphasized my personal view that the American draft conveys a broad and objective impression of the United States position, and in regard to the very difficulties for settlement the steadily increasing and a reasonable and reasonable effort to achieve a satisfactory settlement. I have also emphasized the fact that the American position is a policy for

711.94/4503

DEC 8-1941

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- #1874, December 1, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

in a position to mould public opinion to the justified conception that Japan can now achieve without force of arms the chief purposes for which she has hitherto allegedly been fighting. These unofficial views have been indirectly conveyed to the Foreign Minister. I have furthermore expressed astonishment that the Prime Minister, at this critical moment, should have seen fit to deliver so bellicose an address as his speech yesterday, and I have indicated the serious and deleterious impression which that speech is bound to exert on the American Government and people.

Three. Tokyo's newspapers report that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations.

GROW

LMS

- - - 17, September 18, . . . from Tokyo.

— 100 —

A - A ET CAR

7, September 1951, in the K.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

(c)

FROM

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1900

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1, September 1, 1917, from 0.00.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
TO
DATE
1910

1. The first of these is the fact that the
the first of these is the fact that the

F.W.
834.00/857

17

Final

-2- 7629, September 12, 11 p.m., from Tokyo.

in the Pacific at least until the European war has been won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done nor can our interests be further adequately and properly protected by merely registering disapproval and keeping a careful record thereof. It is clear that Japan has been deterred from taking greater parting with American interest only out of respect for our potential power; it is equally clear that she has tampered upon our right to register in our relations to the strength of her conviction that the American people will not permit that power to be used in her conviction. Indeed it is probable that the American people will permit that power to be used in her conviction. Indeed it is probable that the American people will permit that power to be used in her conviction.

20- 100, September 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 1941.

1. The movement of such an outside unit to our own
security.

2. The

3. The

(4) The

-3- 100, September 22, midnight from Tokyo.

Since the overplayed, there will eventually ensue a reversal swing of the pendulum in which a reconstruction of good relations between the United States and Japan will be required. The alternative seems to me to be hopeless.

The foregoing analysis, which has been drafted with care over a period of several days, has the expressed complete concurrence of the Civil, Military and Commercial Attaches and all other members of the immediate staff of the Embassy.

(END OF MESSAGE)

REF.

7.2

EXHIBIT NO. 27

"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (Pamphlet edition, 1942) Department of State Publication 1853.

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

EXHIBIT NO. 28

"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (Cloth edition, 1943) Department of State Publication 1983.

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

EXHIBIT NO. 29

"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", Volumes I and II (1943) Department of State Publication 2008.

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

EXHIBIT NO. 30

"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew; Simon and Schuster (1944).

(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 31



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LEGATION OFFICE

DEPT. TREAS. OF STATE

NAVY
NAVY
NAVY

AIR MAIL

.....COPIES RE.....
.....LC RE.....
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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2167

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the strictly confidential information of the American Ambassador a copy of a despatch (no. 971) of April 4, 1941 from the American Ambassador at Lima in regard to the attitude of the Peruvian Government in the event that the United States and Japan become involved in the war on opposing sides.

711.94/2-31

Enclosure:

Despatch (no. 971)
of April 4, 1941.

CR/

APR 20 1941

cc
FE:CC:OJL

FE

4-26-41

711.94/2031

2/4

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

U. S. CATHOLIC OFFICE

10 PM

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

R3
The U. S. Government must be
closely paraphrased and
fort being communicated
to you. (C-1)

Secretary of State,
Washington.


14, June, 5 P.M.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

A few days ago the Japanese Ambassador
ascertain the view of President Roosevelt
in the light of the United States and Japan.
The Japanese Ambassador told me that Japan
was not the enemy of the United States.
The Japanese war was not a war of aggression.

END

114



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram no. 200

Dated: 9-11-41, 6 p.m.

From: Bern

Rec'd: 9-11-41, 2:45 p.m.

It is reported by Lewis that he secured the following from a contact connected with the Intelligence Section of the Army of Switzerland: By the end of October, Japan will have gone into the war, and by the end of the same month, Germany will have begun a campaign in Africa with the two hundred fifty thousand troops of Rommel increased to a million. A part of these reinforcements who have now finished training have been recently noted in Strasbourg, Karlsruhe, Mainz, as well as in other districts. Likewise, there have been received reports of troops around Bayonne. Simultaneous movements will be made against Cyprus, Turkey, Bizerta, and Dakar. Once the Japanese are involved in the war, it is figured by the Germans that the United States will be busy in the Pacific Ocean and will be incapable of sending an expedition to Dakar.

It is requested by the Military Attaché that the above information be communicated to the War Department.

HARRISON

U-L:SM:MPM

9-12-41

Copies to Major Dusenbury.

S
This telegram was received by
the State Department from the
Panama City, Panama, dated
October 3, 1941. (C)

Classified and indexed
Dated October 3, 1941
Serial: 100000

Secretary of State,

Washington.

206, October 3, 1941.

The Foreign Minister has just shown me a message received yesterday from the Dominican Legation in Panama stating that "a few days ago" the Japanese Minister in Panama invited to dinner the representatives of Costa Rica, Cuba, Colombia and Venezuela, that he told each of them Japan would be obliged to enter the war, that he asked what would be the attitude of the American countries in such case and that all of the envoys replied that America would form a single front.

The above message repeated to Panama.

LAWTON

WYC

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect (Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

740.0011 P. W./601

30/DR

NOV 8 1041PM

RLS

MAH

[REDACTED]

RA [initials]

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

URL

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (R)

Santiago

Dated December 2, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 11:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

671, December 2, 6 p.m.




CONFIDENTIAL FOR UNDER SECRETARY

ROSSETTI informs me the Japanese Minister tells
him war is almost inevitable and has asked the
privilege for Japanese in Panama to come to Chile.
This request was rejected and Chilean Minister
and Consul in Panama were sent telegraphic in-
structions not to grant visas. He says that
Japanese here under close and constant observation.
He adds that the possibility of sabotage from our
enemies aimed at mines and railroads connecting
them with the coast is thoroughly appreciated here
and that every precaution has been taken.

Suggest that telegram from the Secretary or
yourself to Rossetti expressing appreciation of
the dispatch with which matters affecting the two
governments have been attended to would have a most
salutary effect.

BOWERS

LMS



711.94/2511

PS/AD

Confidential File

FILED

DEC 16 1941

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII

FROM JULY 8 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(All dates refer to 1941)

Date	From	To	Subject	Page
8 July.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....	Japanese Policy.....	1
25 July.....	CNO.....	Kimmel et al.....	Economic Sanctions against Japan.....	2
16 Oct.....	CNO.....	Kimmel et al.....	Japanese cabinet range.....	3
20 Oct.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....	Estimate of Japanese situation.....	4
24 Nov.....	CNO.....	Kimmel et al.....	Warning of surprise aggressive movement.....	5
26 Nov.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....	Reconnaissance mission.....	6
27 Nov.....	Marshall.....	Short.....	Warning.....	7
27 Nov.....	Marshall.....	Western Defense Command.....	Warning.....	8
27 Nov.....	Marshall.....	MacArthur.....	Warning.....	9
27 Nov.....	G-2.....	G-2 Hawaii.....	G-2 Warning.....	10
28 Nov.....	MacArthur.....	Marshall.....	Reply to Marshall warning.....	11
27 Nov.....	Short.....	Marshall.....	Reply to Marshall warning.....	12
28 Nov.....	Adj Gen.....	Short.....	Sabotage.....	13
28 Nov.....	Arnold.....	Hawaiian Air Force.....	Sabotage.....	14
28 Nov.....	Western Defense Command.....	Marshall.....	Reply to Marshall warning.....	15
28 Nov.....	Caribbean Defense Command.....	Adj Gen.....	Reply to Marshall warning.....	16
29 Nov.....	Short.....	Adj Gen.....	Reply to Adj Gen sabotage cable.....	17
29 Nov.....	Caribbean Defense Command.....	Adj Gen.....	Reply to Marshall warning.....	18
4 Dec.....	Hawaiian Air Force.....	Arnold.....	Reply to Arnold sabotage cable.....	19
5 Dec.....	G-2.....	G-2 Hawaii.....	Japanese weather code broadcasts.....	20
7 Dec.....	Marshall.....	Short.....	Japanese ultimatum.....	21

[1] Secret

94 WAR BC 207 WD

WASHINGTON, D. C., 152A, July 8, 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H.

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian Garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia period Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out period Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated period They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August period Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned

ADAMS
334P/720P/8
Priority

[2] Drafter: Op-12.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

Released by: H. R. Stark.

Date: July 25, 1941.

Addressees
For Action
CINCPAC
CINCAF
CINCLANT
COM 15
SPENAVO LONDON

252023

This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X. Appropriate apees deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chaney in London XX. You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty-sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan X. It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material X. It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X. Japanese assets and fund in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X. It is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time X. United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X. CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date XX. This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army subordinates X. SPENAVO informs CNS but warn him against disclosure X. Action apees this dis are Cincpac Cinclant Cincaf Com Fifteen Spenavo London XX.

Secret

[3] Drafter: Op-12.
From: CNO.
Released by: Ingersol.

Addressees Priority
For action
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
CINCAF
(Acknowledge)

Date: October 16, 1941.

162203

CR 0534

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X. If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X. Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X. Second and third apees inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X. Acknowledge XX.

Secret

[4] Secret
8 WVY BC 47 WD

WASHN., D. C., 1234P., Oct. 20, 1941.

20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your information stop. Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

ADAMS

1037A

[5] Sealed Secret
Drafter: Op-12.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
Released by: Ingersoll.

Date: November 24, 1941.

Addressees
For action
CINCAF
CINCPAC
COM 11
COM 12
COM 13
COM 15
For information
SPENAVO LONDON
CINCLANT

242005

CR0443

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.
Copy to WPD, War Dept., and to Op-12 but no other distribution

[6] Secret
RCA 831 US Govt

November 26, 1941

Washington, D. C., Nov. 26, 1941. 1149P.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Four Six Five Twenty Six

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advise Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu

ADAMS

[7] Secret

Priority

Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

No. 472

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue Period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment Period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act Period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense Period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent Period Report measures taken Period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan Period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

MARSHALL

War Department message center: Please send same radiogram to: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, Quarry Heights, C. Z.

[8]

Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Western Defense Command,
Presidio of San Francisco, California.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period A separate message is being sent to G dash two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

MARSHALL

[9]

Priority

November 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, Manila, P. I.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might Jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary period Report measures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised rainbow five which was delivered to you by General Brereton period Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you notify Hart

MARSHALL

Secret

[10]

Secret

P 2 War WD Prty

Washington, D. C., November 27, 1941.

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.

473-27TH

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only.

MILES

144PM

[11]

NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

453AM

From: Manila, P. I.
To: General George C. Marshall
No. 1004, November Twenty-eighth.

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

MACARTHUR

Secret

[12]

NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

557AM

Secret

Priority

From: Fort Shafter T. H.

To: Chief of Staff

No. 959 November 27th

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy
reurad four seven two twenty seventh

SHORT.

[13] Secret

Priority

114 War Kr 189 WD Prty

Washn D. C. 842P Nov. 28, 1941

C G

Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T. H.

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

ADAMS.

Secret

[14] secret

Priority

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Sent No. 484, 11/28.

Hawaii Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.:

Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren see paragraph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following colon protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establishments period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security period. Para it is also desired that or on before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions period signed Arnold.

ADAMS.

A. F. No. 461

Secret

[15]

Secret

Received: NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

11: 18 PM

From: HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,

To: General George C. Marshall

November 28th:

Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance

control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and subsector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SFP of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As Air Forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operations of Air Forces in defense [15A] of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

DEWITT, *Commanding.*

[16]

Secret

Received, NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
346 AM

From: Panama.

To: The AGO.

Panama No. 569; November 28th:

Reurad four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested being forwarded air mail. CDC six eight seven.

ANDREWS.

[17] Secret

Priority

29 NOVEMBER 1941.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL

War Department, Washington D C

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren and Military Establishments including personnel and equipment Stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding [174] General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT

[18]

Secret

NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Subject: Measures Taken for the Defense of the Caribbean Area.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. In compliance with radiogram No. 461 from the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, report that the following measures are in effect for the protection of the Caribbean Area:

a. *Naval Measures.* At the present time, it is believe that the defensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal; however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy has been worked out and coordinated with the various Naval commanders in the Caribbean Theater. In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance.

b. *Measures for the Defense of the Panama Canal.* No additional measures other than those already in effect, have been taken for the defense of the Panama Canal, except to increase inspections in order to insure the alertness of troops. Measures, in effect are:

(1) *Harbor Defense.* Troops are on a continuous alert. Harbor defense is coordinated with the naval defense.

(2) *Aircraft Warning Service.* The two detectors installed are on a 24-hour alert. Seven observation posts have been established at various places in Panama with direct radio communication to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center. Within the means on hand, every effort is being made to complete the installation of other detectors now available within the Department.

(3) *Antiaircraft Artillery.* All available antiaircraft equipment is installed and on a 24-hour alert.

(4) *Anti-Sabotage.* Locks and other sensitive areas are continuously guarded, and all approaches to the sensitive areas are covered by mound bunkers. Approaches to bunkers and between bunkers were practicable are covered by patrols. Transit guards are placed on all vessels transiting the Canal.

(5) *Counter-espionage.* Active counter-espionage measures are being taken continuously.

[18A] (6) *Counter-subversive activities.* with the cooperation of the Republic of Panama, are in continuous operation. Plans have been prepared with the cooperation of the Republic of Panama, for the internment of aliens, and a list of those who should be interned upon the outbreak of hostilities has been prepared and is in the hands of the American Ambassador, to be transmitted to the Panamanian Government. The Canal Zone itself has already been cleared of any known suspects.

(7) *Air Force.* A portion of the pursuit is on a continuous 24-hour alert. The Bomber Command headquarters maintains a 24-hour alert. This latter applies to the whole Caribbean Area.

c. *In Caribbean Theater, other than Panama Canal Department.*

(1) Air Corps units with from three to six B-18 or B-18-A medium bombers have been stationed at St. Croix, Antigua, St. Lucia and British Guiana. The 9th Bombardment Group (less squadrons in St. Lucia, British Guiana, and Surinam), with six B-18-A medium bombers, has been stationed at Trinidad. These units have a reconnaissance mission in the vicinity of these bases and a mission to support the Navy.

(2) A composite squadron with six (6) B-18-A medium bombers and eight (8) P-40 pursuit planes will arrive in Surinam about December 3, 1941.

(3) The ground elements of Force "A" consisting of Headquarters and Service Detachments, three composite companies of infantry and three antiaircraft platoons (each with six .50 Cal. machine guns) are enroute to Surinam. Entire force should arrive by December 5, 1941.

(4) One battalion, 33rd Infantry, with certain service elements, will be moved to Trinidad, departing Panama on December 3 and 13, 1941. One pursuit squadron will be moved to Trinidad as soon as transportation is available.

2. The efficacy of the measures taken for the defense of the Caribbean is qualified by certain deficiencies which exist in the Caribbean Defense Command. These deficiencies are:

a. *Harbor Defenses*: Less than one complete manning detail available for the harbor defense armament.

b. *Aircraft Warning Service* is totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand and in personnel to man the equipment when installed (see 1st Ind., these headquarters, dated October 17, 1941, to The Adjutant General, on AG 320.2 (8/23/41) MC-C, dated September 2, 1941, subject: "Air Defense Organization").

c. *Antiaircraft Artillery* has insufficient personnel to man armament now being installed in the Canal Zone, and inadequate protection against low-flying aircraft, particularly at night, since it has only sufficient ammunition for one minute of fire per gun for its 37 mm guns, and no barrage balloons. There is also a lack of proper searchlights to light field of fire of automatic weapons.

[18B] d. *Air Forces*. No night pursuit. No VHF radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in the air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and twelve modern light bombers are available within the Caribbean Defense Command. No 37 mm cannon for P-39's.

e. The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and their major deficiencies so well known that no attempt has been made to enumerate them.

F. M. ANDREWS,

Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding.

[19]

Secret
11 WTJ
1251P/4th

Received DECEMBER 10, 1941
124 P. M.

From: Ft. Shafter, TH
To: Chief Army Air Corps.
No. 1033, December 4th.

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in agwar four eight four dash twenty eight colon instructions contained in subject radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received comma and continues to receive comma detailed and comprehensive attention as result of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July for one Stop Para additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram substantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of stations and activities by air force commander one and two December Stop Increase in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress Stop This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi official agencies Stop Work has actually been begun on essential protective fencing and flood [19A] lighting projects Stop Para with reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possibly in form of development and expansion of foreword to soldiers handbook comma FM twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citizen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government comma structure of government comma place of military establishment in the structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to democratic form Stop Signed Martin end

SHORT.

1334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[20]

Secret

Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,

G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

[21]

Secret

1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft. Shafter, T. H.

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Military Intelligence Estimates, 1 July-7 December 1941

Item	Date	Subject
1	7 July	Estimate of the Eastern Siberian Situation.
2	11 July	Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
3	17 July	Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.
4	17 July	Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.
5	18 July	New Japanese Cabinet.
6	18 July	Strategical Estimate of the Situation.
7	25 July	Sanctions against Japan.
8	30 July	German-Japanese Relations.
9	16 August	Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.
10	20 August	Chinese Resistance.
11	2 September	Conversation between the Japanese Military Attache and the Chief, Far Eastern Section.
12	5 September	Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.
13	11 September	Political Developments in Japan.
14	17 September	Combat Estimate, Japan.
15	18 September	Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
16	23 September	Crisis in Japan.
17	2 October	Japanese-American Relations.
18	16 October	Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.
19	17 October	Japan's New Premier.
20	21 October	Kwantung versus the Siberian Army.
21	1 November	Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
22	2 November	G-2 Estimate Far Eastern Situation.
23	13 November	Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
24	25 November	Far Eastern Situation.
25	26 November	Japanese Naval Task Force.
26	27 November	Recent Developments in the Far East.
27	29 November	Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
28	5 December	Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
29	6 December	Estimate of Japanese Strength in Indo-China.
30	6 December	Estimate of Japanese Air and Ground Forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa.

NOTE.—Items 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 22, 23, 25 26 were classified Secret.

Items 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30 were classified Confidential.

I. B. 93

JULY 7, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Estimate of the Eastern Siberian Situation.

1. Eastern Siberia, that is to say, the region lying between Lake Baikal and the Pacific Ocean, is a distinct entity quite separate from the other portions of Siberia and old Russia. Remote and lying behind the Lake Baikal-Lena River barrier, its terrain is not that of the swampy railway-dominated wilderness of Central Siberia but admits of normal troop deployments and operations. It is economically distinct in its mineral deposits, its fisheries and its self-contained economy. Politically and psychologically it is distinct, little changed from Czarist days. It thinks for itself and will act for itself first, and for the rest of Russia only secondarily.

2. It is quite within the range of possibility that should Stalin and his communist regime be driven out of Russia the retreat would be to this Far Eastern Region.

3. The Russian forces in this region are a homeogenous army of 51 divisions, 2,500 tanks, 1,600 airplanes, 94 submarines and 220 coastal boats as opposed to Japanese forces of 10 divisions, 1,000 tanks, 300 airplanes and a balanced Fleet. The distribution and relationships of these forces are shown on the accompanying map.

4. This region is potentially a sufficiently homeogeneous one to constitute an effective buffer-state between the Bering Sea Region and the Axis powers, German or Japanese.

5. A German occupation of Eastern Siberia would require the employment of combat forces of such size as to be very difficult, if not impracticable, of accomplishment at the end of a 2,000 mile single railway system. The Axis allocation of this region, therefore to Japan is the more likely procedure, though supported perhaps by German air power and political pressures.

6. With the memory of the Russian superior fighting ability demonstrated in the border affrays of 1938-39, the Japanese are unlikely to take aggressive action against Eastern Siberian land forces. This is confirmed by evidence from other and highly authoritative sources of reluctance to change from their present southern orientation to a northern one. This, however, does not preclude increasing Japanese pressures through Outer Mongolia towards Verkhneudinsk, of naval blockades of the entrances to the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and possibly Bering Sea.

/s/ C. H. Mason,
C. H. MASON

Colone: of Infantry, G. S. C.,
Chief, Intelligence Branch.

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
General Embick
Mr. McCloy (Record Section)

I. B. 103-2

JULY 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.

Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. At your informal request there are attached revised data on the foreign situation. These data supersede those furnished by 1st Indorsement, May 26, 1941, to your memorandum W. P. D. 4510, May 24, 1941.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Incl.—G-2 Data for W. D. Strategic
Estimate of the Situation.

DATA FOR WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGIC ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. SUMMATION OF THE SITUATION

a. Germany, possessing a central position and ground and air forces superior to any individual opponent, has exercised her initiative by attacking Russia. This attack will be at least so successful that, subsequent to the fall of 1941, Germany will have regained her ability to strike outwards from a central position.

b. The British Empire, widespread, with superior surface sea power, but deficient in man power, organization and battle leadership, is necessarily on the defensive. To her, the German attack on Russia affords a breathing spell in which she can buttress her home and Middle Eastern defenses. Assumption of the strategic offensive in any theater is beyond her power.

c. U. S. S. R., ill organized but formidable because of her size, is exposed to the full vigor of German attack. The most that can be expected of her is that she will remain in being in her distant fastnesses after the German onslaught has been spent. However, the German attack has cancelled out Russia as an Axis source of supply from the short-term viewpoint.

d. The United States, with a superior navy in one ocean, but without effective weapons and with but few combat organizations, is committed to opposition to Germany, is providing limited material support to the Axis' enemies, but lacks the means to take overt battle action against Germany in her own or anyone else's behalf.

e. All other countries are but the fringing satellites of the four great powers. China, Italy and Japan have some military, but indecisive potency. The others are themselves trivial, or of importance only in combination with others.

2. SITUATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL POWERS

a. Germany

(1) Germany is now engaged in a major war with Soviet Russia and has launched an offensive on the very broad front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In this offensive, her armies are supported by the armed forces of Finland, Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

(2) A large part of the German Army of 260 divisions is engaged in this Russian offensive, although some 60 divisions remain on guard in Western Europe and Norway against the possibility of a British attack in the West.

(3) The bulk of Germany's 20 armored and 20 motorized divisions are also thought to be engaged in this Russian campaign.

(4) A large part of the German Air Force of some 11,000 planes in 850 combat squadrons, and organized into seven or more air fleets, is conducting offensive operations against Russia, while at the same time there has been held a considerable number of air units in Western Europe and the Mediterranean as a defensive precaution. Around 5,000 planes in combat squadrons are believed to be participating in the campaign against Russia. To provide this operating mass of aircraft, the air forces in the Western European and Mediterranean Theaters have necessarily had to be greatly reduced below the levels prevailing in May, 1941.

(5) The German Navy, much inferior in tonnage to the British and recently weakened by the loss of the "Bismarck," is conducting an aggressive submarine campaign against British shipping with about 150 submarines. An unknown number of German auxiliary cruisers are also aggressively active against British seaborne commerce.

(6) The political and economic situation in Germany is sound. The "Hess affair" does not seem to have affected adversely the will of the German nation to continue the war.

(7) German-French relations are improving as the two nations draw closer together. Already the economic resources of France are beginning to play a considerable role in the German war effort.

(8) In consequence of this major offensive against Russia, no German offensive operations are to be expected in any other theaters of war in the immediate future. In particular, no invasion of England or of Iceland is probable during the remainder of 1941. Germany's ground forces will, undoubtedly, remain on the strategic defensive in both the Western European and Mediterranean Theaters until she can spare troops and aviation from Eastern Europe.

(9) In case of victory over Russia during the summer or fall of 1941, one may expect as logical further German moves:

(a) The consolidation of the German hegemony in Europe (less the British Isles).

(b) The expulsion of Britain from the Mediterranean.

(c) The continuation of the war of attrition against the British seaborne commerce.

(10) The complete entry of the United States into the War would probably not change the plans of the German High Command nor affect for the present Germany's military, political and economic position. It would undoubtedly depress somewhat the war spirit and morale of the German people. It would so stimulate the morale and hopes of Germany's subject populations as to increase greatly the Reich's problems in controlling them. On the other hand, our entry into war would cause Germany to activate her existing fifth column arrangements in Latin America.

b. *Japan*

(1) *Military Situation.* Japanese forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto in the north to Indo-China in the south. The Chinese, in spite of internal friction, continue to resist passively any advance by the Japanese forces. Japan has for some time been gradually assembling an expeditionary force, originally for a possible movement into southeast Asia, but which now may eventually be used in an attack upon the Maritime Provinces.

(2) *Economic Situation.* Japan is economically weak because she lacks essential war materials, adequate foreign exchange, sufficient foreign trade; she is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the war in China.

Economically Japan will be no worse off than she is at the present time unless greater obstacles are placed before her economic progress. Availability of German technical advice and the acquisition of war materials from Thailand and Indo-China will improve her economic position. Japan is increasing her imports of oil from the United States instead of decreasing them. Japan could not be thrown into bankruptcy under present circumstances; if she undertakes a war with a major naval power, much greater obstacles would immediately be placed before her economic progress.

(3) *Political Situation.* The Japanese will support any decision made by the Japanese Government. The military and naval authorities continue to be the predominant influence in Governmental decisions. It is believed that the naval authorities, and business interests will exert every effort to avoid a conflict with the United States regardless of the latter's participation in the European War.

(4) *Psychology of Japanese.* The intense patriotism, the remarkable recuperative capabilities and an indomitable tenacity of purpose along with a frugal and low standard of living have enabled the Japanese people to accept and even support the frightful cost of the indecisive war in China.

(5) *Lines of Action.* Japan has the following alternatives:

(a) Maintain status quo in China.

(b) Withdraw her armed forces from the area south of the Great Wall, make peace with Chiang Kai-Shek and use only economic penetration into southeastern Asia.

(c) Withdraw sufficient forces from the Chinese mainland to facilitate an advance:

(1) *Southward.*

(a) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong, attack British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China or by direct attack by land, sea, and air.

(b) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong, and attack the Netherlands' East Indies or Borneo.

(c) Reduction of the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong prior to movement to the south.

(2) Northward against Russia to secure the Maritime Provinces Japan has long regarded as indispensable to her security.

Actions indicated in (1) are all contingent upon the success of the Axis forces in the European War.

(6) *Most Probable Action.* Japan will probably continue to assemble, by gradual withdrawals from China, a field force for possible employment either in Southeastern Asia or against Russia. Her hopes of empire are bound up with an Axis victory and she is subject to strong German pressure to attack Russia at

once; nevertheless it is believed that she will avoid precipitate action and will continue her policy of avoiding war with Russia on the one hand and with the United States and Great Britain on the other. If forced or if electing to choose between action against Russia or to the Southwest, she will be influenced by Germany's success against Russia, particularly as regards possible Russian troop withdrawals from Siberia, and by America's action, particularly as regards the distribution of United States' naval strength, and as regards attempts to send supplies to Russia through Vladivostok. Should the choice be the southward advance, it will probably consist of a containment of Hong Kong and the Philippine Islands while attacking British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China.

c. British Empire.

(1) The British Empire, at war, is on the defensive; its army, naval and air strength dispersed on exterior lines, with the United Kingdom, a theatre of combat partially encircled by hostile assault positions, absorbing the principal effective military strength. The Imperial Forces are composed of an equivalent of 84 divisions, 233 squadrons and some 360 war ships. The Army has suffered severe reverses in the past year but its morale is still high. There is a great shortage of supporting weapons, tanks, antiaircraft and antitank guns and ammunition in the Army in all theatres. While the Navy has lost several important vessels in the Atlantic, the Home Fleet has had several valuable additions. The Mediterranean Fleet was severely damaged at the Battle of Crete. Economically the condition of the Empire is not satisfactory; unless more severely restrained, German attacks on the vital sea lanes could make the United Kingdom's condition critical in less than six months. Politically the Empire is intact; so far, no important territory has been lost to the enemy. Psychologically the whole people have developed a will to win, and an increasing application of all energy to the war effort is noted. At present the Empire is not able to assume the offensive except in air raids of limited depth on the continent of Europe and in minor areas such as in Syria. Forces in the United Kingdom have limited capacity for raids against the German-held coast line of Europe. In spite of many defeats the spirit of the people is unperturbed and morale is unbroken.

(2) Great Britain still faces a possibility of invasion. Some 40 divisions and an estimated 180 squadrons of first-line airplanes are in a state of readiness to repel a German attack. The Army forces are well-trained and continuously exercised; the air forces are, in fact, constantly engaged in combat. The Army is supported by a well organized and partially armed Home Guard and an effective civil organization to counter the probable German efforts to create confusion before and during invasion. The Royal Air Force has successfully restricted large scale German air attacks on England to night operations. While it has not been able to prevent German air raids on shipping, it has become increasingly effective in a narrow zone on the Continent during the pre-occupation of the German air force in Russia. The principal mission of the Fleet at present is to reduce shipping losses due to German attack on vital sea lanes. A readily assembled naval force is a vital factor for the defence of the British Isles against invasion. The promptness of action and effectiveness thereof will be increasingly influenced by the measure of relief from distant patrolling which might result from American naval patrols east of the 30th Meridian. The reduction of shipping losses is one of the keys to the situation of Great Britain. In addition to the importation of raw materials (some 30,000,000 tons) to keep industry going, the United Kingdom must import an absolute minimum of 10,000,000 tons of food-stuffs, per annum, for human consumption.

(3) In the Middle East (Mediterranean area), the British have available some 16 divisions. They have finally disposed of all Italian forces in East Africa but they have lost their previous gains in Libya. A beleaguered British garrison at Tobruk, some 30,000 strong, is in a precarious position. A recent British offensive with one of its objects to relieve that situation ended in defeat. It is expected that the Germans will concentrate on an effort to reduce the British position. A British offensive is not possible although there may be a desperate effort to fight their way out. A small British force has put down the uprising in Iraq and has cooperated with other small British and the Free French forces in consolidating Syria. The British defeat at Crete was a severe one, especially for the Royal Navy. Repairs to individual ships and small reinforcements have enabled the fleet to participate in the Syrian campaign and to continue in a limited fashion its attack on Italian and German war communications. The Cretan campaign has definitely proved that the Mediterranean Fleet is no longer free to operate at will in that sea so long as German and Italian shore-based aviation

are maintained in their respective positions in effective strength. The opportunities for the Fleet and its future usefulness are therefore bound to more and more restricted. Already the supply of the British troops in Malta and Tobruk is a very serious matter and the supply of British troops in the Eastern Mediterranean area must now be undertaken through the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The withdrawal of the Fleet from the Mediterranean is likely, especially if there is sufficient warning of a resumption of a major German threat in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Royal Air Force operating in the Middle East consists of approximately 30 squadrons. The principal key to the Middle East situation is the receipt of supplies from the United States. It is problematical if these will arrive in sufficient quantity or time to enable the British Command to arm and equip sufficient forces to maintain the defence of that area.

(4) In the Far East (Singapore area), there are approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, 2 Indian, 1 Australian, and the remainder made up from local forces. At Hong Kong there is approximately a brigade of British troops and a few local units. The Royal Air Force has about 13 squadrons in this area. There are also minor naval forces.

(5) Lines of Action:

To continue on the strategic defensive in all theatres until such time as unforeseen events will permit the offensive, and to seek by every possible means to bring the United States into the war at the earliest possible moment.

d. *Italy*

(1) Italy, although previously defeated in the Mediterranean, has now emerged a tarnished victor as the result of active German support. While her East African colonies must be written off, she has acquired considerable Balkan territory, including the strategically important and long-desired Dalmatian coast, and her North African colony, Libya, is again almost in her possession.

(2) The Italian Army, which must be considered second rate, consists of approximately 86 divisions. It is estimated that trained man power is available for an additional 64 divisions, provided Germany could and would furnish the necessary equipment. There are about 1,500 so-called first line planes in the air force which are inferior to those of Germany and Great Britain in performance and armament. Pilots are not well trained. The Navy has, to date, made a sorry showing; however, it still must be reckoned a potent force with its present strength of 4 battleships, 11 cruisers, 75 destroyers, and 72 submarines, especially if supported by ground-based German aviation and operating against a weakened British Mediterranean fleet.

(3) Italy lacks practically all essential raw materials, including oil and steel, and was prepared for a war of only a few weeks' duration. Due to the British blockade, she has become dependent on Germany for most of her supplies, food excepted, which is resulting in German control of her industries. With rationing, she has sufficient food for her needs and is able to furnish a certain amount to Germany.

(4) The general unpopularity of the war, coupled with disastrous military defeats, resulted in rather open criticism of the Fascist Regime, together with considerable discontent. However, recent German-assisted victories and the fact that if Mussolini goes, the Germans will take over completely, have strengthened the position of Il Duce and have bolstered the morale of the mercurial Italian.

(5) Italy may be considered a second-rate military power that is a potential threat as long as she is backed by German military might. She is now in the position of a satellite of Germany, to be employed in any capacity that Hitler believes will further his aims. In this connection, the obvious and almost certain lines of action open to Italy are: (1) to maintain the defensive Axis position in the Mediterranean until the completion of the Russian campaign; (2) to provide the garrisons for the recently conquered Balkan countries; (3) to send a contingent of troops (probably a "token" one) to participate in the Russian campaign; and (4) to assist in the warfare on British shipping.

(6) The entry of the United States into the war should have no immediate effect on Italy other than causing a certain lowering of Italian morale due to the fact that a longer war is presaged.

e. *France*

(1) *Metropolitan France*, politically subservient to Germany, economically impotent and faced with possible starvation this Winter, hating the Germans and Darlan and beginning to criticize even Petain, has an Army (94,200 men) and an Air Force (273 planes) of no combat value.

Fleet (1 Battle Cruiser, 7 Cruisers, 34 Destroyers, 30 Submarines) has potential value. It is conceivable that Darlan might order it to aid Germany. Division of opinion among officers is accentuated by Vichy's decision to collaborate.

The recent creation of the Croatian kingdom under Italian suzerainty tends to free France from the traditional Italian claims in Nice and Corsica and so removes one of the French fears of further Axis aggression.

The long-range possibility exists that growing hatred of Germans and of the Darlan regime, fanned by food shortage, will produce an internal crack-up with obvious repercussions in other occupied countries.

Conclusions. Ground and air forces will not fight for Germany and cannot fight for Britain or even for themselves.

If ordered to aid Germany, some fleet units would be scuttled, some would run for North (or West) Africa, some would follow orders. Potential value of fleet as such would be destroyed.

US participation in the war would not alter the situation except to hasten the internal crack-up—especially if accompanied by wise radio propaganda.

(2) *Syria*, has just been conquered by British and Free French forces. Conquest of Syria by Britain will strengthen Allied *geographical* position in Near and Middle East but will increase administrative responsibilities and will require fair sized force for occupation and police, in other words, dispersion of military forces.

(3) *North Africa*, best governed of French territories, is short of food and other supplies, and is subject to intense Nazi propaganda. It has 8 incomplete Divisions (80,000 men), lacking mechanized equipment and short of munitions for major operations. General Weygand is much respected and strongly dislikes Germans and Darlan. Air Force has 286 planes; Navy has—Algeria; 7 Destroyers, 13 Submarines—Morocco: 1 incomplete Battleship, 7 Destroyers, 2 Cruisers, 4 Submarines. The Navy is less anti-British than the Toulon Force; the navy commander is strongly pro-American. Combat value of the troops is high.

Conclusions. Weygand will make every effort to prevent extension of collaboration to Africa but lacks means for aggressive action and can defend only if assured of prompt and adequate aid. He would not accept British aid initially.

US participation, if accompanied by materialization of prompt and adequate aid, will enable Weygand to hold North Africa.

(4) *Dakar* is the headquarters of the West Africa Government, Anti-American feeling is current there now due to unwise press and radio references to Dakar. A vital strategic location, with excellent port and air facilities, well defended from sea and air, it has successfully withstood one attack from the sea. West Africa has 6 Divisions (70,000 men), 96 planes, 1 immobilized Battleship, 8 Cruisers, 2 Destroyers, 10 Submarines. Dakar is vulnerable from land side—forces landing at St. Louis (186 miles North by good road and railroad) and Bathurst (162 miles South by good road and ferry).

Conclusions. Dakar will resist British attack. Navy would resist strenuously any US Navy attempt to take it; Army and Air Force would resist initially and half-heartedly; public would welcome US effort if wise radio propaganda prepares the way.

(5) *De Gaulle* has 2 completely equipped Divisions and a third in process of formation. Majority of his forces are with the British in East Africa and Egypt; 1 Division is operating in Syria.

Conclusions. Vichy collaboration will accelerate increase of Free French forces. Wise radio propaganda will step up the acceleration. Reported that Weygand dislikes de Gaulle personally but it is believed that—in the event of US participation—an offer by de Gaulle to place himself and his forces under Weygand's orders, to regain French independence, would be accepted. But all these forces are too inherently unstable and weak to form the predicate of any American plan.

f. *Netherlands*

(1) *Western Hemisphere possessions:*

Surinam: 950 troops, mostly black and mostly at Paramaribo; inadequately armed and equipped. The threat from 6,000 criminal prisoners in adjoining French Guiana is faced by 50 Dutch Marines on border.

Curacao: 1010 troops, including 618 British Infantry.

Aruba: 899 troops, including 612 Cameron Highlanders (Flanders veterans).

Bonaire: 50 Military Police.

Conclusions: It is believed that, preceded by proper diplomatic negotiations, U. S. occupation, in trust, of Netherlands possessions in Western Hemisphere would be welcome.

(2) *The Netherlands East Indies*, well governed, prosperous, untroubled by native difficulties or unrest, has about 80,000 men under arms, mostly on Java but with garrisons at important centers on Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes. The Island of Java and main centers on other islands are well fortified, harbors are mined, oil properties are adequately prepared for quick destruction if necessary, Navy has 3 Cruisers, 7 Destroyers, 13 Submarines, 40 auxiliaries—all modern. Air force has about 450 planes, mostly American and with large proportion of bombers. Continuous reconnaissance flights are made over the whole archipelago constantly. Defense plans are coordinated with those of British at Singapore and the Dutch have a firm determination to defend stubbornly.

Conclusions: The Netherlands East Indies will offer stubborn defense to attack. If the attack is determined and sustained, outer islands will have to be sacrificed, after destruction of oil properties, and defense will concentrate on Java which can be held until adequate naval aid arrives from U. S. forces. It is not believed that Britain is in a position to give the required aid alone.

g. U. S. S. R.

The U. S. S. R. is now engaged in a defensive war with Germany and has available for operations the following forces:

(1) *Military Forces*.—180 infantry divisions; 44 cavalry divisions; 79 tank brigades; 39 air divisions (total number of planes, 6,600). It is estimated that 5,000 planes are physically present in the western and southwestern frontier districts. General effectiveness estimated fair.

(2) *Naval Forces*.—Are considered a negligible factor in this war effort.

The definite policy of the Government is to pursue a defensive course and provide adequate armed defense forces in the critical areas of the Soviet Union. Active participation in offensive operations as acts of aggression are not the policy of the Regime; however, in areas where U. S. S. R. vital interests and defense demand that aggressive military operations be undertaken, such action has been taken and will follow.

(3) *Economic*.—Major effort within the Soviet Union industrially is to provide for the immediate self-sufficiency of the nation in munitions and war supplies. Transportation and production are inefficient, due to faulty production methods, inadequate supply of high-grade machine tools, and a lack of qualified technicians.

(4) *Morale*.—Morale within the Red Army is good; morale of the population is satisfactory in spite of the low standard of living, purges, etc.

(5) *Political*.—The recent pact with Japan indicates definite agreement with respect to the Far Eastern situation. A declaration on the part of Great Britain supporting Russia as an ally in the Russian-German conflict has again given Russia a definite place in European affairs.

The Comintern through the Soviet Regime is striving for a world revolution in the interests of Communism. Unless the U. S. S. R. emerges one of the victors in this war, Communism will definitely be on the way out in Europe.

The U. S. S. R. has the following lines of action open in case the United States entered the war as an ally of Great Britain and Russia: (1) Vigorous offensive conduct of the European conflict. (2) Continue a defensive war as at present until offensive operations can be conducted, assisted by British-U. S. support. (3) Continued withdrawal, if necessary, to the Urals to avoid decisive defeat to lengthen German supply difficulty. It is believed the U. S. S. R. would adopt action (2).

h. Latin America.

(1) The Latin American republics, while able to defend themselves against internal aggression, cannot do so if the subversive elements are given direct support by the German air forces. These countries, due to their geographical and economic situation, their insistent demands for military assistance have become liabilities to the United States.

(2) The German military successes have increased their reluctance to permit the United States to establish desired military and naval bases.

(3) The necessity of U. S. bases in Latin America has become not only essential but *urgent*.

(4) The establishment and occupation of bases requires, at least, several months.

(5) The time has come when the United States must make specific requests for immediate concession of bases at Natal, Brazil; the Galapagos Islands, Ecuador; Buenaventura, Colombia; and Acapulco, Mexico. Further postponements, particularly as regards Natal, might prove disastrous if the Germans seize the French naval base at Dakar. The American Republics must be shown that further delay in the concession of bases might not only be interpreted as an attitude of non-cooperation, but that it will also jeopardize the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the integrity and independence of their Sovereignty.

JULY 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese Movement Into French Indo-China.

1. As was made known to the Chief of Staff July 15, 1941, the Japanese Government on July 12, 1941, delivered what amounts to an ultimatum to the Vichy Government, the terms of which, among other items, provided for the occupation by Japanese armed forces of eight air bases and two naval bases in Southern Indo-China (see attached map).

2. It is the considered opinion of this Division that this Japanese movement as planned, while opportunistic in conception, was also strategically defensive in character and designed primarily to prevent British and American influence from shutting off supplies of rubber, tin and rice from Thailand and Indo China which are badly needed by Japan.

3. The French were given until July 20th in which to comply with Japan's demands. Military preparations were initiated by the Japanese, but no military pressure had been put on Indo-China up to midnight July 15-16.

4. On July 16th the Japanese Cabinet resigned en masse. It is too early to attempt a detailed explanation of this act. For the present, it must be taken as further proof of the fact, known for some time, that there was an element of violent discord in the inner government circles of Japan.

5. Until the personnel of the new Cabinet is announced it would be futile to attempt a prediction as to Japan's possible change of policies. One fact seems evident, however, and that is that Vichy will be given a breathing spell and the expedition to Indo-China may be deferred or even abandoned.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure 1.

cc: A. C. of S., WPD.

JULY 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.

1. Prior to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, July 16, 1941, a large scale mobilization was started in Japan under unusual conditions of secrecy. This mobilization is continuing.

2. The Military Attache in Tokyo reports that a part (strength unknown) of this new force is being shipped to Manchoukuo to join the Kwantung Army.

3. In view of the fact that the major part of the Japanese Army is pinned down in China without a large mobile reserve and the further fact that the Siberian Army is about twice the size of the Kwantung Army (20-30 Divisions to 12), the strengthening of the Japanese force in Manchoukuo appears to be a logical precautionary procedure.

4. Whether she moves south or north Japan needs more men.

5. In the opinion of this Division the first aggressive move, if made, will be into Indo-China to deny this region to a DeGaulist Pro-British, Pro-American faction steadily growing in power there. Japan, while building up her strength in Manchoukuo, will then await the outcome of the German-Soviet War. If

and when Germany crushes European Russia and the Siberian Garrison deteriorates in strength or morale, Japan will probably move in to seize the long desired Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copy to War Plans Division.

I. B. 99

July 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: New Japanese Cabinet.

1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated July 18, 1941, states that Prince Konoye has selected the key men for a new and highly militaristic Cabinet. Vital posts are reported as follows:

Premier.....	Prince Konoye
War Minister.....	General Tojo
Navy Minister.....	Admiral Oikawa
Home Minister.....	Baron Heranuma
Foreign Minister.....	Admiral Toyoda

2. The first four named above are hold-overs from the former Cabinet. Admiral Toyoda replaces former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

3. Admiral Toyoda was a protege of the former Admiral Baron Saito (assassinated in 1936 while Premier) and is regarded as a moderate. He is known as a clever, able officer, a specialist in Ordnance, and as having had considerable experience in diplomacy, particularly with the British.

4. The new Cabinet may be regarded as strongly nationalistic, and while probably more moderate and conservative than would have been the case had an Army Officer been given the portfolio as Foreign Minister, it may be that added impulse will be given to Japan's Southward Advance. In this connection, it must be remembered also that Admiral Toyoda has just completed a tour as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and is fully aware of the deplorable condition of Japan's foreign trade and internal economy. He may be expected, therefore, to take steps, as Foreign Minister, which will improve foreign trade conditions since such trade is the life blood of industrial Japan.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
GHQ
ONI
General Embick
Mr. McCloy (Record Section)

JULY 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Strategical Estimate of the
Situation.

1. The following estimate has been prepared as requested in Memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, 4570, June 6, 1941, which requested information on the Axis Powers as of July 1, 1941, July 1, 1942, and July 1, 1943, as a basis for the War Department STRATEGICAL ESTIMATE. Specific data requested in paragraphs 2 (1), (2) of the Memorandum cited and (3) on Axis naval, air and field forces are enclosed.*

2. Estimate of disposition—military, political, economic and psychological.
a. July 1, 1941.

Germany, with the initiative, was employing the mass of her ground and air forces against the U. S. S. R., without, however, relaxing her campaign against shipping serving the British Empire. Elsewhere the military effort of the

*Omitted.

European Axis was at a minimum. Japan, her army practically contained by China, was contemplating action against Indo-China, but her policy was dominated by the uncertainties arising from the Russo-German campaign and the final outcome of the whole war. An Axis political offensive was in full swing with a view to consolidating a "United States of Europe" to include Spain and Portugal and the French, Spanish and Portuguese possessions in Africa. Axis propaganda was being used effectively in Latin America and throughout Islam and with less effect in the United States and India.

b. *By July 1, 1942.*

(1) The following are envisaged:

(a) German defeat of U. S. S. R. and re-establishment of German military initiative.

(b) Participation of the U. S. in the war under Rainbow 5.

(2) Under the foregoing the following are estimated to be the Axis disposition and capabilities:

[2] German occupation of the U. S. S. R. to Lake Baikal and possibly to the Pacific. Possible Japanese occupation of the Maritime Provinces of Siberia. Axis control of Africa, roughly north of the line Fernando Po—Djibout is either accomplished or imminent. Continuation of the aerial and naval siege of the British Isles. German attempt to invade Great Britain or (more probable) a broad strategic movement through the Middle East toward the Indian Ocean, possibly in conjunction with a southwestward advance by Japan. The political consolidation of Europe under German leadership will have been accomplished, but the political cohesion of this entity will be low. Germany and Japan will be obviously war-weary. Economic exploitation of the U. S. S. R. will have barely begun. While still debarred physically, militarily and economically from Latin America, the Axis will have achieved a considerable amount of political disunion in that area by intrigue and propaganda. German propaganda will tend to have become less effective in India, the United States and the Moham-medan world.

c. *By July 4 1943.* Axis dispositions and capabilities are estimated as follows:

Germany will still possess superior ground forces. The invasion of the British Isles, if not already achieved, will now be impracticable. Germany will have extended her penetration southward in Africa and will still be able to renew the offensive in the Middle East. Japan, if not irrevocably committed to war on the side of the Axis, will tend to stand aloof. German economic exploitation of Russia will have progressed, but the general economic condition of Europe will be low. Axis morale will be generally low and war-weariness will be rife. There will be no real political cohesion in Europe. The Axis propaganda effort, centered on Latin America will be losing ground.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure

Distribution

War Plans Division

G. H. Q.

General Embick

Mr. McCloy (Record Section)

dyay

JULY 25, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Sanctions against Japan.

I. *Discussion.*

1. On July 12, 1941 the Japanese Government announced that it had decided to take over control of the nation's capital funds which are to be mobilized in the interests of the state. The new policy apparently discards the past economic set-up and calls for mobilization and distribution of capital at the will of the government in order to attain maximum production as well as to bolster the defense structure.

2. The new policy is obviously a belated attempt to improve the deplorable economic conditions in Japan—conditions pointed out in confidential Economic Estimate, Japan, May 27, 1941, compiled in the Far Eastern Section, this Division, a copy of which is attached hereto as Tab I.*

*Omitted.

3. This centralization of capital, which is merely an extension of the control which the government has already secured over industry and other branches of Japanese economic life, will undoubtedly bring about a more efficient control of Japan's internal structure, but will contribute nothing toward the acquisition of critical and essential raw materials so badly needed by Japan's war industries.

4. A step toward this latter end is Japan's current move to occupy southern Indo-China. In the opinion of this Division this will be followed by an extension of Japan's control to include Thailand. Further aggression by Japan after consolidating her position in these new points d'appui will be predicated upon the outcome of the European War.

5. For some time, the policy of our government has been based upon a desire to restrain Japan by moral embargoes and export control, neither of which were stringent enough to drive Japan into further aggressive action toward Malaysia and the Netherlands Indies.

[2] 6. A discussion as to whether this policy was sound at the time of its adoption is immaterial to a study of the current situation. The fact stands out, however, that Japan has now burst through these mild restraints imposed by the United States Government and is now embarked upon new aggression which endangers the safety of all the areas in the southwestern Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

7. Under these circumstances the last reason for withholding effective sanctions against Japan has been brushed aside.

8. Attention is invited to the last sentence on page 61 of Tab I which reads: "The United States is today in a position to wreck completely the economic structure of the Japanese Empire." This statement is as sound today as when it was written in May, 1941.

9. Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by us, today, would not, in the opinion of this Division, force Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by Japan. Such action on our part need not and should not distract our attention from the main theater of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a policy we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when we place them in Japanese hands.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosure: Tab I.

Copies to:

Secretary of War
Secretary, Joint Board
Deputy Chief of Staff
War Plans Division.

dps

[Pencilled notation:] This memo was written prior to receipt of information regarding embargo decision.

S. M.

H.

JULY 30, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: German-Japanese Relations.

I. Discussion.

1. The American Ambassador to Japan in a telegram to the Secretary of State dated July 23, 1941, points to a trend in Japanese public and private opinion indicating that Japan is no longer a happy partner in the Tripartite Agreement. He states that there has been a gradual weakening over a considerable period of time of the ties binding Japan to the Axis Powers. He further states a feeling he has had for some time that if the Germans ran true to form they would sooner or later overshoot their mark in Japan, and that the proud and sensitive Japanese people would eventually realize the fundamental contempt and scrawny concealed arrogance of the Germans for the Yellow Race.

2. According to the Ambassador there is a growing feeling among many Japanese that Japan is being treated as a satellite, if not as a dependent, a feeling

which has been developing as the result of the increasing influx of Nazi officials (including members of the Gestapo) into Tokyo, the efforts of these officials to exercise a controlling influence in matters of domestic concern and in many aspects of Japanese life, and the constant interference by the German Ambassador in trying to regiment Japanese newspapers along Axis lines.

3. The Ambassador remarks that as usual, the Germans have overshot their mark.

4. The Ambassador reported in a telegram to the State Department dated July 27, 1941, that Former Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed the Turkish Ambassador that he had cabled Ribbentrop 48 hours in advance of the Nazi attack on the Soviet asking if there were any truth in reports of such an attack and Ribbentrop replied with a categorical denial.

5. Our Minister to Thailand in a telegram to the Secretary of State dated July 26, 1941, reported that the Prime Minister had informed him that Lt. Col. Scholl, German Military Attache, had called and warned him (the Prime Minister) against "going too far" with Japan, "because", said the German Attache, "you cannot trust Japan". The German Attache stated further that "Germany will settle with Japan after she has won the war in Europe."

6. In view of the conditions depicted above, the time appears ripe for the judicious use of information which will have as its aim the dissolution of the Tripartite Agreement. Any action on our part which will make Japan an even more reluctant Axis partner weakens our potential enemies, enhances our own prestige and authority and materially and favorably affects our national defense.

II. Recommendation.

That the Secretary of War confer with the Secretary of State with a view to placing the information contained in paragraph 5 above in the hands of the Japanese Ambassador.

/s/ Sherman Miles

SHERMAN MILES,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
G.H.Q.
General Embick
Asst. Sec. of War

I. B. 112

AUGUST 16, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.

1. It is believed that the Japanese Government, with the sanction of the Emperor, has decided upon a foreign policy whose objectives are as follows:

- a. Adherence to Tripartite Pact.
 - b. Establishment of a Greater East Asia sphere of co-prosperity (under Japanese domination and control) regardless of other developments in the world situation.
 - c. Disposal of the China Incident.
 - d. Expansion southward for reasons of economic and strategic security.
2. In implementing the foregoing policy, it is believed that Japan proposes to take steps as follows:
- a. Increased pressure on China from various points in the south.
 - b. Seizure by Japan of all Foreign Concessions in China.
 - c. Politico-military pressure on Indo-China and Thailand to facilitate Japan's southward advance.
 - d. Preparation for an attack on Siberia, but to be made at her own chosen time.
 - e. A resort to every means available to keep the United States out of the war.

3. Since the adoption of the policy outlined in paragraph 1 above Japan has secured military and economic control of Indo-China, is in a position to enforce her military and economic demands on Thailand and to threaten the vital Burma railroad and road, and has increased the strength of the Kwantung

Army (in Manchoukuo) to about 600,000 officers and men as opposed to a Russian force, east of Lake Baikal, of about 400,000. The following factors, however, unfavorable to the successful implementation of Japan's aggressive policy, have been injected into the situation:

a. The German time-table for the subjugation of the U. S. S. R. has gone awry.

b. The United States and Great Britain have frozen Japanese assets.

c. Great Britain has announced an embargo in exports to Japan.

d. The American, British and Dutch armed forces in the southwestern Pacific have been materially strengthened.

e. Great Britain and the United States have pledged aid to the U. S. S. R. and additional aid to China.

f. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have announced accord on an eight point program which, while not mentioning Japan by name, presents a long-range threat to her position as an Axis Power and to the retention of her conquests.

4. The great danger in the situation lies in the fact, so often proved, that Japanese military and naval authorities are not under the complete control of their Government. We have seen for the past year an extraordinary example of discipline and self control exercised by the German military in conformity to their Government's decree of avoiding any possible armed clash with the United States. We can, unfortunately, expect no such self denial and restraint on the part of the Japanese military. We can only hope that they will at least follow for a time the policies of their Government.

5. There are clear indications that, in spite of the decisions outlined in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Japanese Government is willing to take extraordinary diplomatic measures to keep the United States out of the war, at least temporarily. There are indications that Japan is unwilling to commit herself to the extent that Germany would like to see her committed. There are indications that Japan realizes that she must make some concessions to the strong political stand now taken by the United States, even though those concessions consist largely in further conversations and negotiations.

6. Considering all of the above, this Division believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area and of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff

War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
General Embick.

dya

AUGUST 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Chinese Resistance.

1. General Chu, Chinese Military Attache, called on me today at his request to discuss the general situation. He was evidently worried because China was not specifically mentioned in all the discussion with regard to the conference between The President and the British Prime Minister. He seemed to feel that China is being forgotten for the moment. I told him of course that China is and will remain a pivotal point in the war, and that although not specifically mentioned in regard to the conference, the situation in the Far East, including China, was undoubtedly carefully considered.

2. General Chu then pointed out that much has recently been said about halting Japanese aggression both to the south and to the north, but nothing specific on stopping Japanese aggression in China proper. He went on to point out the possibility of Japan concentrating all of her efforts on crushing Chinese resistance

if she considers herself stopped by the Anglo-American front from further aggression to the south and to the north. He said, rather pointedly, "You know we cannot hold out indefinitely." I pointed out to him that the present emphasis on aid to Russia was probably due to Anglo-American belief that the Russian crisis was an immediate one, a question of holding her in the war for the next six weeks, until winter comes to her relief. Chinese resistance on the other hand would not appear to present so pressing a time factor, considering the long period of four years in which they have successfully withstood Japanese pressure. General Chu admitted this, and in answer to my questions as to the duration of Chinese resistance he said that undoubtedly the situation would hold throughout this calendar year. I pointed out to him that Japanese's present extension of her forces both in the north and in the south precluded the possibility of her concentrating her efforts against the Chinese at this time. He admitted this, but stated that he believed Japan must continue her aggressive policy, and that it was possible for her to regroup her forces against China if she were barred from the north and the south. He said that he feared that the Anglo-American policy of holding Japan in the north and the south might force her into a last desperate effort to overcome Chinese resistance. In his opinion Japan cannot stop, and in all questions of major policy the Japanese Government must bow to the decision of its military forces. He cited the Chinese proverb, "He who rides on the tiger must go where the tiger goes."

3. General Chu professed to have little information on the Russian situation, but said that what he had was encouraging. He thought the outstanding thing was that Russia had successfully taken the first shock of war. He remarked that the first few months of the Sino-Japanese war were by far the hardest, and after that the Chinese had settled down to a long resistance.

4. General Chu's visit undoubtedly indicates what we have had from other sources—that the Chinese here, and presumably also in Chungking, fear that they are being left out of the big picture, that we may not be firm in our present stand vis-a-vis Japan, and that aid to China may become more difficult in the future.

5. This Division believes that considerable morale aid might be given to China in the form of public statements emanating from high officials of the Government on our deep interest in Chinese resistance and our policy of aiding it. An official announcement of the forthcoming dispatch of a military mission to China is suggested. It is realized however that such morale aid would have to be considered in the light of its effect on the critical relations now existing between Japan and the United States.

/s/ Sherman Miles

SHERMAN MILES

Brigadier General, U. S. Army

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copies to:

Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division

ONI
Mr. Currie
General Magruder

SEPTEMBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Conversation between the Japanese Military Attache and the Chief, Far Eastern Section.

1. Coincident with the Japanese Ambassador's call on the President on the morning of August 28, 1941. Major General Saburo Isoda, Japanese Military Attache, called by appointment on Colonel R. S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, this Division. The following are notes of Colonel Bratton on the visit:

"I have known General Isoda and been associated with him under various circumstances for eighteen years. In consequence, our conversation was friendly, informal and entirely 'off the record.'

"General Isoda stated that, like the Ambassador, he was exploring ways and means to relieve Japanese-United States tension and bring about better relations

between the two countries. During the course of a conversation which lasted for an hour and a half, General Isoda made statements to the following effect:

a. Due to restrictions imposed by our export control, the Japanese have begun to use a portion of their war reserve of petroleum.

b. He, the Naval Attache, the Ambassador and the entire Embassy Staff are in accord in an earnest desire to better United States-Japanese relations.

c. Japan made a great mistake in joining the Axis.

d. The Army frequently gets out from under control of the Civilian Government and has to be restrained by Imperial Command.

e. Japan has her back to the wall. She can be pushed just so far, then will have to fight us to save her national honor and integrity, though war with the United States is the last thing desired by Japan.

"When asked flatly my opinion as to what assurances on the part of Japan would be acceptable to the United States Government at this time, I told him that Prince Konoye, if he comes to talk with the President, must come with Imperial sanction and armed with authority to speak for and on behalf of the armed forces of Japan as well as on behalf of the Civilian Government. I said that, in my opinion, nothing short of this would be productive of lasting results or be acceptable to the President.

"General Isoda received this statement of opinion on my part with entire good will, expressed his pleasure over the opportunity of having a frank talk, and stated his desire to have other and more frequent talks in the future. I, in turn, assured him that I would be glad to meet him in a private and unofficial capacity at any time."

2. General Isoda's visit clearly parallels the conversations now in progress between the Japanese Ambassador and the State Department. In effect he speaks for the Japanese Embassy, the entire staff of which is sincerely working for the betterment of Japanese-American relations. He obviously did not feel empowered to speak for the Japanese Army.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence

I. B. 122

SEPTEMBER 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.

1. This estimate covers the period September 3-December 1, 1941.

2. In this period the dominating elements of the situation will be:

a. The preoccupation of Germany with the U. S. S. R.

b. The inability of Great Britain and her associates to take the strategic offensive.

In consequence a militarily decisive phase of the war will not be reached.

3. Axis:

a. Germany (see Tab A) will be immersed in the conflict with the U. S. S. R., either in terms of combat or of large-scale military reorganization. Victories over the U. S. S. R. may tend to raise her national morale; but on balance her morale should be lower, because of losses in Russia and because of the certainty of prolongation of the war. Economically she will continue strained but stable. Specifically:

(1) She will be unable to invade the British Isles.

(2) She will be unable to attack in the Middle East. (See Tab B).

(3) She is and will be able at will to occupy French Northwest Africa, but probably will not do so. (See Tab C).

(4) She probably will be in a position to intensify her warfare against shipping as compared with its present reduced level. (See Tab A).

(5) The policy of the United States, backed by growing armaments, particularly in terms of sea and air power, will be an increasing factor in her calculations.

b. *Subsidiary European Members of the Axis.*—Their subservience to Germany will increase and their influence in world affairs will continue to diminish. Italy

in particular will garrison the Balkans and provide Axis communications with Libya. (For Spain, see Tab C.)

c. *The Conquered and Occupied Countries of Europe* may develop still greater unrest; but this element in the total situation will, for the time being, remain of little net influence on the general situation.

d. *Japan* (see Tab D), beset with uncertainties, may do nothing, may attack the Maritime Provinces, may seek to expand to the Southwest; it is even possible that she may withdraw from the Axis. Japan also has the capability of concentrating her newly augmented forces against China and seeking a decision there. No indication of likelihood of this is seen. In the general picture and excluding China, where she must continue to fight, her most likely, but by no means certain, course is inaction.

4. *Turkey*, the most practicable land corridor between Europe and the Middle East, will find her position increasingly precarious; but in this period she probably will evade choice of definite alignment with either the Axis or the Anglo-Russian bloc.

5. *Anti-Axis:*

a. *U. S. S. R.* (see Tab E), with limited and decreasing ability to pass to the offensive, faced with the loss or dislocation of most of her war industry and with inadequate communications to the outside world, is destined to continued military reverses, while exacting a significant toll from the German armed forces. Her only hope is to bring about German overextension and exhaustion. Destruction of her armed forces and overthrow of the Stalin regime within this period are possible but not yet probable. (See also TAB A for Russia vs. Germany and Tab D for Russia vs. Japan.)

b. *Great Britain* has a continued respite to perfect her home defenses, build up her air force, consolidate her Middle Eastern and Far Eastern positions, and to a limited degree improve the defense of the Atlantic sea lanes. She will have neither the ability nor the opportunity to take the strategic offensive, other than by limited air attacks on Germany's European position. She has the opportunity to launch a limited offensive against Libya. (See Tab B.)

6. *Latin America* is momentarily less concerned with the war, since its center of gravity has shifted to Eastern Europe. The Axis powers, on the whole, are losing ground before Democratic pressure, political, psychological and economic.

SHERMAN MILES,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

5 Enclosures: Tabs A to E Inclusive.

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary of War
Coordinator of Information
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Director of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
Major General Embick.
Under Secretary of War

1. Tab A—GERMANY—omitted
2. Tab B—British situation in the Middle East—omitted
3. Tab C—A German drive to the Southwest—omitted
4. Tab. D.

JAPAN

1. *Lines of Action Open to Japan*

Japan has the following alternatives:

- a. Continue to withdraw her armed forces from the area south of the Great Wall with a view to attacking Siberia.
- b. Make peace with Chiang Kai-shek.
- c. Disregard American action and opinion and occupy Thailand.
- d. Attack Burma and the Burma Road via Thailand.

e. Take or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and attack Singapore.
f. Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and seize the Netherlands East Indies.

g. Reorient their whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.

h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation.

i. Bide their time, wait for a better opportunity for the pursuance of any of the above lines of action, hoping that time will be in their favor.

j. On the basis of the neutrality pact with Russia as a "face saver", enter into an understanding with the United States and Great Britain in regard to territorial expansion and economic penetration in southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific area.

2. *Most Probable Action*

Japan, beset with uncertainties, will probably "buy" time by entering into negotiations with the United States. A cabinet upset in Japan, a not unlikely event, will change the whole picture. The present cabinet, however, will initiate no additional aggression on the part of Japan until all diplomatic means of relieving pressure have been explored and exhausted. This does not preclude independent action on the part of Japan's armies in the field.

3. *Japan—Combat*

Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air force of 55,000 and a trained and partially trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.

The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto and Manchoukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China—Thailand border in the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus 15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new units included in the above estimate.

Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some of these have been replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased from 8 to 19 divisions with auxiliary troops including 4 tank regiments and 4 cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese army is well trained and an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified to perform their various duties in peace and war. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disciplined, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to modern occidental armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy air forces is 55,000 officers and men and the two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons. Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Recent acquisition of German planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air proficiency.

The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition but there is a shortage of organizational equipment such as tanks, and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern artillery.

Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers exclusive of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. Naval strength comprises over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

The Japanese naval personnel is well trained—a training equal to that of the British and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific area.

Japan, because of her geographic location blocks all sea approaches, north of Haiphong, to the southeastern coast of Asia; flanks all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. Furthermore her geographic position is such that her navy, on the strategical defensive, could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.

4. Japan—Political

The political cauldron of Japan has been boiling furiously since Matsuoka was relieved as Foreign Minister. During the time that Matsuoka was Foreign Minister and under the leadership of Premier Prince Konoye, Japan set up its own version of totalitarianism last fall called the "new national structure". Political parties were disbanded and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, designed to unite all the people in assistance to the Throne, was hastily whipped into shape. The Association was not a political organization like those controlling Italy, Germany, and Russia because of the Japanese theory of the Emperor as the supreme head of the state to whom all Japanese yield obedience and service. The vaguely stated aims of the Association were too diffused to meet with general approval; as conditions are at present, it is clear that the "new structure", movement—so far as its basic purpose was concerned—has entirely miscarried. In its major tests, provided by the efforts to regiment industry and "reform" the Diet, it merely stirred up severe controversies. The original hope that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association could "unify all phases" of Japan's national life has long since disappeared.

While the outward totalitarian structure has weakened, the domination exercised by the army clique for nearly a decade continues. Practically every phase of life in Japan has been placed under governmental control.

The whole political machinery is geared to preparation for expansion into the maritime provinces of Siberia, for further expansion in southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific and to the solution of the China "Incident." Without their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Japanese are continuing in the path to what they believe is their "divinely appointed destiny" without being too sure as to where that "destiny" will take them. As a matter of fact, there are indications that the people of Japan are becoming more and more alarmed and apprehensive; they fear that the present course will take them into a major war. There is increasing dissatisfaction with the secretive nature of governmental policy. If Japan goes to war with a major power, her people will enter it desperately rather than confidently.

In September, 1940, Japan concluded a Tripartite Pact of Co-operation with Germany and Italy which by implication requires Japan to attack the United States (or any other power except Russia, not involved in the European War at that time) should it attack either of the Axis partners. Although Foreign Minister Toyoda, Matsuoka's successor, has said that there is no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere to the Axis Alliance, there are indications that Toyoda's sincerity in making such a statement is entirely different from that of Matsuoka. In other words, the advantages and value of the Tripartite Agreement are at present being very seriously questioned. But Germany, through her representatives in Japan, is doing everything within her power to keep Japan "in line." Thus Japan is most anxious to confer with the United States, "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the two countries," which means recognizing Japan's territorial and economic gains in Eastern Asia. The chief obstacle is that even if a conference were convened by the two governments, there could be no guarantee of the results of such a conference unless the Japanese Army and Navy were directly represented. Although a request for such representation would be unprecedented, G-2 is of the opinion that unless such representation is obtained, a conference at this time would be without lasting results.

Japan has boundless ambition in East Asia, but she finds herself in a poor strategic position to take advantage of the opportunities the present time affords. Japanese leaders are aware of the perils of further military commitments before the stalemate in China is broken. One of the factions in Japan favors making

a final effort to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to conclude a peace as soon as possible; another faction favors fighting the issue to a conclusion. The stalemate is about as far from decision as it has been.

In the maelstrom of Japanese indecision, one thing stands out clearly—that is, that the Japanese do not want the United States to become involved in the war, but they want the United States to stay out of the war primarily to enable Japan to retain a free hand in advancing the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia.

Another fact which is almost as clear is that Admiral Toyoda is a stop-gap Foreign Minister, appointed temporarily with the idea of making a more permanent appointment when Japanese policy could be more coherent and concrete.

5. *Japan—Economic*

Because of the ever-increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase the deficiencies in these categories. These deficiencies are serious but are not likely to become dangerous before December 1, 1941. The fact that Japan is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the "incident" in China prevents any curative steps being taken.

The technical assistance which the Germans have been giving to Japan over a period of six months is no longer as welcome as it was before Germany's attack on Russia. That attack has precluded the possibilities of Japan's receiving machinery and implements of war from Germany. As a matter of fact, the Japanese are beginning to question whether the Tripartite Agreement has not brought far greater economic disadvantages than advantage to Japan in carrying out her plans for a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Asia. The Pro-Axis leaders are finding great difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

The "Co-Prosperity Sphere" is anything but prosperous. Because of the difficulties of labor shortage, lack of sufficient transportation facilities and lack of cooperation among the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or persuasion, the "sphere" is about to fall apart.

The action of the Netherlands East Indies in joining with the United States and Great Britain in embargoing goods to Japan was undoubtedly a severe blow, both economically and in prestige. The economic competition going on behind the scenes in Thailand, between Japan on the one hand, and Great Britain and China on the other, will be increasingly significant. Recent information, however, indicates that Japanese banking interests are asking for a new loan of 25,000,000 Bahts from Thailand bankers, (supplementing a loan of \$3,750,000 actually made to Japan early in August in order to pay for commodities purchased by Japan in Thailand). The influence of the Chinese, the traditional financiers of Siam, cannot be overlooked here.

The processes of economic warfare are so slow that, even if the status quo ante were to be established in China by way of settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese economic predominance in the East Asiatic area would still be so firmly established that several months would have to pass before the effects of the economic embargo would in itself influence Japanese action in the Far East.

The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance in East Asia as well as to try to persuade Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies through threats and promises to soften the impact their embargo has caused. Japan obviously does not want to go to war with the United States to achieve her economic objectives, but at the same time she feels that the achievement of these objectives is an essential part of her foreign policy.

The fact remains that Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort. To procure them she must have foreign exchange; in order to obtain foreign exchange, she must have foreign trade, which, at present, is seriously curtailed. The stoppage of trade is reducing Japan's raw materials drastically—raw materials which are vital to the organic well-being of Japan and to her ability to wage war successfully. No other country even approaches the United States in importance to Japan's economic welfare, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for the exports of Japan. Thus through the advantage the United States has gained through the embargo, Japan finds herself in a very poor bargaining position.

I. B. 124

September 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Political Developments in Japan.

1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated September 11, 1941, gives the following information:

"Emperor Hirohito today took direct command of Japanese Army Headquarters and moved to assure close Army collaboration with Premier Fumimaro Konoye's Government, which appeared to be trying to keep Japan out of war even if that meant drifting away from her Axis ties."

2. Major developments are reported as follows:

a. Establishment of a new Defense General Headquarters under General Otozo Yamada. Yamada is personally responsible to the Emperor and becomes virtual Generalissimo of the Army superseding previous emphasis on General Staff control.

b. Appointment of Fumio Goto, former Home Minister, as chairman of the Central Cooperative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, replacing Admiral Suetsugu.

c. Entertainment of the Cabinet at luncheon by the Emperor, "in appreciation of its outstanding services to the State."

3. A proper evaluation of this news is impracticable at this early date but a definite trend seems indicated—a trend away from the Axis and toward better relations with the United States and Great Britain. The new system is interpreted as an effort to strengthen the civilian government, check militaristic domination of Imperial Policy, and erect a barrier to possible dissatisfaction among the militarists with the future course of events.

4. General Yamada is a conservative, of great energy and ability. It is reported that he stands high in the Emperor's favor. Goto is likewise a conservative and replaces one of Japan's worst jingoists. The action of the Emperor in taking direct command of the Army and his giving prestige to the Cabinet by inviting it to luncheon, and publicly thanking it is unprecedented.

5. Barring a massacre of the conservatives by the militarists, an event deemed unlikely in view of the Emperor's action, it is probable that Japan will find a peaceful way out of one of the greatest crises in her history and seek a means to realign her foreign policy in an anti-Axis direction.

(signed) Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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General Embick

[Note by General Miles:] Original copy given to Gen. Watson for the President.
(signed) S. M.

September 17, 1941

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.:

Subject: Combat Estimate, Japan. (With map showing disposition armed forces.

In compliance with verbal request, this date, from the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., there is attached hereto (Tab A) a brief Combat Estimate on Japan, with a map showing the disposition of Japan's armed forces and the Asiatic area at present occupied by the Japanese.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Incls.—2
Tab A
Map¹

¹ Omitted.

TAB A—COMBAT ESTIMATE, JAPAN

Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000, including an air force of 55,000, and a trained and partly trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.

The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto and Manchoukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China-Thailand border in the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus 15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new units included in the above estimate.

Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some of these have been replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased from 8 to 21 divisions with auxiliary troops including 4 tank regiments and 4 cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese army is well trained and an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified to perform their various duties in peace and war. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disciplined, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to occidental modern armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy is 55,000 officers and men and the two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons. Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation no small degree. Recent acquisition of German planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air proficiency.

The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. Shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition but there is a shortage of organization equipment such as tanks, and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern artillery.

[2] Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers exclusive of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. The naval vessels have over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons in the process of building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: The Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

The Japanese naval personnel is well trained—equal to that of the British and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific area.

Japan, because of her geographic location blocks all sea approaches, north of Saigon, to the southeastern coast of Asia; flanks all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. Furthermore her geographic position is such that her navy, on the strategical defensive, could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Subject. Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. The following data are furnished in response to your memorandum, above subject, WPD 4994, September 17, 1941. The succeeding paragraphs are numbered according to the questions propounded therein.

"1. Do you see any beneficial effect of America's war effort with respect to Great Britain maintaining her control over Singapore?"

America's defense effort, in terms of political, military, and economic pressure, has already contributed materially toward curbing Japan's advance to the southwest. This restraint on Japan tends to become stronger as time passes by.

"2. If Great Britain were driven out of the Mediterranean and Middle East Area, could she retain control in a remunerative sense in India and Malaysia? What are the capabilities of Japan with respect to this situation?"

Yes, provided the Trans-Pacific sea lanes are secured. In such an event Japan would be sorely tempted to attack to the southwest. Such an attack could be blocked only by the use of large U. S. Naval forces and considerable U. S. ground and air forces.

"3. If the Russian military forces were defeated in European Russia, would the Maritime and Siberian Areas continue to resist? What would their capabilities be in the premises?"

Yes, but on the basis of a purely passive defense. Resistance could be organized more effectively in eastern than in western Siberia. The degree of resistance would depend in large measure on material assistance from the United States and Japan's position in the then developing situation. The amounts of material furnished by us would be conditioned by the shipping situation, the means of land transport available on the Asiatic mainland and by the attitude of Japan.

[2] "4. What would the effect be of a successful German drive to the southwest including the north and northwest African Areas?"

Such a move would have two major disadvantages for Germany: military overextension and an increased economic problem with reference to Spain and Portugal. It would give her the following major advantages: consolidation of western Europe and north Africa; increased opportunity for naval raiding by ships and aircraft based on northwest Africa; opportunity to extend her influence in Latin American and perhaps to infiltrate there physically. Such action by Germany would necessitate the prompt occupation of the Natal area, Brazil, by the United States and the prompt occupation of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands by the Democracies.

"5. What would the effect be on the situation if the Germans make a successful drive southeastward through Turkey, Iran and against the Suez Area?"

Such an event would entail disastrous British losses and a profound shock to British morale. It would throw the British back against India and Kenya. It would require the reorganization and protection of sea communications between India, Malaysia, Australasia and the Democracies. (See 2 above).

SHERMAN MILES,

*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

I. B. 131

SEPTEMBER 23, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Crisis in Japan.

1. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect that the Japanese Cabinet is confronted with a highly critical and explosive situation. The Emperor's recent gesture in support of the Cabinet notwithstanding, certain pressure groups in Japan are making threatening gestures toward the Premier.

2. The point at issue is whether or not the Japanese Government is to encourage, authorize or permit a nationwide celebration on the anniversary of the signing of the Tripartite Agreement. Genuine Government anxiety over this point is obviously being used as a red herring in the road to national objectives in the hope that the United States Government can be rushed into making concessions designed to strengthen the authority of the present Japanese Cabinet. This on the theory that if the current Japanese Cabinet falls there will be no one left in Japan with whom we can deal satisfactorily.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that in all of her recent proposals and counter-proposals Japan has carefully avoided giving any definite assurance that she will not attack Russia.

4. The present agitation, therefore, on the part of Japan to extract an immediate agreement from the United States to some or all of her proposals for a "conference of leaders" may be motivated by a desire to cover preparations for an all out attack on Siberia timed with the expected Russian collapse in Europe.

5. A lessening of pressure at this time would be considered as appeasement by the Japanese and would be highly detrimental to the advantage that the United States has gained by the policy initiated when Japanese funds in this country were frozen and reaffirmed when a strict embargo was placed on oil going to Japan.

[2] 6. The celebration of the signing of the Tripartite Agreement by the Japanese on September 27, and the extent of that celebration is a matter entirely within the control and jurisdiction of the present Japanese Government. The United States can and should judge only by the acts and not by the words of that Government.

7. This Division still believes, as stated in I. B. 112, dated August 16, 1941, that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific Area, and also the hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Director of Naval Intelligence
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I. B. 135

OCTOBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Japanese-American Relations.

1. The crisis in Tokyo brought about by the anniversary of the Tripartite Agreement has been weathered by the Konoye Cabinet through a somewhat perfunctory celebration involving speeches by the German and Italian Ambassadors, Prince Konoye, and others, at luncheons given in honor of the Axis on September 27, 1941.

2. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect that at 4:30 p. m. on September 27th after completing the ceremonies celebrating the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the American Ambassador to call on him, and urged him to strongly recommend to his home government an immediate meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt.

3. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was advised as to the gist of Admiral Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew. Admiral Nomura also was urged by his Foreign Minister to do everything in his power to prevail upon the President to meet and confer immediately with Prince Konoye.

4. The fervor with which the Japanese, over a period of many months, have been agitating for this "meeting of leaders" has been matched only by their reluctance to make commitments on two points, i. e. withdrawal from China, and preparation for an attack on Siberia.

5. This Division is of the belief that the present Cabinet in Tokyo does not yet feel strong enough to enforce any order for withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, even though under pressure from the United States, it might be inclined to do so. And, as a matter of fact, at this stage in the execution of our national strategic plan, a cessation of hostilities in China followed by the withdrawal of twenty-one Japanese divisions, 20 independent brigades, and 1,000 aircraft therefrom would be highly detrimental to our interests. Such a force if returned to Japan would be potentially of such an explosive nature that only a military oligarchy could control it. These militarists would submerge or destroy the moderate element in Japan replacing it with a restless Chauvinistic element possessing neither the ability nor the inclination to continue diplomatic relations with any of the Democratic Powers.

If the Japanese force in China were transferred to Indo China or Manchoukuo it would undoubtedly overflow into adjacent regions and our interests would be even further jeopardized.

It seems evident that the Konoye Government lacks confidence enough to make any promises in regard to restraining the Kwantung Army, even at its present strength, from launching an attack on Siberia. With its forces augmented by all or a part of the troops now in China, the home government would be helpless, for the Kwantung Army since 1932 has been completely independent of the various cabinets appointed in Tokyo and, reinforced by elements from China, would undoubtedly attack when it felt assured that such action was opportune. The opportune moment will be coincident with or immediately following a Russian collapse in Europe, or if and when the Russian force becomes numerically inferior because of withdrawals from Siberia to reinforce the European Armies.

6. From the foregoing it seems imperative, for the present at least, to keep as much of the Japanese Army as possible pinned down in China. In other words we must cease at once our attempts to bring about the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China and must give to China whatever aid is possible on our part in sustaining the Chinese power and will to continue to contain and occupy the bulk of the Japanese Army.

7. The initial feeling of revulsion over this apparent utilization of China as a cat's paw in our plan of strategy will be alleviated by an examination of the situation of the anti-Axis powers in the light of cold reason. Our objective is the destruction of Nazism, and all out aid to those powers actively engaged in resisting its aggressive drive for world domination. Russia is, as a matter of expedience, an ally in this cause. We must, among other things, do what we can with what we have at our disposal to aid Russia in her struggle with Germany. Any action on our part, therefore, which would liberate Japanese (pro-Axis) forces for action against Russia's rear in Siberia would be foolhardy.

8. The eagerness on the part of the Japanese Foreign Minister for a "meeting of leaders" is probably based on a strong desire to strengthen the position of the cabinet with respect to the internal situation in Japan. Such a conference would: (1) Strengthen Prince Konoye's position with his people, (2) Extend the tenure of the present cabinet at least through the sessions of the conference. (3) Increase the belief of all Japanese leaders that we would not meet with them unless willing to make concessions. In other words, a conference to them will mean concessions on our part. If the President of the United States can be persuaded to loosen the economic restrictions now in force against Japan, Prince Konoye can then go before the Japanese people with a fait accompli such as no other man has been able to produce in the last decade. Economic concession, it must be observed, is the one essential which the Japanese military leaders recognize as necessary to be obtained before another major war can be fought. Once the conference is convened the Japanese will be in a strong position to demand some economic concessions, pleading the certainty of the collapse of the Konoye government if he goes home empty-handed.

9. From the point of view of the United States, a conference of leaders at this time, might serve to give this country additional time in which to prepare more adequately for any eventuality. Definite understanding, however, should be established, prior to such a conference, with Great Britain, Russia, China, Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Through cooperative and unified action with the powers named, we have obtained the economic advantages we now hold. It is the opinion of this Division that these advantages should, under no circumstances, be sacrificed unless concessions can be gained from Japan which will benefit all the non-Axis countries of the Pacific area; otherwise the very objective this country has sought so long to attain, that of unified anti-Axis strength in the Pacific, will be lost completely.

10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders nor economic concessions at this time would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically and militarily, for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition precedent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity, not to attack Russia in Siberia.

11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before us. This Division

still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is still clearly indicated.

HAYES A. KRONER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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OCTOBER 16, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.

1. A United Press dispatch states that the three months old Konoye Cabinet resigned on October 16th under nationalistic pressure for termination of Japanese-American peace negotiations.

2. This resignation was the logical result of Foreign Minister Toyoda's failure to secure a relaxation of the economic pressure on Japan by the U. S. Government.

3. It is impossible to predict the next move on the part of Japan until the composition of the next cabinet is known. It is highly probable, however, that the trend will be toward the Axis, with the Army, rather than the Navy, exercising the controlling influence. This Army element will not be slow to take advantage of any weakening of the Siberian Army brought about by Russian reverses in Europe.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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OCTOBER 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japan's New Premier.

1. The United Press reports that Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, War Minister in the late Konoye Cabinet, has been designated Premier and ordered to form a new Cabinet.

2. General Tojo was born in 1884, the son of a Samurai. He has held several high offices in the Army, notably that of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Vice Minister of War and Inspector General of Aviation.

3. He has been called the father of modern Japanese Army strategy and is known to be anti-foreign, with a particular dislike for the Russians, and an open admiration for German methods. He created a sensation in 1938 when, as Vice Minister of War, he predicted that Japan would have to fight Russia as well as China. He also warned that America would have to be watched. When the Axis Alliance was signed in September 1940 he said that the road Japan would follow had been "definitely decided" and there was no turning back. General

Tojo is regarded by his associates as a man of unshakable determination. He cites reverence and filial piety as the two most important attributes of a Japanese soldier. He has little patience for arguments or other other people's views.

4. Any cabinet selected by General Tojo may be expected to have Axis leanings, but will be otherwise anti-foreign and highly nationalistic.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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OCTOBER 21, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject : Kwantung versus the Siberian Army.

I have prepared this copy of the above study for submission to the President. Inasmuch as it points out the desirability of certain action by the United States, it is requested that you decide whether or not it should go forward.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

I. B. 144

OCTOBER 21, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject : The Kwantung versus the Siberian Army (For Situation Map see Tab A.)

1. The best information available to this Division indicates the strengths of the Siberian forces east of Lake Baikal and the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchoukuo to be approximately as indicated below :

	<i>Kwantung Army</i>	<i>Siberian Army</i>
Infantry-----	25 Divs. (450,000 men)	31 Divs. (540,000 men).
Cavalry-----	4 Brigs. (12,000 men)	10 Divs. (75,000 men).
R. R. Guards-----	36 Bns. (72,000 men)	
Tanks-----	7 Regts. (1,750 tanks)	10 Brigs. (1,600 tanks).
Air Corps-----	7 Regts. (500 planes)	10 Divs. (1,677 planes).
Army Troops and overhead--	150,000 men	25,000 men.
Total Man Power-----	684,000 men	682,000 men.

2 It is to be noted that the Siberian Army is relatively strong in cavalry and in planes at present. However, the Japanese inferiority in the air could be quickly altered by shifting from China (where Japan is practically unopposed in the air) the bulk of the Japanese air forces operating with the ground forces in that area.

3. Although the quality of the present leadership of the two opposing forces has not been tested, the consensus of opinion here is that the leadership in the Siberian and in the Japanese forces is the best in their respective armies.

4. In general, the materiel and equipment in neither force is comparable to the latest types in use by the German, British and American armies. Russian medium and heavy tanks are believed to be superior to similar equipment in the Kwantung Army.

5. Weather conditions during the fall and winter months give a slight advantage to the Siberian Army, inasmuch as the Japanese, as a people, have not had time to be come inured to the rigors of the extreme cold prevalent in Siberia during these months.

6. Neither the Siberian nor the Kwantung Army has a sufficient superiority over the other, at present, to warrant an offensive. This situation may change, however, in the near future if the Siberian force or any large part thereof is moved westward to strengthen the forces in European Russia. The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, has doubled in strength since July 1, 1941, and it is fairly certain that Japan will continue to strengthen this army with whatever men and equipment she can spare from China and Japan Proper.

7. If and when the Kwantung Army feels that it has a combat superiority over the Siberian army of 2 to 1 it is highly probable that it will take the offensive regardless of the policy and intentions of the Tokyo Government. When this ratio rises to 3 to 1 or better the probability will become a certainty.

8. This being true, it is very much to our interest, so long as Russia continues to offer active resistance to Germany, to take whatever steps may be possible to maintain the present Russian equality in combat strength vis-a-vis the Kwantung Army. Two such practicable steps immediately present themselves:

a. Increased aid to China, to enable the latter to continue to pin to the ground in North, Central and South China the bulk of the Japanese Army.

b. Increased aid to the Russian armies both in Europe and Siberia.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enc.: Map.¹

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General Embick.

I. B. 148

NOVEMBER 1, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan. (For map see Tab A).

1. Recent developments in the international situation, and particularly in the Pacific, indicate the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Yunnan Province in an attempt to cut China's life-line, the Burma Road.

2. Factors which indicate possibility of such a line of action by Japan:

a. The political and economic situation at home and pressure from the Axis demand action.

b. If she moved on Thailand, or elsewhere to the south, Japan runs grave risk of war with the ABD countries—an event which she wishes to avoid, at least for the present.

c. Japan's plan for conquest of Eastern Siberia would obviously best be served by a policy of watchful waiting until Russia is much weakened.

d. A drive from Indo-China into Yunnan would most probably not involve Japan with any third nation.

e. An offensive elsewhere in China could have no such decisive effect as the stoppage of supplies entering China over the Burma Road. This operation, if successful, might force capitulation of the Chinese.

3. Factors operating against such an offensive:

a. Japan is already extended in China where she has the equivalent of some 30 divisions spread so thinly that withdrawal of any troops for concentration elsewhere would seriously endanger her present lines. This was clearly shown in the recent operations at Changsha and Ichang.

b. Japan has perhaps 33 divisions in Manchuria and adjacent areas. To withdraw any considerable force from this region might cause her to "miss the bus" when her chance comes for invasion of Siberia.

c. Japan has the equivalent of some 3½ divisions in Indo-China as garrison troops and to secure the Thai borders. Continuance of the bulk of these troops on this duty is necessary.

d. Similar considerations apply to the concentration of the Japanese air forces.

e. Estimates of the initial force required for invasion of Yunnan, from various sources, British, Chinese, Russian and American, vary from 5 to 10 divisions, and all agree on the necessity of using strong air forces. Thus, a major effort would be necessary, including the use of many transports, supply ships, etc.

¹ Omitted.

f. If Japan became involved in a long campaign in southwest China, she would be seriously hampered in operations elsewhere.

4. Physical difficulties in the way of a Yunnan invasion are considerable, the most important being the terrain. The best corridor is that followed by the Yunnan meter-gauge railway from the border at Laokai to Kunming. This is a tortuous route along the sides of deep gorges, from an elevation of 305 feet at Laokai to 4,500 at Mengze on the Yunnan plateau in a distance of 110 miles. (Airline, about 75 miles.) The dozens of bridges and tunnels have presumably been destroyed; the Chinese report that they have completely demolished the railway including the roadbed for a distance of 50 miles north of the border, and partially for an additional 15 miles. There is a trail about 30 miles west of and roughly parallel to the railroad, but there is no road south of Mengze. Only two other corridors exist, according to the Chinese Minister of War: one, an old road parallel to and about 30 miles west of the railway; the other about 125 miles east of the railway. The same source says that lateral travel between these routes is impossible because of the ruggedness of the terrain, and that the Chinese have rendered impassable all three routes of approach. Possible use of the valleys of the larger river appears remote.

The Red River flows from the Tali Lake, just north of the Burma Road 250 miles west of Kunming, southeastward into Indo-China at Laokai. It is not navigable north of Laokai. There is a trail running northward along the river to a point 60 miles above Laokai, where it branches northeast to Mengze. A footpath extends on up the river all way to Tali. The terrain is extremely rugged. From the scanty information available, the valleys of the Black and Makong Rivers would be even less accessible.

5. Chinese preparations against an invasion of Yunnan from Indo-China include the demolitions mentioned above. For some time, two group armies have been stationed in southeastern Yunnan. These are:

1st Group Army: 6th Army Corps of 2 divisions; 60th Army Corps of 3 divisions.

9th Group Army: 52d Army Corps of 3 divisions; 54th Army Corps of 2 divisions.

Plus 2 independent divisions. These are regular troops, but the bulk are Yunnanese, who have not previously demonstrated superior fighting qualities. The commander of the troops in this area is General Kuan Ling-shen who took part in the successful Changsha defense of 1939.

The Chinese lack artillery, are very short of ammunition, both artillery and small arms, and to all practical purposes are devoid of an air force.

The Chinese have lightly organized a position 20 to 40 miles in depth, with the main line of resistance along a generally east-west line about 50 miles north of Laokai. Their line of observation is along the border. Two other positions south of Kunming are being organized. The southernmost is about 30 miles south of Kunming.

6. It is estimated that at the present rate of Japanese reinforcement of their troops in Indo-China, a period of from one to three months will be required before they can have a sufficient concentration for an offensive against Yunnan.

7. The rate of Japanese advance on Kunming once the border is crossed, will depend on the degree of Chinese resistance, especially in their defense of the extremely rugged terrain between the Indo-China plain and the Yunnan plateau.

8. A Japanese offensive into Yunnan from Indo-China would be an extremely difficult operation but if it were successful in closing the supply route from Burma it would be a serious blow to China's power and will to resist.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enc.:

Tab A.¹

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General Embick.

¹ Omitted.

NOVEMBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.:

Subject: G-2 Estimate, Far Eastern Situation. (For situation and communications maps see Tabs B, C, and D.)¹

In compliance with verbal request, Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., this date, the following is submitted as a G-2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation:

1. After four years of war in China, Japan is militarily over-extended on the mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psychologically aware of the fact that her economic structure is crumbling.

2. For obvious reasons both Germany and China would like to embroil the United States in a large scale war with Japan. While Japan is reluctant to go to war with us, her political and economic situations demand action. She has the following alternatives:

a. Attack Siberia to neutralize the threat on her flank and rear.

b. Occupy Thailand as a base from which to launch an offensive against Burma or Malaya.

c. Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and seize the Netherlands East Indies.

d. Launch a direct attack on Singapore.

e. Make a determined effort to bring the war in China to a close by cutting China's last supply route, the Burma Road.

f. Bide her time while disposing her forces from north to south in such a way that she will be able to seize the opportunity for successful aggression in whatever direction it presents itself.

3. A Japanese attack on Siberia is unlikely as long as Russian resistance in Europe continues, and as long as the Siberian forces are not materially reduced in strength. Action under *b* above might, and under *c* or *d* above would certainly bring Japan into armed conflict with ABD powers—a situation which Japan, at present, wishes to avoid.

4. A drive from Indo-China into Yunnan would probably not involve Japan with any Third Power. Although an extremely difficult operation for the Japanese, requiring elaborate preparation on their part, a successful drive into Yunnan and across the Burma Road, even if it did not cause China's early capitulation, would nevertheless, be a terrific blow at her chances of holding out. It would not however, have the effect of immediately releasing any considerable Japanese force for use elsewhere, since long-drawn out mopping up operations would probably be necessary.

5. Because of the ruggedness of the terrain in southern Yunnan, and the almost complete lack of communications, the Chinese, if determined, could put up a very strong resistance even with the means now at their disposal. Such a defense would further deplete Japan's meager resources and immobilize her remaining reserves. (For a description of the terrain see Tab A.)

6. Japan's most probable line of action, therefore, will be to continue her efforts to secure a relaxation of American economic pressure while completing her plans and arranging her forces for an advance in the direction which will be most fruitful of quick results.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

I. B. 148-1

NOVEMBER 13, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.

1. Reference is made to memorandum of this Division to the Chief of Staff, I. B. 148, November 1, 1941, subject: Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan. In this memorandum emphasis was placed on the principal avenue of advance, Laokai-Kunming. Since its submission the question has been raised of the possibility of a Japanese advance against Kunming and the Burma road through Kwangsi Province, in conjunction with a penetration up the normal avenue of the Yunnan railroad, Laokai-Mengtze-Kunming.

¹ Omitted.

2. The axis of the route through Kwangsi is the course of the Yu river, 150 miles northeast of the Yunnan railroad and roughly parallel to it. (See Map, Tab A.) This river rises in the mountains of eastern Yunnan and flows through southwest Kwangsi Province to its confluence with the West River near Nanning. It is navigible for river junks as far west as Poseh. To make use of this corridor the Japanese would have to move north from Hanoi to Caobang, thence across the Chinese border to the vicinity of Poseh, whence they could launch their attack up the Yunnan escarpment toward Kwangnan on the plateau, 150 miles southeast of Kunming.

This would be an even more difficult operation than a direct attack along the Yunnan railway line, since the supply problem would be enormous. From Caobang a fair road for light motor traffic runs 185 miles north to Poseh. Most bridges on this route have a capacity of only $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons. Also it is probable that since the Japanese occupation of Indo-China, the Chinese have destroyed the road near the border.

Poseh can also be reached by the Hanoi-Langson-Nanning road, and thence northwest via Wuming and the Yu valley. Somewhat better roads exist on this route but the distance from Langson to Poseh is about 260 miles, as compared with 185 from Caobang to Poseh. Here also, the Chinese have demolished the highways near the border, and also the railway line which was under construction before the Japanese occupation of Nanning in 1940.

Arrived at Poseh the Japanese would be confronted with practically the same difficult terrain conditions as at Laokai, on the frontier. Poseh has an elevation of 525 feet; Kwangnan, 4,515. The air distance between the two is approximately 100 miles, and there are no motor roads in existence. (The Chinese have been surveying a highway from Kaihua, east of Mengtze on the Yunnan railway, through Kwangnan to Poseh, but latest reports indicate no actual construction on this route.) The terrain is almost as rugged as that north of Laokai.

The only apparent reason for use of this route would be in the event that the Japanese plan of campaign called for a "pincers" movement on Kunming. However, it would not be a true envelopment as initially it would be directed against Chinese forces not allotted to the defense of Kunming. Absence of lateral communication inside China would be a serious handicap to such an operation, to say nothing of the long line of communications through a hostile territory.

3. a. For defense against a movement through Kwangsi Province, there are available in the Fourth War Zone (Kwangsi and western Kwangtung) the following troops:

16th Group Army: 31st Army Corps of 2 divisions; 46th Army Corps of 2 divisions.

35th Group Army: 64th Army Corps of 2 divisions.

These are regular troops, largely veterans from Kwangsi and adjacent areas, of excellent fighting ability. The Zone Commander is Chang Fa-kuei, a very capable officer of long experience.

b. The Chinese lack artillery, are very short of ammunition, both artillery and small arms, and to all practical purposes are devoid of an air force.

4. An attack on Kunming through Kwangsi Province is only conceivable in conjunction with an advance up the Yunnan railway. It is estimated that this would require at least an additional five Japanese divisions, or a minimum total task force of 10 divisions.

5. It is estimated that there are now available in Indo-China for an expedition against Kunming a maximum of 40,000 troops, probably less. At least 160,000 troops would have to be brought into Indo-China through Haiphong for a double envelopment, and at least 60,000 for a single direct attack. ONI estimates the capacity of this port at 2,000 fully equipped troops per day. On this basis, under the most favorable circumstances, at least one month would be required to concentrate a sufficient force for the direct attack up the Yunnan railway. Between two and three months would be required to make the concentration for a double attack up the railway and up the Yu river valley.

6. The rate of Japanese advance on Kunming once the border is crossed, would depend on the degree of Chinese resistance, especially in the defense of the extremely rugged terrain between the Indo-Chinese and Yu river plains and the Yunnan plateau.

7. A Japanese offensive into Yunnan from Indo-China would be an extremely difficult operation but if it were successful in closing the supply route from Burma it would be a serious blow to China's power and will to resist. In this connection it is interesting to note that the British War Office concludes that such an

offensive would be rendered "most difficult" by reason of the supply problem alone, while the French Military Attache at Tokyo ridicules any idea of an attack on Yunnan from Indo-China.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure:

Tab A.¹

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Air Corps

General Embick

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The following are extracts from cables received in the Office of Naval Intelligence together with G-2 comment thereon:

a. *From Shanghai November 21.* Intense activity at Woosung since the 15th. Unusual number of ships present including former merchant craft 10,000 tons and up. Wednesday 10 transports sailed, eight of which carried troops. Same day 32 additional ships, similar type, anchored in lower Whangpoo. Landing boats included in outgoing equipment. On decks of three outgoing ships was observed a number of creosoted heavy timber trestles in sections each approximately 60 feet long and 8 feet wide. Several merchant vessels recently taken over observed installing machine gun mounts. One thousand troops departed from Swatow last Saturday.

G-2 Comment: Movement of troops from Central China believed directed toward Hainan and Indo-China. No evidences of heavy concentration on Taiwan (Formosa).

b. *From Guam November 23.* Increased naval activity Truk, Saipan area. Indicated increases base forces in Mandates. Additions to fleet;—Palao, one division Marus; Truk, two divisions Marus; and two seaplane tenders, also shore command (possible landing force). Saipan, two divisions Marus; Jaluit, three divisions Marus and three unidentified shore commands, also two seaplane tenders. Air force activity increasing. Eleventh Air Group believed in Palao. Airon 24 concentrated in Marshalls. Fifth Fleet apparently at Chichijima, portions possibly at Marcus. It is estimated that 70 itinerant ships arrived or departed from Mandates since November 1 with emphasis on Truk and Jaluit areas.

G-2 Comment: Marus are small cargo or passenger vessels requisitioned by the Navy for use as trains, supply vessels and tenders. A Division of Marus consists of some two to four vessels.

The Eleventh Air Group is something a little larger than an American Squadron. The Fifth Fleet consists of odds and ends of vessels not useable by the Combined Fleet. Airon 24 consists of one old carrier (Kamoi) and one converted carrier.

2. From information available in the Division the Japanese strength in the mandated islands is believed to be as follows:

15,000 ground troops.

8 destroyers.

100 aircraft of all types.

9 submarines.

4 light cruisers.

3. The Navy Department have supplied the following comment on November 24th regarding Japanese activity in the Western Pacific:

"Apparent establishment by Japan of combined air and surface patrol over shipping routes U. S. to Australia. Daily aircraft patrols observed extending

¹Omitted.

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over Gilbert Islands from Jaluit. Surface craft believed covering area extending to Ellice Island. Fishing fleet reported cooperating with patrols. Fishing fleet divided in three sections: one in vicinity of Bathurst Island, one near Arnham, one near Thursday Islands. Fishing fleet expected to appear around Dutch New Guinea. These ships equipped with long range radio."

(signed) Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War
War Plans Division
GHQ

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a. m., this date:

1. The Japanese have been organizing a naval task force for the past month comprising:

a. *Second Fleet*: Under the command of Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. (The Second Fleet corresponds roughly to our Scouting Force, consisting mainly of strong Cruiser Divisions).

b. *Third Fleet* which formerly was the China Coast Command Force including its first and second base forces, constituted by miscellaneous small vessels.

c. *Combined Air Force* consisting of all large carrier forces.

d. Also destroyer squadron 3, air squadron 7, submarine squadron 5, and possibly 1 battleship division from First Fleet consisting of 3 battleships.

Summary of Above: 14 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 10 Carriers, 3 Light Cruisers. 2 Destroyer Squadrons (24 destroyers), 2 Submarine Squadrons (18 submarines), and possibly 3 battleships.

2. The combined air force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls. Present location, other units of this task force are not known.

3. The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant, 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the Marshall Islands.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
I. B. File
Far East Section
Record Section

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Recent developments in the Far East.

1. It has been reported on good authority, that between 18 and 24 Infantry Divisions and 8 Armored Brigades from the Russian Far Eastern Army have been identified on the Western front. If this is true, between 24 and 18 Divisions and 2 Armored Brigades remain in Eastern Siberia. Thus the possibility of a Kwantung Army offensive thrust against Siberia is increased, although such a move is not believed imminent at present.

2. Certain Japanese troops have been withdrawn from North and Central China within the last three weeks—24,000 of them sailed from Woosung (near Shanghai) between November 15 and 23. The transports carried 184 landing boats. Several other ships left during same period, number of troops and cargoes

unchecked. A special landing craft carrier left Shanghai the 18th of November and was sighted of Wenchow on the 20th sailing southwest.

3. A Naval Task Force which was reported by the 14th Naval District (Hawaii) as organized and concentrated at Taiwan and Hainan appears, according to a November 27 radio from the 16th Naval District (Manila) to be a loosely organized force on its way to an unknown concentration point. According to the latter dispatch it consists of:

3-4 battleships (possibly only)	5 mine layers
3 carriers	4 converted seaplane carriers
11 heavy cruisers	12 mine sweepers
5 light cruisers	12 patrol motor boats
47 destroyers	14 others
16 submarines	

It is apparently not yet ready for concerted action as its Commander is still in home waters and the force concentration has not yet taken place.

4. The Japanese land forces in the Mandated Islands have been gradually increased in the last 6 months from 5,000 to 15,000 men, and they now have about 100 combat planes of all types, plus the 4th Fleet, a mixed naval force of second class units.

5. Reports from Bangkok indicate that the Japanese Foreign Office officials there expect hostilities to break out in that region in the near future.

6. According to British reports, the Japanese have made and will continue to make aerial reconnaissance over British Pacific Islands, especially the Gilbert Group, Nauru and Ocean Islands; also over the Northern portion of British Malaya.

7. Reliable information has been received that the Japanese Foreign Office officials in North French Indo-China expect military movements in and through that region in the near future.

8. In Tongking, the total number of Japanese troops remains at about 25,000 (1½ Divisions), with about 90 planes. Since November 21st, additional Japanese troops have been moving into Southern French Indo-China: 10,000 from Tongking (which have been replaced there by other troops), and some 20,000 by sea. Conservative estimate of number of Japanese troops now in southern Indo-China is at least 70,000. This is approximately 3½ Divisions. The number of Japanese planes has also been increased by 82 (London, Military Attache report, November 25), bringing the total in the south to not less than 157. There may be more than this number since observation is limited. A large quantity of equipment has been landed in Indo-China in the last 60-70 days in amounts far in excess of current needs for the force believed there at present. Totals (minimum):

<i>At Saigon:</i>	300 side cars
90 Tanks (under 5 tons) (Bren gun carriers?)	20 road rollers
42 Tanks (7 to 9 tons)	5,000 collapsible rubber boats
About 30 other Armored vehicles	500 horses
(Type not specified)	3 locomotives
60 75-mm. guns.	500 light railway freight cars (4 wheel)
230 Guns—various calibers	1,500 cases gas masks
1,030 trucks	14 ambulances
200 motorcycles	52 armored cars

At Hanoi:

900 Trucks.

Large quantities of railway material (type not specified) oil and aviation gasoline (quantities not mentioned). Tanks and artillery (quantities, types, calibers, not mentioned).

9. According to a reliable report of November 17, there is a concentration of approximately 50,000 troops on the Island of Hainan. The air bases on the southern part of this island are capable of holding several hundred planes which can be flown from there to Tourane in Indo-China and from that point to Saigon, which is only about 400 miles from Tourane.

10. A reliable source reported on November 25 that an unconfirmed report to the Hanoi government indicated Japanese plans for an invasion of Thailand

about December 1, including seizure of the Isthmus of Kra. In connection with this last item, the Japanese are reliably reported to have been working on a naval and air base at Kompongson Bay on the Gulf of Siam, since September 27, 1941. Also Japanese reconnaissance planes have recently been seen over northern Malaya.

11. Up to the evening of November 26th, the Japanese Ambassador had been unable to make the Secretary of State yield to Japanese proposals and demands, and in consequence the Japanese hopes for an appeasing settlement by the United States are very slim.

12. There is good evidence that the Japanese are prepared to use chemical and probably bacteriological warfare whenever and wherever they deem it necessary or profitable to do so.

13. A press dispatch of November 21 quotes the Chinese military spokesman, Chungking, as accusing the Japanese of starting germ warfare. He said that on November 4th Japanese planes dropped food and clothing at Changteh, Hunan Province and that persons who made use of these were taken ill and died with symptoms similar to those of bubonic plague. (The Military Attache Chungking is investigating this report).

14. From the foregoing it appears evident that the Japanese have completed plans for further aggressive moves in Southeastern Asia. These plans will probably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that the Kurusu mission is a definite failure. A task force of about five divisions, supported by appropriate air and naval units has been assembled for the execution of these plans. This force is now enroute southward to an as yet undetermined rendezvous.

15. This Division is of the opinion that the initial move will be made against Thailand from the sea and overland through Southern Indo-China. It is further believed that the Japanese are uncertain of the reaction of the ABD powers to this move and therefore have organized in sufficient strength to cope with any opposition they might initially encounter from those powers in the South China Sea.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution :

Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Director of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.

I. B. 159

NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.

I. General.

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942.

2. *a.* During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indicate that a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and redistribution of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the

theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring.

b. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.

c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended militarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.

d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up to a large scale strategic offensive. We have only a means of strategical maneuver—our ability to make available more or less material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most advantageously employed.

e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the period in question.

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question:

(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.

(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

II. Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War.

1. *The British Isles.* This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially strengthened.

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the present, after a short delay for reorganization and transfer, Germany can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of the improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41.

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.

2. *The Atlantic.* The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replacements have

overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 are as follows:—

Losses (British, Allied and Neutral)

	Total		Monthly average	
	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 months).....	628	2, 755, 242	105	459, 207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4½ months).....	285	1, 000, 990	63	222, 442

During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately 2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations elsewhere.

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.

3. *Eastern Theater.* By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russian. Specifically she will:

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.

Continue the siege of Leningrad.

Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.

Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.

Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.

The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the Don. They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.

The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and technique in severe winter weather is considered better than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently required.

The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: The uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British operation elsewhere has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from Russia.

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia.

With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.

4. *Middle Eastern Theater.* In this theater, extending from Libya to the Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria, Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.

Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the Middle East Theater.

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization.

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern Iraq by March of 1942.

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least vulnerable.

We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.

5. *The Far Eastern Theater.* Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her:

- a. Attack Siberia.
- b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to the war with China.
- c. Occupy Thailand.
- d. Through Thailand, attack
 - (1) Burma and the Burma Road,
 - (2) Malaya.
- e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
- f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
 - (1) Attack Singapore
 - (a) directly by sea;
 - (b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and Malaya.
 - (2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.

g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.

h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.

i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.

(h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing forces.

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.

The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States are in consultative association for the defense of Maylasia. To date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan and will continue to contain important Japanese forces. The effective use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period ending March 31, 1942.

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941—said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

III. *Morale.*

The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and the decline in Axis morale.

The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the failure of the German air attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all, by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in the war.

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprecedented success in war—and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, only the desire to see it all end.

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three military situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:

Military Situation

1. Superiority of strength. Possession of initiative. Unbroken success.
2. Approximate equality in strength. Initiative doubtful. Ultimate success still in balance.
3. Inferiority in strength. Strategic initiative lost. Ultimate success doubtful.

Moral Reaction

1. The elan of victory—fighting with confidence of success.
2. The grim struggle—fighting to gain success.
3. Their "back to the wall"—fighting to prevent defeat.

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower than Number 2.

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the outcome, probably within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under discussion.

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Distribution:

The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff.
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
G. H. Q.
Chief of the Air Corps
Director of Naval Intelligence
Coordinator of Information
General Embick
Record Section
I. B. File

dya

I. B. 159-A

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941—March 31, 1942.

I. General.

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942. It supplements and amplifies the Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941—March 31, 1942, issued by this Division on November 29, 1941, and is believed to be more suitable for planning purposes than the previous estimate.

2. *a.* During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her

Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indicate that a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and redistribution of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring.

b. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.

c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended militarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.

d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up to a large scale strategical offensive. We have only a means of strategical maneuver—our ability to make available more or less material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most advantageously employed.

e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the period in question.

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question:

(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.

(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

11. *Morale.*

The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and the decline in Axis morale.

The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the failure of the German air attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all, by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in the war.

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprecedented success in war—and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, only the desire to see it all end.

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three military situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:

Military Situation

1. Superiority of strength. Possession of initiative. Unbroken success.
2. Approximate equality in strength. Initiative doubtful. Ultimate success still in balance.
3. Inferiority in strength. Strategic initiative lost. Ultimate success doubtful.

Moral Reaction

1. The elan of victory—fighting with confidence of success.
2. The grim struggle—fighting to gain success.
3. Their "back to the wall"—fighting to prevent defeat.

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower than Number 2.

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the outcome, probably within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under discussion.

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.

III. Brief Estimate on the Actual and Potential Theaters of War.

1. *The British Isles.* This theater is the citadel of the anti-Axis Powers. Its security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially strengthened.

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the present, after a short delay for reorganization and transfer, Germany can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41.

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.

2. *The Atlantic.* The battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replacements have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 are as follows:

Losses (British, Allied and Neutral)

	Total		Monthly average	
	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 Months).....	628	2, 755, 242	105	459, 207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4½ Months).....	285	1, 000, 990	63	222, 442

During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately 2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations elsewhere.

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.

3. *Eastern Theater.* By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great losses in men and materiel, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia. Specifically she will:

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.

Continue the siege of Leningrad.

Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.

Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.

Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.

The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal is oil. Axis forces may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.

The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and technique in severe weather is considered better than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently required.

The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: the uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British operation elsewhere has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from Russia.

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia.

With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.

4. *Middle Eastern Theater.* In this theater, extending from Libya to the Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria, Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.

Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the Middle East Theater.

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization.

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern Iraq by March of 1942.

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least vulnerable.

We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.

5. *The Conquered Nations.* The conquered countries will continue to rally somewhat more strongly against their conqueror. While effective revolts are to be discounted, maintenance of order will divert some 40 German and some 25 Italian divisions. The economic contributions of these countries to the Axis war effort will fall below German hopes and will tend to decline. Germany's failures in administration, in organization of production and above all in reconciliation to her hegemony of Europe will become an increasing drain on her strength.

6. *The Far Eastern Theater.* Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her:

- a. Attack Siberia.
- b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to the war with China.
- c. Occupy Thailand.
- d. Through Thailand, attack
 - (1) Burma and the Burma Road,
 - (2) Malaya.
- e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
- f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
 - (1) Attack Singapore
 - (a) directly, by sea;
 - (b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and Malaya.
 - (2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.
- g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.
- h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.
- i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
- (h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing forces.

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.

The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetra-

tion to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan and will continue to contain important Japanese forces. The effective use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period ending March 31, 1942.

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941—said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

7. Northwest and West Africa. a. Northwest Africa. Although valuable as a base for aerial operations, northwest Africa cannot provide an anti-Axis offensive theater of operations. Any anti-Axis ground force that had occupied this area would be faced with the crossing of the Mediterranean, if it should decide to conduct operations on the European mainland. Its prime value, therefore, to anti-Axis forces lies primarily in denying its occupation to Axis forces. Paragraph 9, Tab A, outlines the potential opposition to Axis occupation and shows clearly that German forces would meet with little resistance. Time and space factors, as well as potential enemy resistance, clearly indicate that Germany can occupy this area ahead of an anti-Axis force.

On the other hand, enemy potentialities are not as favorable with regard to the occupation of the Azores. With control of the Atlantic still in the hands of anti-Axis forces, the Axis could hardly be expected to span one thousand miles of ocean to reach the Azores. Should the Azores be prevented from falling into the hands of Axis forces, the advantages gained by the Axis occupation of Northwest Africa would be partially nullified.

b. West Africa. West Africa is of value to the Axis in providing submarine and airplane bases from which to operate against Allied shipping and influence

Latin America. Axis occupation would also deny the direct bomber ferry service from the United States to the Middle East Theater. The theater is one which would be extremely severe, due to climatic and disease factors, to all but native troops. With France committed to collaboration with Germany, time and space factors and potential resistance would make undisputed occupation by the Axis difficult but possible. Cape Verde, on the other hand, could be occupied by anti-Axis forces and the occupation would limit the encroachment of Axis forces towards South America and reduce the scope of operation of Axis submarines and planes.

c. The probability of German occupation of Northwest and West Africa during the period December 1, 1941–March 31, 1942, is contingent on the possible outcome of the present campaign in Libya as well as on the plans of the German General Staff. The preceding sub-paragraphs show that Germany can occupy Northwest Africa at will and West Africa with some delay. On the other hand, success by the Axis in those areas, would probably invite anti-Axis occupation of the Azores and Cape Verde. It seems more likely that this German action in Africa will be postponed, but if it is launched it should surprise no one.

8. *Western Hemisphere.* During the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942, it is not expected there will be any significant change in the Western Hemisphere theater.

The twenty Latin American republics all have individual problems. Most of their political difficulties are due to economic strain and jockeying for power between the "ins" and the "outs", the "outs" always being supported by the anti-American forces. They are all extremely conscious of the world situation and the two powerful antagonists, and are not anxious to make any enmities with the potential winner. Military power impresses them mightily, as few other matters do.

In this area, no direct war effort can be seen during this period, and Germany's line of action and organization will be to perfect and extend her present influence in each of the countries by propaganda, bribery and coercion. Subversive activities will be kept under cover and the Axis influence will not emerge in any large-scale version in this area until a more propitious circumstance arises which will be determined by the progress of events in Europe and Asia.

In other words, the Axis threat in the Western Hemisphere theater is potential during this period, with possibilities of political upheavals, sabotage and subversive actions only if it is to cause a diversion of American forces and attention.

SHERMAN MILES,

*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.*

Enclosure :

Tab A

Distribution :

Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
G. H. Q.
Air Corps
Director of Naval Intelligence
Air Section
British Empire Section
Central European Section

Eastern European Section
Far Eastern Section
Latin American Section
Southern European Section
Western European Section
Record Section
I. B. File

TAB A—SUPPORTING ESTIMATES

1. The British Empire—Omitted.
2. U. S. S. R.—Omitted.
3. The Philippines—Omitted.
4. Germany—Omitted.
5. Italy—Omitted.
6. Japan
7. Thailand
8. Turkey—Omitted.
9. Iberian Peninsula. Northwest Africa—Omitted.

6. Japan.

a. Combat. Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air force of about 65,000. She now has increased her trained and partially trained reserve to approximately 4,750,000. The estimated number of active divisions is 62; of independent brigades, 22; of cavalry brigades, 5; and of tank regiments, 13; plus 15 depot divisions in Japan proper and Korea, and garrison troops and railway guard units in Manchuria.

The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto (Sakhalin) and Manchuria in the north to the French Indo-China-Thailand border in the south. According to the latest reports available, the distribution outside Japan proper is approximately as follows:

	Divs.	Ind. Brigs.	Cav. Brigs.	Tank Regts.
Manchuria and Adjacent regions.....	30	6	4	7
North China.....	8	6	1	1
Central China.....	10	6	-----	1
Canton and South China Coast.....	2	1	-----	1
Formosa.....	2	-----	-----	-----
Hainan.....	1	1	-----	-----
French Indo-China.....	3	1	-----	1

This wide deployment creates immense problems of supply and communications, and requires the use of a large number of transports and supply ships. Reliable information indicates that as of October 1, the Japanese forces on the continent south of the great wall had reserve supplies and munitions for not more than six weeks, this in spite of extensive use of vessels of the Japanese merchant fleet withdrawn from the Pacific trade. Since October 1, of course, this situation has probably been alleviated, but the problem of supply still exists. Any hostile naval or air action against the lines of communication to the continent would put the Japanese forces in Central China and all areas to the south in a very critical position.

The Japanese army is well trained and has proved an efficient fighting force against the Chinese. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, the bulk experienced in combat, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view; only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to modern occidental armies. Japan's army is physically hardy, and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty, and a fanatical patriotism which makes it a formidable foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

Except for the Russian forces in Siberia, the Japanese army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the powerful European armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions which can be equipped, even though Japan's partially trained man power is ample for her anticipated needs. Individual equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition, but there is a shortage of organizational and other equipment, such as tanks, antiaircraft weapons, and modern artillery.

The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of both is about 100,000 officers and men, and the two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 5353 combat planes. The Army has 136 squadrons and 2362 planes; the Navy 159 squadrons and 2991 planes. Plane design has lagged, and many old type planes are included in the totals, above, but lack of formidable opposition has allowed the Japanese to maintain undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Acquisition of German planes and more extensive employment of German technical advisers has probably contributed to a further increase in efficiency. Present plane production is currently estimated at 200 per month, for all combat types, both army and navy.

Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers, exclusive of about 35,000 in the naval air corps. Naval strength comprises over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: the Combined Fleet, and the Japanese Naval Forces in

China. The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power, or to those of any combination of powers, attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific.

Japan, because of her geographic location including her bases on Formosa and Hainan, flanks all sea approaches to the southeastern coast of Asia north of Saigon; lies athwart all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategic position for defense against any distant naval power. The Formosa base is the key to this position; neutralization of Formosa would imperil all her troops and installations south of Japan proper. However, Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategic defensive could from time to time assume the tactical offensive. Japan's greatest weakness lies in the vital necessity of keeping open the water lines of communication to her forces in central and south China and Indo-China over routes that are vulnerable to underwater and air attack from hostile bases in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and China.

b. Political. A year ago, under the premiership of Prince Konoye, Japan set up its own version of totalitarianism, called the "new national structure." Political parties were disbanded, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, designed to unite all the people in assistance to the Throne, was hastily whipped into shape. As a political organization, however, the Association does not control the country as do the Nazis in Germany or the Fascists in Italy, since such control would be contrary to the Japanese theory of the Emperor as the supreme head of the State, to whom all Japanese yield obedience and service. The stated aims of the Association were too vague to meet with general approval, and it is clear that the "new structure" movement has not been a success since it has not been able to "unify all phases of Japanese life."

While this attempt to create a totalitarian structure has been going on, the domination exercised by the army clique for nearly a decade has continued. The whole political machinery is geared to preparation for expansion into the maritime provinces of Siberia, for further expansion in southeast Asia, and the southwestern Pacific, and to the solution of the China "Incident".

The Tripartite Pact which Japan signed with Germany and Italy in September, 1940, by implication requires Japan to attack the United States, or any other power, except Russia, not involved in the European war at that time, should it attack either of the Axis partners. The strong Russian resistance to Nazi attack has, however, been a damper to Japanese enthusiasm for her Axis obligations. Although Foreign Minister Togo, who succeeded Toyoda, has announced that there is no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere to the Axis alliance, there is evidence that in order to secure a better position for herself, she might disregard her obligations, and even withdraw from the Axis. Japan has boundless ambitions in East Asia, but in view of the increasing American and British strength in the Far East, and the continued stalemate in China, she finds herself in a more and more unfavorable strategic position to realize these ambitions. Japanese government leaders are aware of the perils of further military adventures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacific. They wish by every means possible to inveigle the United States into an agreement "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the two countries." This simply means recognition of Japan's territorial and economic gains in Eastern Asia. The result of these conflicting desires is a state of almost desperate indecision. The fact that Japanese newspapers have come out with their most bombastic bluster during the beginning of Mr. Kurusu's conference seeking a peaceful settlement with this country is the best indication of the lack of coordination, the indecision, and the confused general political situation in Japan. There can be no doubt that the army hot-heads, the Black Dragon Society, and other intransigents will oppose most strenuously any major concessions by their present government leaders. Thus the chief obstacle to successful negotiations by Mr. Kurusu or any other envoy, has been the fact that although Premier Togo is an army man, he cannot be said to control the army, the navy, or the ultra-nationalistic secret societies. Until such control is assured, no agreements through negotiations can be successfully carried out. The Kurusu conference can now be said definitely to have ended in failure because of the extreme position taken by the Japanese Government in regard to concessions which they felt could be made in the Far Eastern Area.

Without their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Japanese are continuing in the path to what they believe is their "divinely appointed destiny" without being too sure as to where that destiny will take them. As a matter of fact, there is evidence that the people of Japan are becoming more and more alarmed and apprehensive; they fear that the present course is taking them into a major war with not just one power, but with a combination of powers. In her present situation, if Japan goes to war, her people will enter it desperately rather than confidently.

c. Economic. Because of the ever increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase sharply the deficiencies in these categories.

Germany's attack on Russia has cut off the supply of military and industrial equipment and machinery from Germany to Japan. The Japanese are finding that economically, as well as politically, the Tripartite Pact has serious disadvantages to them. The pro-Axis leaders are having more and more difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is anything but prosperous. Labor shortages, lack of adequate and sufficient transportation facilities, guerrilla warfare and, most of all, lack of cooperation on the part of the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or the threat of force, have prevented Japan from realizing the economic benefits which she has so often and so loudly proclaimed would result from her scheme.

The firm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies in enforcing the embargo has put Japan "on the spot" economically. Even little Thailand has been encouraged to resist Japanese pressure for economic, as well as political, concessions. The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance from the regions under her control in East Asia, and to continue her efforts to persuade the ABD powers through threats and promises to relax the embargo. If she goes to war to achieve her economic objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the same time she feels that achievement of these objectives are vital to her existence.

Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort, even continued effort against China. The stoppage of trade and freezing of credits has drastically reduced Japan's supply of raw materials, and has caused her to begin using her reserves. Many of her industries are suffering from shortages, rationing has been extended and intensified; in short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. The situation calls for strenuous measures; yet, if she goes to war, she may use up her reserves, especially of oil and steel, before she can force a decision favorable to herself. Thus her economic situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders. This is a problem which she must solve within the next few months.

7. Thailand.

a. The contributions of Thailand toward the defeat of the Nazi or Axis forces has been for the most part negligible. However, beginning in the late summer of 1941 there have been evidences of her growing will to resist any encroachments on her sovereignty. This is supported by the facts that Thailand has been strengthened both in military force and diplomacy to a position where the Thais could make a very real contribution to the common cause.

b. Thailand, or Siam, a weak buffer state between colonies of Great Powers, has traditionally played one off against the other while leaning toward the dominant one of the moment. The fall of France, accompanied with her replacement in Indo-China by aggressive Japanese troops on Thai borders, compelled the Thai government to reorient her policies. The obvious weakness of the Democracies throughout 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941 made Thailand's foreign relations appear pro-Japanese. And there is no doubt that several Thai Cabinet Ministers and other influential leaders including Princes of Royal blood are pro-Japanese. However, the Prime Minister and Field Marshal, Luang Pibul Songgram, for all practical purposes the supreme ruler of Thailand, is positively pro-Thai to the exclusion of all foreign ties or bias. The key to the situation may be that since August 1941 Songgram has devoted almost all his efforts and his considerable abilities to the reorganization and strengthening of Thai armed forces. The Thai army is unquestionably loyal, and with their

morale high from recent victories over the French forces, they can be counted on to follow the person and leadership of their Commander-in-Chief.

c. The formation of the ABCD coalition and the strong position recently taken by the United States have effectively altered the political and diplomatic outlook. Thailand is now distrustful of Japanese designs and fearful of invasion. A guarantee of Thailand's territory and independence after the war, and immediate, substantial, material aid and supplies, would greatly strengthen Thailand's will and power to resist the Japanese.

d. With reference to Thailand, a great contribution that could be made to the defeat of Nazi forces would be to prevent this country and natural base of operations against the Burma Road, Malaya, and the East Indies from falling into Axis hands. The Thai army and people will fight bravely to defend their independence, but with little or no outside aid, probably could not withstand a determined attack in force more than two weeks. Thai forces are deployed along the long Mekong River frontier, but first line defense units of less than 40,000 reliable combat troops—especially with insignificant mechanized units and woeful weakness in antitank and antiair forces—could not block for long the logical push from northwest Cambodia west along the railroad to Bangkok and the heart of Thailand.

e. Thailand's resistance may be disastrously affected under heavy enemy bombing, unless fighting planes and antiaircraft units are made available to Bangkok in time. If supporting outside forces could assume the protection of the entire Malay Peninsula, up to and in contact with Bangkok, and give some naval aid in the Gulf of Siam, Thailand could concentrate her entire force against the major threat from the southeast to her distinct advantage. With relatively small quantities of military supplies and equipment, but particularly air force, antiair, and antimechanized elements, medium artillery ammunition, and technical or military advisers arriving in time, Thailand might hold out indefinitely.

THAILAND'S ARMED FORCES

40,000 Regular Army—well trained and equipped, organized into 5 Corps (8,000 each) of 15 Inf. Divisions (2,500 each).

8,000 men mobilized in newly organized 6th Corps.

2,500 in Marine Division.

20,000 police force and border guards under military organization.

200,000 partially trained reserves not mobilized and lacking in equipment. Only 2,000 trained reserve officers.

Mechanized force of 95 tanks and 150 motorcycle troops.

Anti Air defense—about 12 light guns, 8 75-A.A. and 8 searchlights.

Country wide air defense warning system.

Air Force

200 airplanes of all types organized into 5 Army wings and 1 Naval wing.

600 trained pilots but no reserve planes.

Thai Naval Force consists of 4 heavy gunboats, 16 medium and small torpedo boats, 12 motorboats and 5 small submarines. Sufficient trained personnel.

There is an arsenal in Bangkok with means for producing considerable small arms and light artillery ammunition.

DECEMBER 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Estimate of Japanese Strength in Indo-China.

1. It is estimated that there are 107,000–115,000 Japanese troops ashore in Indo-China, 25,000 in the north and 82,000–90,000 in the south.

2. Analysis of the foregoing:

a. Tong King:

Initial garrison-----	6,000
Landed prior to Oct. 18-----	5,000
Landed since Oct. 18-----	14,000

Present Total----- *25,000

*Exclusive of about 13,000 troops landed at Haiphong and moved south by rail.

1384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

b. South Indo-China:

(1) Known to have landed.

Garrison Nov. 1-----	32, 000
Nov. 3-18-----	
By sea-----	2, 000
By rail-----	3, 000
Nov. 18-29-----	
By sea-----	30, 000
By rail-----	10, 000
	<hr/>
	77, 000
Since Nov. 29 (est.)-----	5, 000
	<hr/>
	82, 000

(2) Reported by Manila, December 21—21 transports in Camrah Bay—estimated 18,000.

(3) According to various reports, there is an undetermined number of transports enroute to Indo-China.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War.

Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD.

mid

DECEMBER 6, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Estimate of Japanese Air and Ground Forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa.

1. Indo-China.

Japanese troops in the theater-----	125, 000
In the North-----	25, 000
In the South-----	82, 000
On ships in harbors-----	18, 000

Total-----125,000

(Other troops, number unknown, are in transit toward Indo-China, south of Shanghai)

Planes (bulk in the south)-----450

2. Hainan.

Japanese troops-----	50, 000
Planes (approx.)-----	200

3. Taiwan (Formosa).

Japanese troops-----	40, 000
Planes (approx.)-----	400

4. Basis of the foregoing: Reports by M. I. D., O. N. I., State Department and British Intelligence.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War.

Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD.

EXHIBIT NO. 33A

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Date 1007 2 11 1941 P.S. 43

I. B. 135

October 2, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Japanese-American Relations.

1. The crisis in Tokyo brought about by the anniversary of the Tripartite Agreement has been weathered by the Konoze Cabinet through a somewhat perfunctory celebration involving speeches by the German and Italian Ambassadors, Prince Konoze, and others, at luncheons given in honor of the Axis on September 27, 1941.

2. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect that at 4:30 p.m. on September 27th after completing the ceremonies celebrating the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the American Ambassador to call on him, and urged him to strongly recommend to his home government an immediate meeting between Prince Konoze and President Roosevelt.

3. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was advised as to the gist of Admiral Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew. Admiral Kuroda also was urged by his Foreign Minister to do everything in his power to prevail upon the President to meet and confer immediately with Prince Konoze.

4. The fervor with which the Japanese, over a period of many months, have been agitating for this "meeting of leaders" has been matched only by their reluctance to make commitments on two points, i.e. withdrawal from China, and preparation for an attack on Siberia.

5. This Division is of the belief that the present Cabinet in Tokyo does not yet feel strong enough to enforce any order for withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, even though under pressure from the United States, it might be inclined to do so. And, as a matter of fact, at this stage in the execution of our national strategic plan, a cessation of hostilities in China followed by

SECRET

1 248

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

1. The number of the page is 100. The number of the page is 100.

SECRET

of the cabinet with respect to the internal situation of Japan. (1) Stranghan Prince Konoys, (2) his people, (3) extend the tenure of the conference at least through the decisions of the conference, (4) remove the belief of all Japanese leaders that we would not act with them unless willing to make concessions. In other words, the conference will mean concessions on our part. If the United States can be persuaded to loosen the economic restrictions now in force against Japan, Prince Konoys can then go back to the Japanese people with a fait accompli such as we have not been able to produce in the last decade. Economic cooperation, it must be observed, is the one essential which the Japanese military leaders recognize as necessary to be obtained before another major war can be fought. Once the conference is convened the Japanese will be in a strong position to demand some economic concessions, pleading the certainty of the collapse of the Konoys government if he goes home empty-handed.

9. From the point of view of the United States, a conference of leaders at this time, might serve to give this country additional time in which to prepare more adequately for any eventuality. Definite understanding, however, should be established, prior to such a conference, with Great Britain, Russia, China, Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Through cooperative and unified action with the powers named, we have obtained the economic advantages we now hold. It is the opinion of this Division that these advantages should, under no circumstances, be sacrificed unless concessions can be gained from Japan which will benefit all the non-Axis countries of the Pacific area; otherwise the very objective this country has sought so long to attain, that of unified anti-Axis strength in the Pacific, will be lost completely.

10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders nor economic concessions at this time would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically and militarily, for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition precedent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity, not to attack Russia in Siberia.

11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese Government at the present time our course lies

SECRET

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

Little hope that I have reached
similar conclusions and hold them
strongly. I believe however that during
the next ~~ten~~ ^{while we are examining the Philippines} months, great care must be
exercised to avoid an explosion by the
Japanese Army. Put concretely, this means, that
while I approve of stringing out negotiations during
that period, they should not be allowed to ripen into
a personal conference between the President and P. M. S. Great
pain that such a conference, ^{which} ^{has} ^{been} ^{held} ^{would} ^{produce}
a result which would ^{be} ^{likely} ^{to} ^{bring} ^{Japan} ^{to} ^{our} ^{relatively}
unfavorable relations with China.

EXHIBIT NO. 34

[Copy]

OCTOBER 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet.

1. The Navy dispatched the attached message on October 16. Our G-2 does not concur in the situation pictured by the Navy. War Plans Division agrees with G-2.

2. Navy dispositions may require adjustment and a special alert. This is not true for the Army.

3. *Recommendation.*

That the Secretary of War direct that secret radiograms, as follows, be sent to the Command General, United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; C. G. Western Defense Command.

Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent end

/s/ L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,

Brigadier General,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Concurrence.

A. C. of S., G-2 (Bratton) concurs.

Incl.

Naval message, 10-16-41.

EXHIBIT NO. 35

JANUARY 31, 1942.

[1] Memorandum for the Record:
 Subject: Warnings sent to Hawaii prior to Dec. 7, 1941.

Before leaving the Military Intelligence Division I am preparing this memorandum for record should it ever be needed. It covers the information now on hand concerning M. I. D.'s part in the warnings sent to Hawaii before December 7.

1. *Nov. 27, 1941.* Secret telegram from W. P. D. to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and the Caribbean Defense Command. This telegram was numbered 472 and was sent out at 6:11 p. m. on the 27th. It stated that Japanese future action was unpredictable and that hostile action was possible at any moment. It directed the Commanding Generals to undertake, prior to hostile Japanese action, such reconnaissance and other measures as they deemed necessary, and to report measures taken. The contents of this dispatch was known to me at the time, though I do not remember to have seen an exact copy.

2. *Nov. 27, 1941.* I sent a short telegram to the G-2's Hawaii and Panama and to all the Corps Areas. The telegram to Hawaii was numbered 473 and sent at 6:59 p. m. This message stated that hostilities may ensue as a result of a practical stalemate in Japanese negotiations and that subversive activities may be expected. It was sent because of the obvious seriousness of the situation and the great danger of sabotage everywhere, a point which was not specifically covered in W. P. D.'s telegram referred to in the paragraph above, and with which this Division is specifically charged under the President's directive of June 1939. This telegram was sent after consultation with W. P. D., and my recollection is that they recommended the inclusion of the direction that the G-2's would inform the Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staffs only.

3. *Nov. 27, 1941.* The Commanding General, Hawaii, replied in a short telegram to the W. P. D. telegram referred to in Par. 1 above. This telegram was numbered 959 and received in Washington at 5:57 a. m., Nov. 28. It specifically refers to the number of the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, and therefore is an answer [2] to that telegram. It states, however, that his Department was alerted "to prevent sabotage." It further stated that he had liaison with Navy. Being an answer to the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, this reply from General Short was sent to and seen by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and W. P. D. It was not sent to or seen by this Division. I do not remember to have been informed of this message in any way.

4. *Nov. 28, 1941.* At some time during this day, I think in the morning, General Arnold told me that he was extremely worried about sabotage of planes. He stated that a number of bombers had been received from different points in one of the western depots, all having a certain defect which indicated sabotage. He told me that he proposed to send out drastic orders to all air forces at home and abroad to take all precautions against sabotage. I told him that a general warning on sabotage had been sent the previous day to the G-2's. He was not satisfied with this, and insisted that specific directions be sent by his staff to all Air Corps commands. This directive was written by Major C. R. Blake, chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch, Office of Chief of Air Corps at the direction of General Martin Scanlon, A-2. It directed inter alia the air commands to "initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage." I strongly objected to this message going out to air forces only. I was in complete accord with the Air Corps in believing that sabotage was a real danger and that the necessary precautions should be taken, but I did not believe that the Air Forces alone should be given additional warnings, or that so broad and general a directive should be given to so many different commands. I feared all kinds of drastic measures against civilians which would have disastrous repercussions. I knew that the policy of the Chief of Staff was not to alarm the civilian population, as indicated in the W. P. D. warning message of November 27. My objection to the proposed Air Corps directive finally resulted, late in the afternoon on the 28th, in a staff conference in General Bryden's office attended by General Gerow, General Scanlon and, I believe, General Gullion. The result of this conference was the approval of a message drafted by me but containing also the sentence quoted above from the Air Corps draft, modified,

however, by a prohibition against illegal measures and a reference to the delimitation of responsibility in subversive activities as between the Army, Navy and the F. B. I. This message as approved in the staff conference was sent by The Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals of all Corps Areas and overseas departments. The message to Hawaii was numbered 482 and sent at 8:37 p. m. It was also agreed at the above mentioned staff conference, at the insistence of the Air Corps, that identical messages would be sent by the Air Staff to all air commands, and this was done. The message that went to Hawaii was numbered 484 and sent at 9:23 p. m.

[3] 5. November 29, 1941. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, replied by reference to the Adjutant General's cable #482 of November 28 (the message referred to in the paragraph immediately above as having been sent by The Adjutant General as a result of the staff conference in General Bryden's office). This message stated in detail the precautions which General Short had put into effect in Hawaii against subversive activity. It was sent by The Adjutant General on December 1, 1941 to the Secretary of the General Staff, and by the latter disseminated to the Staff, including of course M. I. D. It was considered by this Division as a satisfactory answer to the message which it purported to answer, i. e. the message of November 28 which resulted from the Bryden staff conference on subversive activity.

6. On the morning of December 7, 1941, having received certain information that morning that the Japanese negotiations would definitely be broken off at 2 p. m. that afternoon, and being convinced that this might well be timed with a planned Japanese attack somewhere, I went to the Chief of Staff's office and urged him to send a warning message to the overseas departments. While I was there General Gerow, Col. Bratton of this Division, and Col. Bundy of W. P. D., came in. They fully concurred in the necessity for such a message. It was written by the Chief of Staff, sent by the hand of Col. Bratton to the Message Center, and the Message Center stated it would be in the hands of the recipients within another half hour. Col. Bratton so reported to the Chief of Staff. It was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack began.

7. Summary. There are obviously three points of outstanding interest in regard to these messages:

a. General Short's message, number 959, of November 27, specifically stated that it was an answer to the W. P. D. message number 472 of the same date. It was a wholly inadequate answer to that message. It was not, however, referred in any way to this Division, nor was its contents made known to this Division. Even had it been made known to this Division, the responsibility of determining whether or not it was an adequate answer to the W. P. D. message number 472 clearly lay with the latter Division.

b. The repetition of sabotage warnings contained in the M. I. D. message number 473 of November 27 and in T. A. G. message number 482 of November 28. The latter message resulted in the insistence of the Air Corps that further sabotage warning be sent, and I fully concurred in the sending of such warning provided they were sent to the responsible Commanding Generals as well as to the air commands, and that they continued precautions against unlimited action on the part of many relatively junior air commanders.

[4] c. The failure of the Signal Corps to get the message of December 7 through promptly or to notify the Chief of Staff or any Division of the Staff that it would not go through promptly.

[s] Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Enclosure:

Memo from Lt. Col. C. J. Barrett, January 29, 1942 on the background on the Air Corps message of Nov. 28, 1941.

JANUARY 29, 1942.

Memorandum for General Miles:

Subject: Interview with Major Blake.

The following information was obtained from Major Charles R. Blake, Chief, of the Counter Intelligence Branch, Office of the Chief of the Air Corps:

On the morning of November 28, Major Blake was called to General Scanlon's office and directed to prepare a message addressed to the commanders of all Air

1392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Force activities, both in the United States and foreign possessions, directing them to take the necessary steps to prevent sabotage, espionage and the execution of any other threat to internal security. Major Blake wrote in longhand in that office a draft copy of which is attached, marked "Enclosure 1". Later he wrote a clearer copy of the same draft, still in longhand, copy of which is attached marked "Enclosure 2". The message was then typed with several carbon copies and delivered by Major Blake to General Scanlon, standing in the door to General Arnold's office. Another officer, believed to be Colonel Vanaman, was present, but since Major Blake does not know Colonel Vanaman, identity is not certain. General Scanlon took the message to General Arnold's office* and left a short time later with the statement that the message was to be coordinated with G-2.

No reason for the preparation of this message was given to Major Blake at the time. He states, however, that he was later informed unofficially that it resulted from a conference attended by the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Army Air Forces and the Chief of Naval Operations.

/S/ C. J. Barrett
C. J. BARRETT,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

Enclosures:

Cpy. radio 11-28-41
Cpy. radio 11-28-41

Encl #1

11/28/41 12:02 P. M.
CRB

Secret

A. C. of AS-A2
Auth: ~~CH of A. G.~~
Date: 11-28-41
Initials: CRB
Copy No. 2 of 6

The world situation requires immediate atten. to the problem of sabotage, subversion and espionage prevention in all echelons of the AAF.

You are directed to initiate forthwith all addit. measures nec to provide for the comple prot of your establish and equip against sab, prot of your pers against subv prop and prot of all activities against esp.

It is further directed that reports of all steps init by you to comply with these instr be sub to CAAF on or before 12/2/41.

Encl. #2

Secret

Auth: ~~CH of A. G.~~
AC of AS-A-2
Date: 11-28-41
Initials: /S/ CRB
Copy No. 2 of 6

To: Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.
Chief of the Air Corps.


Commanding Generals of all Foreign Air Force Activities.

1. The world situation requires immediate attention to the problem of sabotage, subversion, and espionage prevention in all echelons of the Army Air Forces.

2. You are directed to initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the complete protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage.

3. It is further directed that reports of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions be submitted to the CAAF on or before Dec. 2, 1941.

EXHIBIT NO. 36






EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT

OF

DESPATCHES

Basic exhibits of despatches (1941)

Date	To	Action	Page
1 Apr.....	OPNAV.....	COM ALL NAV DIST.....	1
4 Apr.....	OPNAV.....	CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1-16.....	2
18 Apr.....	OPNAV.....	ALUSNA, PEIPING, ASTALUSNA CHUNGKING & SHANGHAI.....	3
3 Jul.....	CNO.....	CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT COM 15 (AIRMAIL) SPENAVO LONDON.....	4
3 Jul.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF, CINCPAC.....	5
7 Jul.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF.....	6
7 Jul.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF.....	7
15 Jul.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF.....	8
17 Jul.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF.....	9
19 Jul.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF.....	10
19 Jul.....	COM 16.....	OPNAV.....	11
20 Jul.....	COM 16.....	OPNAV PRIORITY ROUTINE—CINC- PAC, CINCAF, COM 14.....	12
25 Jul.....	CNO.....	LIST OF ADDRESSEES CINCPAC, CIN- CAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO.....	13
25 Jul.....	CNO.....	LIST OF ADDRESSEES.....	13
25 Jul.....	CNO.....	CINCPAC, CINCAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO LONDON.....	14
14 Aug.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF, CINPAC, CINCLANT.....	15
28 Aug.....	CNO.....	CINCPAC, COMPAN NAVCOAST FRONTIER.....	16
9 Oct.....	CNO.....	U. S. HOLDERS WPL52.....	17
16 Oct.....	CNO.....	CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCAF.....	18
16 Oct.....	OPNAV.....	ALL MERCHANT SHIPS.....	19
17 Oct.....	OPNAV.....	NAVSTA TUTULA SAMOA CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 11-16.....	20
17 Oct.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF, COM 12.....	21
17 Oct.....	CNO.....	CINCPAC.....	22
23 Oct.....	OPNAV.....	COM 12, 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF.....	23
4 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 11-16.....	24
18 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14.....	25
20 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF, COMPACSO NAV COASTAL- FRON.....	26
21 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	CINCPAC, CINCAF.....	27
22 Nov.....	CINCPAC.....	OPNAV.....	28
22 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	CINCPAC.....	29
24 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	CINCPAC.....	30
23 Nov.....	COM 12.....	OPNAV.....	31
24 Nov.....	CNO.....	CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 11, 12, 13, 15.....	32
24 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF.....	33
25 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	COM 12.....	34
27 Nov.....	OPNAV 388.....	COM ALNAL COAST FRON COM 14, 16, CINPAC, CINCAF.....	35
27 Nov.....	CNO.....	CINCAF, CINCPAC.....	36
27 Nov.....	OPNAV.....	COM 1-13, 15, NAVY YARD WASHING- TON, GOV GUAM & SOMOA.....	37
28 Nov.....	CNO.....	COM PNCP, COM PSNCP.....	38
2 Dec.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF.....	39
1 Dec.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, 16.....	40
3 Dec.....	OPNAV.....	CINCAF, COM 16.....	41
4 Dec.....	OPNAV.....	ALUSNA TOKYO, BANGKOK ASTA- LUSNA PEIPING, SHANGHAI.....	42
4 Dec.....	OPNAV.....	CO MARDET PEIPING CO MARDET TIENTSIN.....	43
4 Dec.....	OPNAV.....	NAVSTA GUAM.....	44
6 Dec.....	OPNAV.....	CINCPAC.....	45
6 Dec.....	COM 14.....	OPNAV.....	46

[1] Top Secret

1 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: Com all Nav Districts NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa

Info:

Ø12358

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities

in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

[2] Top Secret

4 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC CINCAF Com 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Info: CINCLANT COMBATFOR COMSCOFOR COMBASEFOR COMDTS Navy Yards Boston, Portsmouth, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Mare Island, Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, NAD Puget Sound, Mare Island, Oahu & Cavite.

041700

Except DESDIV 50 (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization.

At discretion fleet commanders will accept final increment of mobilization supply ammunition.

Strip ship in accordance with orders action ADDEES.

Ships assigned availability for drydocking at ADDEES discretion.

For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are not to return to mobilization ports on the continent.

[3] Confidential

18 April 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: ALUSNA Peiping; Astalusna Chungking; Astalusna Shanghai.

Info: CINCPAC; CINCAF; COMSIXTEEN.

181535

Include CINCPAC as information addressee in all despatch reports also furnish one copy of all intelligence reports plus present distribution direct to CINCPAC. Send them by way of issuing officer Comsixteen for secret and confidential and through Fleet Postoff Pearl for other.

[4] Top Secret

3 July 1941

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: CINCAF-CINCPAC-CINCLANT-COM 15 (Airmail) SPENAVD London

Info:

031939

[Paraphrase]

The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out, however the CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, army and air bases in Indo China. The neutrality pact with Russia will be abrogated and major military effort will be against their maritime provinces which will probably be toward the end of July though attack may be deferred until after collapse of European Russia. They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by 1 Aug. Movement of Jap flag shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned. Using utmost secrecy, inform principal Army commanders and your own immediate subordinates except Ghormley. Also British Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador.

Copy to

COS, US Army

OP-12

[5] Top Secret

3 July 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT COM 11-12-13-14-15-16; ALUSNA London: ALUSNA
Tokyo: ASTALUSNA Shanghai

Ø3213Ø

[Paraphrase]

Definite information has been received that between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Gov't has issued orders for 7 of the 11 Nip vessels now in the North Atlantic and Caribbean area to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under routine schedules three of the remaining ships will move to the Pacific during this same period. The one remaining ship, under routine movement, can be clear by July 22nd. Briefly, all Nipponese merchant vessels will be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22nd. In Jap business communities strong rumors are current that Russia will be attacked by Japan on July 2Øth. From unusually reliable Chinese sources it is stated that, within 2 weeks Japan will abrogate neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution of Jap Fleet appears normal and that it is capable of movement either north or south. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 2Øth dash August first, is indicated by the foregoing.

[6] Top secret

7 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cincpac

Ø7Ø224

Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329:

Japan directs eight Marus on East Coast United States rush cargo handling and proceed Colon Pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on following schedule: 16th, Tokai; 17th, Amagisan; 18th, Awajisan; 19th, Tosan; 2Øth, Kiyosumi; 21st, Kirishima; 22nd, Norfolk and Asuka X.

Tokyo to Berlin 2 July 585: (English text note to Ribbentrop in part)

"Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities regarding Soviet in order join forces with Germany in actively combatting Communist and destroying Communist system in eastern Siberia X at same time Japan cannot and will not relax efforts in the south to restrain Britain and United States X new Indo-China bases will intensify restraint and be vital contribution to Axis victory."

Berlin to Tokyo 2 July 825:

Oshima delivers above note and tells Ribbentrop in part, "Matsuoka will soon submit a decision X if you Germans had only let us know you were going to fight Russia so soon we might have been ready X We were planning to settle South Seas questions and China incident hence decision cannot be reached immediately, but Japan will not sit on fence while Germany fights Russia."

[7] Top secret

7 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cincpac

Ø7Ø243

Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 16 June 519:

Matsuoka requests Ribbentrop's aid in demand on French for following naval bases: "Saigon and Camranh"; and following air bases in southern French Indo-China: "Saigon, Bienhoa, Phnompenh, Kompontrach, Nhatrang, Soctrang, Touraine, Simreap" X Japan determined acquire above quickly, diplomatically

if possible or by force if necessary in order expand and strengthen them X Chief reason given is to prevent British moving in.

Berlin to Tokyo 21 June 739:

Ribbentrop reluctant to force issue now.

Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 22 June 549 and 246 respectively:

Matsuoka will negotiate directly with French X Repeats determination get bases soon.

Tokyo to Vichy 28 June 258:

French Indo-China base question this date receives Imperial sanction.

30 June 252:

Japan now considers it absolutely essential to force France accede to demands for above bases.

[8] Top secret

15 July 1941

From: Opnav

Action: Cincaf

Info: Cinpac

151924

Summary of Tokyo to Washington fifteen July three six eight X Relayed to London X Quote within next day or two Japan Vichy commercial negotiations begin X Japan will propose in name of mutual defense taking over southern French Indo China naval and air bases outlined in Jonab dated seven July X At same time Japan will attempt to station necessary army navy air forces in that area peacefully with French agreement if possible X If French object Japan has decided to use force X Japan does not intend move further south or interfere with colonial government X Move necessary to guarantee supplies from colony and Thailand and prevent Syrian type British action X Tokyo wishes avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United States if possible but risk is necessary unquote.

[9] Top secret

17 July 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info: CINCPAC

180300

Tokyo to Vichy twelve July two seven four and two seven five list six terms of ultimatum to be answered by twenty July x Japan will send necessary army navy air forces to southern French Indo China x French turn over naval and air bases listed in Jonab of seven July x expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely x French withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes x Vichy authorize French Indo China military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing x colony to pay Japan twenty three million piastres annually to meet cost of occupation xx Tokyo to Vichy fourteen July two eight one army now planning advance on or about twenty July xx Tokyo to Saigon and Hanoi sixteen July circular one five one eight formal demands presented to Vichy on fourteenth x reply asked by twentieth x Japan intends carry out plans by force if opposed or if British or United States interferes x Kanju Maru being held at Saigon to evacuate all Japanese there sailing early dawn twenty four July x burn codes x Japanese in northern area evacuate or move into Hanol.

[10] Top secret
19 July 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC
193230

Purple fourteen July Canton to Tokyo two five five quote information from military officials to attaches in Canton follows x one x the recent general mobilization order expresses Japans irrevocable resolution to end Anglo American assistance in thwarting Japans natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out with the backing of the Axis if possible but alone if necessary x formalities such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them were dispensed with to avoid alarm and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude x two x immediate object will be to attempt peaceful French Indo China occupation but will crush resistance if offered and set up martial law x secondly our purpose is to launch therefrom a rapid attack when the international situation is suitable x after occupation next on our schedule is sending ultimatum to Netherlands Indies x in the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part x Army will need only one division to seize Singapore and two divisions to seize Netherlands Indies x with air forces based on Canton comma Spratley comma Palau comma Singora in Thailand comma Portuguese Timor and Indo China and with submarine fleet in Mandates comma Hainan comma and Indo China we will crush British American military power and ability to assist in schemes against us x three x occupying force will be reorganized as twenty fifth Army corps of four divisions and also thirtieth Army corps consisting of South China forces to be assigned special duty with airplanes tanks and howitzers x General Iida in command will set up headquarters in Saigon x preparation complete x expedition will soon proceed from here unquote parenthesis note by Opnav it should be noted that above is not a directive but appears to express thinking and opinions of Canton orange military parenthesis.

[11] Top secret
19 July 1941
From: COM SIXTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC CINCAF
191514

Tokyo to met number fifteen sixty of nineteenth in prep affirm code states that although cabinet has changed there will of course be no departure from the principle that tripartite pact forms keystone of Japans national policy and new cabinet will also pursue policy of former cabinet in all other matters.

[12] Top secret
20 July 1941
From: COM 16
Action: CINCPAC ROUTINE, CINCAF ROUTINE, COM 14 ROUTINE, OPNAV
PRIORITY
Info:
2013356

Tokyo to Vichy number two nine five purple of nineteenth XX army has all preparations made XX have decided to advance on twenty fourth regardless of whether demands accepted or not X orders for advance will be issued on July twenty third Japanese time X remainder of message contains instructions to ambassador regarding exchange of official documents in case of acceptance X instructions regarding notifying Tokyo of Frances reply etcetera.

1400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[13] Top secret

25 July 1941

From: Chief of naval operations.

Action: Addressees as per attached list.

Info:

251600

At twelve hundred gct July twenty sixth 1941 execute wpl51 except the ninth to eighteenth words inclusive of task baker of paragraph seven the word United States being considered as one word X The excepted words will be executed at a later date after necessary arrangements have been made

Addressees for despatch concerning execution of wpl-51

By rapid communication means to:

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (require acknowledgement from this addressee).

Commander, Battleships, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet.

Commander, Transports, Atlantic Fleet.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda.

Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

Special Naval Observer, London.

U. S. Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada.

By registered air mail to:

President, Naval War College; Commandant, First Naval District; Commandant, Third Naval District; Commandant, Fourth Naval District; Commandant, Fifth Naval District; Commandant, Sixth Naval District; Commandant, Seventh Naval District; Commandant, Eighth Naval District; Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

By registered ordinary mail to:

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District; Commandant, Twelfth Naval District; Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District; Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

[14] Top secret

25 JULY 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

Action: CINCPAC CINCAF CINCLANT COM 15 SPENAVO London

Info:

252023

This is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X Appropriate Adees deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chauey in London XX You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan X It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material X It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X It is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present

be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X Action being initiated by the United States army to call the Philippine army into active service at an early date XX This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate navy and army subordinates X SPENAVO inform CNS but warn him against disclosure X Action addrees this dis are cincpac cinclant cincaf com fi'teen spenavo London

(Deliver one copy to War Plans Division U. S. Army)

[15] Top secret

14 AUGUST 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT

Info: COM 11-12-13-COM 14-15-16.

142155

Indications that orange ships formerly in North Atlantic and those on South Atlantic routes returning Japan via Magellan comma 4 tankers only vessels on Pacific coast, none enroute to USA, none North Atlantic, estimated 17 west coast of South America, none Los Angeles to Panama. Japanese rapidly completing withdrawal from world shipping routes. Scheduled sailings cancelled and majority ships in other than China and Japan seas areas home-ward bound. Resumption of shipping services indefinite result of USA, British and Dutch pressure through refusal of transit of Panama Canal, export control restrictions, refusal of bunkering and port facilities and fund freezing.

[16] Top Secret.

28 AUGUST 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCPAC Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.

Info: CINCLANT; SPENAVO. LON; Commander Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier; Commander Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier & COM 11.

282121

(Paraphrase)

Certain operations prescribed for the Atlantic by WPL 51 are hereby extended to areas of the Pacific Ocean as described herein in view of the destruction by raiders of merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean within the Western Hemisphere neutrality zone as defined in the declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939. Formal changes in WPL 51 will be issued but meanwhile action addressees will execute immediately the following instructions. CINCPAC constitute the Southeast Pacific Force consisting of two 7500 ton light cruisers and dispatch it to Balboa. For task purposes this force will operate directly under CNO after entering the Southeast Pacific sub area as defined in WPL 46 para 3222 except western limit is longitude 190 degrees west. Within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier and within the Southeast Pacific sub area the commander Panama naval coastal frontier and commander Southeast Pacific Force will in cooperation and acting under the strategic direction of the Chief of Naval Operations execute the following task colon Destroy surface raiders which attack or threaten United States flag shipping. Interpret an approach of surface raiders within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier or the Pacific Southeast sub area as a threat to United States flag shipping. XX For the present the forces concerned will base Balboa but CNO will endeavor to make arrangements for basing on South American ports as may be required XX Action Adees and commander Southeast Pacific Force inform CNO when these instructions have been placed in effect. XX

Distribution:

Copies to 12, 16, 20, 30, 38, 38W; WPD, U. S. Army; Brit. Nav. Staff in Washington.

1402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[17] Top Secret.

9 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: All U. S. holders of WPL fifty-two outside of Navy Department

Info:

082335

(Paraphrase)

On October 11th at 0200 GCT cancel WPL 51 and place WPL 52 in effect.

[18] Top Secret.

16 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (Acknowledge).

Info:

162203

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third Adees inform appropriate Army and Naval District authorities X Acknowledge XX

[19] Top Secret.

16 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV.

Action: All merchant ships.

Info:

162300

(Paraphrase)

The following despatch is for all United States merchant ships in the Pacific: There is a possibility of hostile action by Japan against U. S. shipping. United States merchant ships at sea in the Pacific proceed now as follows: In Chinese waters, China Sea or Dutch Indies waters, proceed immediately to Manila, Singapore, or a North Australian Port. In North Pacific westbound, except those bound to Vladivostok, proceed to Honolulu unless close to the Philippines, in the latter case proceed there. Ships bound for Vladivostok, proceed on voyage. If Honolulu bound continue voyage. If in North Pacific eastbound, continue voyage. If in South Pacific, continue voyage. Vessels operating coastwise off of South America or between the United States and the west coast of South America, continue voyage. All coastwise shipping eastern Pacific, continue voyage. Usual trade routes should be avoided.

[20] Top secret.

10/17/41.

From: OPNAV.

Action: NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA COM 11, 12, 13, 14 NAVDISTRICTS
CINCPAC CINCAF COM 15, 16.

Info:

162239.

Attention invited to OPNAV warning merchant vessels 162300 this date X Routing instructions will be sent you later.

[21] Top secret.

19-17-41.

From: OPNAV.

Action: CINCAF COM 12.

Info: COM 11, 15, 13, 16, 14 CINCPAC NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA ALUSNA
Melbourne and British Admiralty Delegation Washn.

162258.

(Paraphrase)

Effective immediately route all trans-Pacific U. S. flag shipping to and from the following areas Far East area plus Shanghai and India and East India area as defined in WPL 46 thru Torres Straits keeping to the southward and well clear of Orange mandates taking maximum advantage of Dutch and Australian patrolled areas X Make arrangements with Australian naval board for Torres Straits pilots.

[22] Top secret.

17 OCTOBER 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCPAC.

Info:

171458.

(Paraphrase)

Because of the great importance of continuing to reenforce the Philippines with long range Army bombers you are requested to take all practicable precautions for the safety of the airfields at Wake and Midway.

[23] Top secret

23 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: COM 12 COM 14 CINCPAC CINCAF COM 16.

Info: COM 11 COM 13 COM 15 NAVSTA GUAM.

222259

[Paraphrase]

Until further orders all army and navy transpacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo will be escorted both ways between Honolulu and Manila. Authorized route slow vessels in above categories which would unduly prolong voyage via Torres Straits without escort. To insure minimum demands for escort from Pacific fleet schedules must be arranged so that these ships proceed in company. CINCAF should take over escort when and where practicable as arranged between CINCPAC and CINCAF. General escorting other transpacific American flag shipping not considered warranted at this time in view of routing prescribed in my 162258. Where cargo in merchant bottoms for Guam is involved normal routing is authorized.

Cargo for Guam should be so assembled and loaded that a minimum number of ships be required to make that port. Reference COM 12 despatches to CINCPAC Nos. 212352 and 212358 and CINCAF confidential serial #1633.

[24] Top secret

4 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC; CINCAF; COM 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

Info:

941899

Japanese merchant vessels complete withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters appears in progress. Ships in area have departed or are preparing to depart except Naruto presently completing run from west coast of Mexico for South American ports. No ships presently reported en route from Japan.

1404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[25] Top secret

18 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14
Info:
181705

[Paraphrase]

In convoy with American flag vessels, placing of Bloemfontein is authorized. Until international conditions on and subsequent to 25 Nov. become defined and clarified however any further direct or great circle routing between Hawaii and Philippines should not repeat not be used. Until further advised by Dept. routes south of mandates should be prescribed.

[26] Top secret

20 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF, COMPACSO NAVCOASTAL FRONTIER.
Info: CINCPAC COM-14, COM-16
192235

Routing proposed by COM-14 150118 satisfactory. CINCAF and Comdr. Pacific southern naval coastal frontier coordinate routing to avoid congestion.

[27] Top secret

21 November 1941

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF
Info: Com 14, Com 16
211755

Reliable reports indicate the recent establishment by Japan of a combined air and surface craft patrol covering shipping routes from the U S to Australasia X Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from base at Jaluit X Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands X Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations X Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in areas vicinity Bathurst Island X Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres Strait X They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets X

[28] Top secret

22 November 41

From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCAF Com 12, 14, 16
220417

Manila convoy consisting Coast Farmer Admiral Halstead Chaumont Meigs Republic Holbrook Bloemfontein reporting Com fourteen with conflicting routings X Due depart Honolulu twentyseven November ten knots X First three ships have cargo for Guam and Chaumont personnel for Midway Wake X Last two cannot use Torres routing because limited fresh water radius X Only one cruiser detailed escort X In view above and information OPNAV 211755 consider route via Guam no additional hazard X Unless otherwise directed will instruct Com fourteen route all via northern route Chaumont departing two days early and joining convoy in vicinity Wake thence via Guam and San Bernardino X No escort for Chaumont as far as Wake considered necessary at present X Request CINCAF arrange escort Guam ships to Manila if delays discharging necessitate splitting convoy at Guam

[29] Top secret

22 November 1941

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
Info: CINCAF Com 12 Com 16 Com 14
221805

Urdis 220417 X Pacific situation unchanged comply my 181705 X Guam cargo should be sent Manila then transshipped for Guam X Make other arrangements

personnel in Chaumont for Midway and Wake X Bloemfontein and Holbrook obtain water en route at Tutuila Suva or other port as expedient

Ref: 11-664. Manila convoy consisting reporting Com 14 with conflicting orders for routing X

Ref: 11-533 Placing Bloemfontein in convoy . . . direct routes not to be used between Hawaii and Philippines

[30] Top secret

23 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC

Info: COM 16-12-14, CINCAF

221801

My dispatch 181705 and 192235. Move Point Baker further to south of Ellice Islands. Refer last sentence first mentioned dispatch routes south of mandates means through Torres Straits.

[31] Top secret

23 November 1941

From: COM 12

Action: OPNAV

Info: CINCPAC

230258

[Paraphrase]

Department dispatches apparently do not take cognizance of magnitude of Army troop movement directed by War Department from San Francisco by December 10 involving about 22 vessels including largest liners. Aside from troop transportation about 12 merchant on scheduled voyages ready to sail trans Pacific. Seven vessels already sailed. Com 12 organizing 17 knot convoy to depart San Francisco by December 8. Also planning 10 knot convoy to assemble Honolulu by December 15 routings prescribed eastward of Ellice Islands thence Torres Straits. Watering necessary practically all vessels especially troop transports. In view reports Japanese patrolling this area believe it vulnerable. Subject to further study believe routing south about Australia impracticable. If troop movement must be made at this time recommend great circle course to San Bernardino Strait with adequate fleet protection.

[32] Top secret

November 24, 1941

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Action: CINCAF CINCPAC COM11 COM12 COM13 COM15

Info: SPENAVO London CINCLANT

242005

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.

Copy to WPD, War Dept. and to Op-12 but no other distribution.

[33] Top secret

November 24, 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info: COM 16 ALUSNA, CHUNGKING, ASTALUSNA, SHANGHAI; ALUSNA, TOKYO; CINCPAC

242239

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addresses are often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature X Since Com 16

1406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to Com 16 for action OPNAV for information X After combining all incoming reports Com 16 direct dispatches to OPNAV info CINCPAC based on all information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity X Request CINCAF issue directive as necessary to fulfill general objective

[34] Top secret

25 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: COM 12

Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14, COM 16

252203

Route all transpacific shipping thru Torres Straits. CINCPAC and CINCAF provide necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.

[35] Top secret

27 November 1941

From: OPNAV 38S

Action: Commandants all Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF.

Info: CINCLANT

271519

On account of fact that existing and subsequent merchant ship codes may be compromised the use of secret positions in assignment of routes for merchant ships will be initiated as rapidly as possible and instructions for their use given to masters as this will enable directions for diversions to be given without disclosing to axis nations the location of our ships.

[36] Top secret

November 7, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO

272337

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD, War Dept.

[37] Top Secret

27 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: Coms 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-15 Navyyard Washn Governor Guam & Samoa

Info:

272338

(Paraphrase)

Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent probability extension orange operations X Publicity to be avoided.

[38] Top Secret

November 8, 1941

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: Com PNNCF Com PSNCF

Info: CINCPAC Com PNCF

290110

Refer to my 272338 X Army has sent following to commander western defense command quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers X Unquote XX WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific sub area and Panama naval coastal frontier X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur

[39] Top Secret

2 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info:

012356

(Paraphrase)

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this despatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "defense information patrol". Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by president as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out president's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both army and navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

[40] Top Secret

3 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action CINCAF, CINCPAC, Com 14, Com 16

Info:

031850

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong-kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X

[41] Top Secret
 3 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCAF, Com Sixteen
 Info: CINPAC, Com Fourteen
 031855

Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy Purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy Purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied

[42] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: ALUSNA Tokyo, ALUSNA Bankok, ASTALUSNA Peiping, ASTALUSNA Shanghai
 Info: CINCAF, ALUSNA Changking, Com 16
 040330

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word Jabberwock. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".

[43] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CO MARDET Peiping, CO MARDET Tientsin
 Info: CINCAF, Com 16
 040343

Destroy this system at discretion and send word Jabberwock when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by Mardets Peiping and Tientsin and reported by word "Boomerang" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.

[44] Top Secret
 4 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: NAVSTA Guam
 Info: CINCAF CINPAC Com 14 Com 16
 042017

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINPAC Com 14 Com 16 and OPNAV X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained

[45] Top Secret
 6 December 1941
 From: OPNAV
 Action: CINCPAC
 Info: CINCAF
 061743

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

[46] Top Secret.
December 6, 1941
From: COM FOURTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info:
060114

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

EXHIBIT NO. 38

[Copy]

Drafting Section:
Administrative
Drafting Officer
T. J. B.
G-2 File Number:

PARAPHRASE OF AN OUTGOING SECRET RADIOGRAM

No. 40, Sent Dec. 3, 1941

Date: December 3, 1941

To: Military Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.

Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador.

MILES

EXHIBIT NO. 39

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A. M., E. S. T., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,

Brigadier General,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

The attached message was taken personally by direction of the Chief of Staff to the War Department Message Center by Colonel Bratton, G-2, who gave it in person to the Message Center Chief, Colonel French, at 11:50 a. m., Decem-

ber 7. It was typed in Colonel Bratton's presence and delivered to the Code Clerk. Time of recording on the Message Center records is 12 noon, December 7.

Colonel Bratton asked Colonel French at this time how long it would take before the message was on the way. Colonel French replied that it would be on the way in ten minutes and that it would be in the hands of addressees within 30 minutes at the latest. Colonel Bratton reported these facts to the Chief of Staff.

The following is the log of the message:

	E. S.T.	Honolulu Time
Filed War Department Message Center-----	12:00 noon	6:30 AM
Sent <i>Western Union</i> -----	12:17 PM	6:47 AM
Received RCA, Honolulu-----		7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu -----		11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department-----		2:58 PM

The Message Center reports that a check from Honolulu indicates that on receipt this message was handed to an oriental messenger (statement Colonel French to Colonel Smith, Secretary, General Staff) for delivery by hand to Army Headquarters.

(Signed) W. B. Smith,
W. B. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a. m. We were almost immediately joined by Col. Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1:00 p. m. that day.

You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Col. Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply—1:00 p. m.—an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you thought we should send out warning as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied, you put down the telephone and said that the Admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Col. Bratton and I nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

You then wrote out the warning message. There was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.

At about this time General Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had some significance and warning messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your handwriting was then given to Col. Bratton to take immediately to the Message Center. (There was a little discussion here as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery. General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them to give first priority to the Philippines if there is a question of priority" or something to that

effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty.

Col. Bratton states that he looked at his watch on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a. m. He further states that the Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.

(Signed) Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

JUNE 8, 1942.

Memorandum for Brig. General W. B. Smith:

In connection with the request General Surles sent to you, I am sending you two files; one is the Log, which shows the record of messages received, etc., on December 7, 1941; the other file includes statements by different officers covering their recollections of occurrences on that date.

I understood from you that what Mr. Lindley was particularly interested in was what the situation was at the time the first word of the attack was received. Inasmuch as I was the only officer present in this office at the time, I present you with the following statement:

"On the morning of December 7th, I was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff doing some special work that I had been directed to do by General Marshall. He arrived at the office at about 10:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter and had a series of conferences with staff officers from G-2 and the War Plans Division. At about 12:00 o'clock he called me to his office and informed me that he expected to see the President that afternoon at about 3:00 o'clock and for me to arrange to keep the office open and have some of the commissioned and civilian personnel report for duty.

"At about 1:30 P. M. an enlisted man from the Navy rushed into my office out of breath, with a pencil note which was supposed to have been a message from the Navy radio operator at Honolulu and which said, as I recall: 'Pearl Harbor attacked. This is no drill.' I immediately telephoned General Marshall at his quarters at Fort Myer where he was having lunch and told him of the message. He directed me to contact Hawaii if possible and verify the message. Before I could do this another and more official message came, indicating the correctness of the first message that had been received. General Marshall was in his office within ten minutes after I telephoned him and after remaining in the office for a short period he went to the White House where he stayed until about 4:00 P. M."

Miss Nason does not recall a particular chronological record of events having been prepared or filed, but if the data I have furnished you here is not sufficient, I suggest that you talk to her and perhaps she will recall what you have in mind.

These files of course are very precious from the historical point of view and I would appreciate it if you would return them to this office just as soon as you have finished with them; also that you do not release any information contained in them until it has been cleared by the Chief of Staff.

(Initialed) JRD
J. R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Incls.

Secret folder on Hawaii
Log—Cpy #1
Memo. to Gen. WB Smith fr.
Gen. Surles 6/3/42

EXHIBIT NO. 40

COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED

FROM: CINCAP _____

TO: OPNAV _____

INFO: CINC PAC _____ REFERENCE NO.: 074845

MONTH: DEC. YEAR 1941

LEARN FROM SINGAPORE WE HAVE ASSURED BRITAIN
ARMED SUPPORT UNDER THREE OR FOUR EVENTUALITIES X
HAVE RECEIVED NO CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS
FROM YOU

TOP SECRET

[1]

EXHIBIT NO. 41

INFORMATION FROM DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON MESSAGES NO. D 901, 902, 907, 910

NOTE: Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)"; information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".

No. 901 (pilot message; Exhibit 1, p. 238)

	<i>Washington Time</i>
Filed by the Japanese 8:56 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (A & N) -----	6:56 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bain- bridge Island, Washington) 1215-1220 GMT 6 Dec (N) -	7:15-7:20 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N & A)	
Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy (A) -----	12:05 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A) -----	6 Dec

No. 902 (14 part memo; Exhibit 1, pp. 239-45)

Part 1

Filed by the Japanese 10:00 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) -----	8:00 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bain- bridge Island, Washington) 1303-1310 GMT 6 Dec (N) -	8:03-8:10 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)	
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 GMT 6 Dec (N) --	11:49 a. m. 6 Dec
Decoded ¹ and typed up at Navy (N) -----	6 Dec

¹ All parts of the message were in English, so that translation was not required.

1414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[2]

Part 2

Washington Time

Filed by the Japanese 10:30 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (N) -- 8:30 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted by Navy Station S 1337-1343 GMT
 6 Dec (N) ----- 8:37-8:43 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649
 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:49 a. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded² and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 3

Filed by the Japanese 10:40 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (N) -- 8:40 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S
 1349-1358 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 8:49-8:58 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 GMT
 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:49 a. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 4

Filed by the Japanese 11:55 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) --- 9:55 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S
 1505-1520 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 10:05-10:20 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649
 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:45 a. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

[3]

Part 5

Filed by the Japanese 11:59 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) --- 9:59 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1540-1546 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 10:40-10:46 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) ----- 6 Dec

Part 6

Filed by the Japanese 12:30 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N) -- 10:30 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1618-1624 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:18-11:24 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed up at Navy (N)

Part 7

Filed by the Japanese 1:07 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N) --- 11:07 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1605-1618 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:05-11:18 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed up at Navy (N)

Part 8

Filed by the Japanese 1:07 a. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo time (N) --- 11:07 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1640-1658 GMT 6 Dec (N) ----- 11:40-11:58 a. m. 6 Dec

² Actually the decode was on the basis of a teletype from Navy Station N (Cheltenham, Maryland), apparently received before teletype from Station S was received.

[4]

*Part 8 (Cont'd)**Washington Time*

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese Code in Navy Dept. 1951
 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed up at Navy (N)----- 6 Dec

Part 9

Filed by Japanese 11:55 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time
 (N)----- 9:55 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1530-1536 GMT 6 Dec----- 10:30-10:36 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Decoded by Army SIS (N)
 Typed at Navy (N)----- 6 Dec

Part 10

Filed by Japanese 11:59 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time
 (N)----- 9:59 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1517-1525 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 10:17-10:25 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Decoded by Army SIS (N)
 Typed at Navy (N)----- 6 Dec

Part 11

Filed by the Japanese 12:31 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo
 time (N)----- 10:31 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1607-1616 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 11:07-11:16 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951
 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed by Navy (N)----- 6 Dec

[5]

Part 12

Filed by the Japanese 12:49 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo
 time (N)----- 10:49 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1600-1608 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 11:00-11:08 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N).
 Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951
 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed by Navy (N)-----

Part 13

Filed by the Japanese 1:25 a. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo
 time (N)----- 11:25 a. m. 6 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 1635-1652 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 11:35-11:52 a. m. 6 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N).
 Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951
 GMT 6 Dec (N)----- 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
 Decoded and typed by Navy (N)----- 6 Dec

Part 14

Filed by the Japanese 4:38 p. m. 7 Dec Tokyo
 time (N)----- 2:38 a. m. 7 Dec
 Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
 0805-0810 GMT 7 Dec (N)----- 3:05-3:10 a. m. 7 Dec
 Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
 Decoded and typed by Navy (N)----- 7 Dec.

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No. 907 (one o'clock message; p. 248 Exhibit 1)

Filed by the Japanese 6:18 p. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo time (N)-----	Washington Time 4:18 a. m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 0937 GMT 7 Dec (N)-----	4:37 a. m. 7 Dec

[6] (Cont'd)

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)
Decoded by Navy (A)
Sent by Navy to Army SIS
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)----- 7 Dec

No. 910 (code destruction; p. 249 Exhibit 1)

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N & A)-----	4:44 a. m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) 1007 GMT 7 Dec (N)-----	5:07 a. m. 7 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)-----	
Decoded by Navy (A)-----	
Sent by Navy to Army SIS-----	
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A)-----	7 Dec

EXHIBIT NO. 42

¹ AR 10-15
1-2

Army Regulations
No. 10-15

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 18, 1936.

GENERAL STAFF ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL DUTIES

	Paragraphs
SECTION I. War Department General Staff-----	1-13
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Section I

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

	Paragraph
Chief of Staff, general duties-----	1
Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties-----	2
Secretary, general duties-----	3
War Department General Staff, general duties-----	4
Communication; general procedure-----	5
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Personnel Division, general duties-----	8
Military Intelligence Division, general duties-----	9
Operations and Training Division, general duties-----	10
Supply Division, general duties-----	11
War Plans Division, general duties-----	12
The General Council-----	13

1. Chief of Staff, general duties.—a. General.—The Chief of Staff is the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the military program. He will cause the War Department General Staff to prepare the necessary plans for recruiting, mobilizing, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training the Army of the United States for use in the national defense and for demobilization. As the agent, and in the name of the Secretary of War, he issues such orders as will insure that the plans of the War Department are harmoniously executed by all agencies of the Military Establishment, and that the military program is carried out speedily and efficiently.

¹ This pamphlet supersedes AR 10-15, November 25, 1921, including C5, July 2, 1927.

[2] b. As Commanding General of the Field Forces.—The Chief of Staff in addition to his duties as such, is, in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field operations and the general training of the several armies, of the oversea forces, and of GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the field forces after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a commanding general thereof.

2. Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties.—a. The Deputy Chief of Staff will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his absence. The Deputy Chief of Staff will report directly to the Secretary of War in all matters not involving the establishment of important policies.

His office is charged with the preparations of plans and policies in connection with legislation and with military estimates for funds; with processing budgetary matters in the General Staff; with reports concerning legislation and requests for legislation that come within the purview of The General Council or that are referred to the General Staff; *with public relations to include all forms of publicity*; ² and with such other duties as the Chief of Staff may prescribe.

b. In addition to his other duties the Deputy Chief of Staff is charged with supervision over the activities of all the divisions of the War Department General Staff.

3. Secretary, general duties.—The Secretary of the General Staff will maintain an office of temporary record for the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff. He will transmit to the proper destination in the War Department, all papers emanating or returning from the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff. Under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, he will collect statistical information of military importance for the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

4. War Department General Staff, general duties.—a. The War Department General Staff is charged with the preparation in time of peace of the plans outlined in paragraph 1. In a national emergency it is charged with the creation and maintenance of the necessary and proper forces for use in the field. To this end it will, under the Chief of Staff, coordinate the development in peace and war of the separate arms and services so as to insure the existence of a well-balanced and efficient military team. Assisted by an appropriate number of National Guard and Reserve officers (as prescribed in sec. 5, act June 3, 1916 (39 Stat. 167), as amended by sec. 5, act June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 763), as amended by sec. 2, act June 15, 1933 (48 Stat. 153) (U. S. C. 10:38; secs. 1258 and 1339, M. L., 1929)), it will formulate all policies and regulations affecting the organization, distribution, and training of the National Guard of the United States, Officers' Reserve Corps and the Organized Reserves, and all policies and regulations affecting the appointment, assignment, promotion, and discharge of Reserve officers. It will perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President, and will render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

[3] b. The divisions and subdivisions of the War Department General Staff will not engage in administrative duties for the performance of which an agency exists, but will confine themselves to the preparation of plans and policies (particularly those concerning mobilization) and to the supervision of the execution of such plans and policies as may be approved by the Secretary of War.

c. All divisions of the General Staff, and all other agencies in the military service, are charged with the collection and transmission to The Adjutant General for the use of the historical section, Army War College, of such military records and historical data as become available incident to their work.

5. Communication; general procedure.—a. The chiefs of the several arms, services, and bureaus of the War Department and of the several divisions of the War Department General Staff, or of subdivisions thereof, are authorized and expected to communicate ~~informally~~³ with each other concerning matters over which they severally have supervision, ~~but formal opinions of The Judge Advocate General should be obtained through The Adjutant General.~~ *The Secretary of War, Under Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, or any Assistant Chief of Staff may directly request and receive an opinion of The Judge Advocate General, but when such an opinion is requested by the chief of an arm, service, or bureau of the War Department, the opinion when rendered will be sent to The Adjutant General.*³

² WD Cir 81, 30 July 40.

³ WD Cir 77, 19 Apr 41.

b. Approved memoranda, or excerpts therefrom, establishing policies will, except in highly confidential cases, be furnished by the chief of division of the War Department General Staff charged with supervision over the activity covered by the particular memorandum to The Adjutant General, who will furnish copies to other interested arms, services, and bureaus.

c. When a case arises which is covered by an approved policy, the proper office will take appropriate action on the case in accordance with the policy, and it will not be referred to the War Department General Staff for decision except in cases of unusual importance or when an exception to the established policy appears desirable.

[4] d. Papers requiring General Staff action which reach the office of The Adjutant General will be sent directly to the division of the War Department General Staff concerned.

6. Issuance of instructions.—The Deputy Chief of Staff and the assistant chiefs of staff, in charge of the divisions of the General Staff hereinafter provided for, are authorized on matters under their supervision to issue instructions in the name of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

7. Organizations; designations.—a. The War Department General Staff will include the following divisions, each division being under the immediate control of an assistant chief of staff:

- (1) Personnel Division (First Division).
- (2) Military Intelligence Division (Second Division).
- (3) Operations and Training Division (Third Division).
- (4) Supply Division (Fourth Division).
- (5) War Plans Division.

b. For the first four divisions the abbreviations G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, respectively, are prescribed. The prescribed abbreviation for the War Plans Division is WPD.

c. The chiefs of the several divisions of the War Department General Staff will be designated as assistant chiefs of staff; the prescribed abbreviations will be A. C. of S. followed by the prescribed abbreviation of the division.

d. (1) The interior organization of each division will be prescribed by its chief in such a way as to facilitate the performance of the functions assigned and the easy transition from a peace to war status.

(2) The War Plans Division will, in the event of mobilization of General Headquarters, be increased by one or more officers from each of the other General Staff divisions, so as to enable it to furnish the nucleus of the General Staff of the General Headquarters. The necessary General Staff personnel, in addition to the above required for General Headquarters, will, insofar as practicable, be obtained from personnel with General Staff experience and personnel of the Army War College, which will upon mobilization temporarily suspend its course. In carrying out the above provisions care will be taken to insure that no disruption of the War Department General Staff, or of any division thereof, occurs due to the excessive removal of personnel therefrom.

8. Personnel Division, general duties.—a. The Personnel Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the personnel of the Army as individuals.

[5] b. The Personnel Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

(1) The procurement, classification, assignment, promotion, pay,⁴ transfer, retirement, and discharge, in peace and war, of all personnel of the Army of the United States, including the Regular Army, the National Guard, the Organized Reserves, the Officers' Reserve Corps, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps.

(2) Measures for conserving man power.

(3) Replacements of personnel, in accordance with priorities formulated by G-3.

(4) Army Regulations, uniform regulations, and such general regulations as especially concern individuals or matters of routine not specifically assigned to other sections.

(5) Decorations.

(6) Religious, recreational, and morale work (except that all programs of time allotted will be arranged in agreement with G-3).

(7) The Red Cross and similar agencies with the exception of such part or parts of said agencies as may be wholly devoted to hospital and medical relief work.

⁴ C 2, 10 Oct 39.

(8) Enemy aliens, prisoners of war, and conscientious objectors, including their security.

(9) *Mobilization of military police units as part of station complements for local security.*⁵

c. The Personnel Division is further charged with furnishing G-4 with information as to the amount and location of shelter necessary for activities under its supervision.

d. The functions of the War Department General Staff with reference to the selection, assignment, etc., of General Staff officers will be performed by the Personnel Division, subject to the proviso that no officer will be assigned to, or relieved from, either the War Department General Staff or the General Staff with troops without the personal approval of the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff.

[6] 9. Military Intelligence Division, general duties.—a. The Military Intelligence Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information.

b. The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning—

(1) Military topographical surveys and maps, including their *acquisition*,¹ reproduction and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).

(2) The custody of the General Staff War Department map and photograph collection.⁴

(3) Military attaches, observers, and foreign-language students.

(4) Intelligence personnel of all units.

(5) Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the Government and with duly accredited foreign military attaches and missions.

(6) Codes and ciphers.

(7) Translations.

(8) ~~Public relations, to include all forms of publicity.~~ See AR 600-700.²

(9) Censorship in time of war.

(10) *Safeguarding of military information.*⁴

10. Operations and Training Division, general duties.—a. The Operations and Training Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the organization, training, and operation of the military forces, and which are not hereinafter expressly assigned to the War Plans Division.

b. The Operations and Training Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

(1) Organization, including Tables of Organization, for all branches of the Army of the United States.

[7] (2) Assignment of units to higher organizations.

(3) So much of Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equipment as relate to the allotment of major items of equipment to units and the distribution of such items within units.

(4) Distribution and training, including educational and vocational training of the Army of the United States, including the National Guard and Organized Reserves; location of units of the Regular Army and Organized Reserves.

(5) All training and tactical publications.

(6) The United States Military Academy; special service schools; The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and The Army War College.

(7) Military training in civilian institutions and in civilian training camps.

(8) Consultation with G-4 on types of equipment, and on major items such as guns, rifles, tanks, etc., consultation with WPD.

(9) Priorities in assigning replacements and equipment, and important priorities affecting mobilization.

(10) Movement of troops, to include those necessary in the execution of the approved plan of strategical deployment prepared by the War Plans Division (movements of supply, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat units to be made on request of G-4).

¹ WD Cir 81, 30 July 40.

² C 2, 10 Oct 39.

³ WD Cir 152, 31 July 41.

(11) ~~Military police.~~ *Mobilization of military police units, zone of the interior.*⁵

(12) The system of military publications.

(13) *Maneuvers, command post exercises, terrain exercises, and staff rides, including joint anti-aircraft and air exercises and joint Army and Navy exercises. (Exercises involving tests of war plans will be planned in collaboration with the War Plans Division.)*⁶

11. Supply Division, general duties.—a. The Supply Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the supply of the Army.

b. The Supply Division is specifically charged with the duty of preparing basic supply plans in such detail as will enable the several [8] supply arms and services of the Army to prepare detailed plans for the accomplishment of their several missions and with the adjustment of such basic plans to meet the changing military needs and the limitations of appropriations or procurement possibilities.

In the development of the detailed plans the arms and services will request decisions on military questions from the Supply Division, General Staff, and decisions on business or industrial questions from the Assistant Secretary of War.

c. The Supply Division is also charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

(1) Distribution, storage, and issue of supplies.

(2) Transportation by land and water, including ports of embarkation and their necessary auxiliaries.

(3) Traffic control (the police of roads and routes to be ordered by G-3 on plans formulated by G-4).

(4) Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equipment, the quantities and types of military supplies required for the use of the Army and essential to the military program, time and priorities of delivery pertaining thereto, types and priorities to be determined in agreement with G-3 and in the case of major items in consultation also with WPD; Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equipment to be in agreement with G-3 insofar as concerns allotment and distribution of major items.

(5) Inventions.

(6) Leasing of War Department facilities and issuing of revocable licenses.

(7) Hospitalization and evacuation of men and animals, including such agencies or parts of agencies as may be wholly devoted to hospital and medical relief work.

(8) Distribution and movement of supply, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat units (orders for movements to be issued by G-3 on request).

(9) Property responsibility and accountability.

d. The Supply Division is further charged, in coordination with other divisions of the War Department General Staff, with the determination and statement of plans and policies governing the preparation of estimates for funds for military purposes and priorities pertaining thereto, and, when necessary, with the restatement of such priorities to govern the expenditure of all funds appropriated.

[9] e. The Supply Division is also charged with the formulation of policies and projects governing—

(1) The procurement of real estate in connection with the training, shelter, and housing of troops, and with the storage, distribution, and issue of supplies.

(2) The procurement (not involving procurement of real estate), construction, repair, maintenance, and disposition of buildings and all utilities connected therewith (except insofar as relates solely to procurement).

12. War Plans Division, general duties.—a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

(1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications.

⁵ WD Cir 152, 31 July 41.

⁶ WD Cir 33, 28 Feb 41.

(2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense.

(3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division).

(4) Actual operations in the theater of war.

(5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the Supply Division on major items of equipment.

(6) Peace maneuvers, command post exercises, terrain exercises, and staff rides involving units higher than an army, joint Army and Navy exercises, and exercises involving tests of war plans.⁵

13 The General Council.—a. Creation and function.—For the purpose of periodically reviewing and properly coordinating all major War Department projects, and passing on matters of current policy, there is hereby created under the Chief of Staff, The General Council.

b. Composition.

(1) The General Council will be composed of the Deputy Chief of Staff, who will be president of The General Council, the [10] assistant chiefs of staff, and the executive officer of the Assistant Secretary of War.

(2) The Adjutant General, the chiefs of arms and other services, the Commandant of the Army War College, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Executive for Reserve Affairs, Office of the Chief of Staff will be directed to sit as members of The General Council during the discussion of any important subject bearing upon their individual responsibilities. They may elect to sit during the discussion of any important subject in which they are interested.

c. Secretary; records.—The Secretary of the General Staff will act as secretary for The General Council. No records will be kept except those necessary to record dates of meetings, officers present, questions considered, and action taken. In the absence of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the senior assistant chief of staff present will preside.

d. Recommendations.—The General Council will report its recommendations to the Chief of Staff.

e. Relations with the War Council.—When important matters of General Staff policy are brought before The War Council, the Chief of Staff will present the recommendations of The General Council thereon.

Section II

GENERAL STAFF WITH TROOPS

Organization; distribution of duties----- Paragraph 14

14. Organization; distribution of duties.—(As changed by C 1, April 16, 1938.)⁴ The general staff at each headquarters will be organized into four ~~divisions~~ sections.⁴ The duties performed by these ~~divisions~~ sections⁴ will be similar to those performed by the first four divisions of the War Department General Staff and are prescribed in Staff Officers' Field Manual, ~~Part One~~.⁴ For war planning, see AR 160-10. Mobilization planning is a function of the General Staff general staff⁴ as a whole and not of any particular ~~division~~ section⁴ thereof.

[A. G. 320.2 (5-25-36).]

By order of the Secretary of War:

Official:

E. T. CONLEY,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

⁴ C 2, 10 Oct 39.

⁵ WD Cir 33, 28 Feb 41.

EXHIBIT NO. 43

Serial 011512-3

27-1-41 Secret

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States are aware of the advantages that will accrue to both nations in the prosecution of any war in which the United States and the British Commonwealth may participate as associates, should tentative understandings be reached in advance concerning military cooperation. Therefore, they have prepared this statement in the hope that it will clear the way for the discussions which are to follow.

2. As understood by these two officers, the purpose of these staff conversations is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war, and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained, it must be supported by their responsible military and naval authorities. Therefore, no specific commitments can now be made except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisaged must, for the present, remain contingent upon the future political action of both nations. All such plans are subject to eventual official approval by the two Governments.

4. The present national position of the United States is as follows:

(a) A fundamental principle of United States policy is that the Western Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American military and political control.

(b) The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war against Germany.

(c) The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory.

5. If the United States Government decides to make war in common with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that:

(a) The broad military objective of United States operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily must also maintain dispositions which, under all eventualities, will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.

(b) The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions.

(c) The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or from attacking the Dutch.

(d) Should Japan enter the war, United States' operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.


(e) As a general rule, United States forces should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived from United States-British joint plans.

(f) The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain, but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportion as to provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany.

6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination of those military efforts which will contribute most directly to the defeat of Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation, tentative agreements should be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations. Staff conversations should also include an examination into the present military situations of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situations that might result from the loss of the British Isles.

7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if the British Staff Representatives could furnish the United States Staff Representatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth as a preliminary to the staff discussions.

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